[PATCH 0/3 V2] Add AMD SEV and SEV-ES intra host migration support

[PATCH 0/3 V2] Add AMD SEV and SEV-ES intra host migration support

[Peter Gonda]

Intra host migration provides a low-cost mechanism for userspace VMM upgrades.
It is an alternative to traditional (i.e., remote) live migration. Whereas
remote migration handles move a guest to a new host, intra host migration only
handles moving a guest to a new userspace VMM within a host.  This can be
used to update, rollback, change flags of the VMM, etc. The lower cost
compared to live migration comes from the fact that the guest's memory does
not need to be copied between processes. A handle to the guest memory
simply gets passed to the new VMM, this could be done via using /dev/shm
with share=on or similar feature.

The guest state can be transferred from an old VMM to a new VMM as follows:
1. Export guest state from KVM to the old user-space VMM via a getter
user-space/kernel API 2. Transfer guest state from old VMM to new VMM via
IPC communication 3. Import guest state into KVM from the new user-space
VMM via a setter user-space/kernel API VMMs by exporting from KVM using
getters, sending that data to the new VMM, then setting it again in KVM.

In the common case for intra host migration, we can rely on the normal ioctls
for passing data from one VMM to the next. SEV, SEV-ES, and other
confidential compute environments make most of this information opaque, and
render KVM ioctls such as "KVM_GET_REGS" irrelevant.  As a result, we need
the ability to pass this opaque metadata from one VMM to the next. The
easiest way to do this is to leave this data in the kernel, and transfer
ownership of the metadata from one KVM VM (or vCPU) to the next. For
example, we need to move the SEV enabled ASID, VMSAs, and GHCB metadata
from one VMM to the next.  In general, we need to be able to hand off any
data that would be unsafe/impossible for the kernel to hand directly to
userspace (and cannot be reproduced using data that can be handed safely to
userspace).

During the intra host send operation the SEV required metadata, the guest's
ASID is loaded into a kvm wide hashmap keyed by a value given by
userspace. This allows the userspace VMM to pass the key to the target
VMM. Then on intra host receive the target VMM can be loaded with the
metadata from the hashmap.

v2:
 * Added marcorr@ reviewed by tag
 * Renamed function introduced in 1/3
 * Edited with seanjc@'s review comments
 ** Cleaned up WARN usage
 ** Userspace makes random token now
 * Edited with brijesh.singh@'s review comments
 ** Checks for different LAUNCH_* states in send function

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210621163118.1040170-1-pgonda@google.com/

Peter Gonda (3):
  KVM, SEV: Refactor out function for unregistering encrypted regions
  KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration
  KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration

 .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  43 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 396 +++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  12 +
 4 files changed, 433 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

base-commit: 7caa04b36f20

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

-- 
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

[PATCH 1/3 V2] KVM, SEV: Refactor out function for unregistering encrypted regions

[Peter Gonda]

Factor out helper function for freeing the encrypted region list.

Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 8d36f0c73071..78fea9c4048d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1775,11 +1775,25 @@ int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void unregister_enc_regions(struct kvm *kvm,
+					    struct list_head *mem_regions)
+{
+	struct enc_region *pos, *q;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
+	if (list_empty(mem_regions))
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, q, mem_regions, list) {
+		__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, pos);
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+}
+
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
-	struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
-	struct list_head *pos, *q;
 
 	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
 		return;
@@ -1803,13 +1817,7 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 	 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
 	 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
 	 */
-	if (!list_empty(head)) {
-		list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
-			__unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
-				list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
-			cond_resched();
-		}
-	}
+	unregister_enc_regions(kvm, &sev->regions_list);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
-- 
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

[PATCH 2/3 V2] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration

[Peter Gonda]

For SEV to work with intra host migration, contents of the SEV info struct
such as the ASID (used to index the encryption key in the AMD SP) and
the list of memory regions need to be transferred to the target VM.
This change adds commands for sending and receiving the sev info.

To avoid exposing this internal state to userspace and prevent other
processes from importing state they shouldn't have access to, the send
returns a token to userspace that is handed off to the target VM. The
target passes in this token to receive the sent state. The token is only
valid for one-time use. Functionality on the source becomes limited
after send has been performed. If the source is destroyed before the
target has received, the token becomes invalid.

The target is expected to be initialized (sev_guest_init), but not
launched state (sev_launch_start) when performing receive. Once the
target has received, it will be in a launched state and will not
need to perform the typical SEV launch commands.

Co-developed-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  43 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 248 +++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  12 +
 4 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 5c081c8c7164..eac5d6e2ef11 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -427,6 +427,49 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
 
+10. KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_SEND
+----------------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_SEND command is used to stage the VM's SEV info
+for the purposes of migrating memory to a new local VM while using the same SEV
+key. If the source VM is destroyed before the staged info has been received by
+the target, the info is lost. Once the info has been staged, only commands
+KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT, and KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
+can be used by the source.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_intra_host_send
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+    struct kvm_sev_intra_host_send {
+        __u64 info_token;    /* token referencing the staged info */
+    };
+
+11. KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE
+-------------------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE command is used to transfer staged SEV
+info to a target VM from some source VM. SEV on the target VM should be active
+when receive is performed, but not yet launched and without any pinned memory.
+The launch commands should be skipped after receive because they should have
+already been performed on the source.
+
+Parameters (in/out): struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+    struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive {
+        __u64 info_token;    /* token referencing the staged info */
+        __u32 handle;        /* guest handle */
+    };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains the handle for this SEV guest.
+
+
 References
 ==========
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 78fea9c4048d..03b5e690ca56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/processor.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
@@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 #define sev_es_enabled false
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
+#define MAX_RAND_RETRY    3
+
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
@@ -74,6 +77,22 @@ struct enc_region {
 	unsigned long size;
 };
 
+struct sev_info_migration_node {
+	struct hlist_node hnode;
+	u64 token;
+	bool valid;
+
+	unsigned int asid;
+	unsigned int handle;
+	unsigned long pages_locked;
+	struct list_head regions_list;
+	struct misc_cg *misc_cg;
+};
+
+#define SEV_INFO_MIGRATION_HASH_BITS    7
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(sev_info_migration_hash, SEV_INFO_MIGRATION_HASH_BITS);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+
 /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
 static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
 {
@@ -1104,6 +1123,160 @@ static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static struct sev_info_migration_node *find_migration_info(unsigned long token)
+{
+	struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
+
+	hash_for_each_possible(sev_info_migration_hash, entry, hnode, token) {
+		if (entry->token == token)
+			return entry;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Places @entry into the |sev_info_migration_hash|. Returns 0 if successful
+ * and ownership of @entry is transferred to the hashmap.
+ */
+static int place_migration_node(struct sev_info_migration_node *entry)
+{
+	int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+	if (find_migration_info(entry->token))
+		goto out;
+
+	entry->valid = true;
+
+	hash_add(sev_info_migration_hash, &entry->hnode, entry->token);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_intra_host_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
+	struct kvm_sev_intra_host_send params;
+	int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (sev->es_active)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (sev->handle == 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (sev->info_token != 0)
+		return -EEXIST;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			   sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (params.info_token == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	entry->asid = sev->asid;
+	entry->handle = sev->handle;
+	entry->pages_locked = sev->pages_locked;
+	entry->misc_cg = sev->misc_cg;
+	entry->token = params.info_token;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->regions_list);
+	list_replace_init(&sev->regions_list, &entry->regions_list);
+
+	if (place_migration_node(entry))
+		goto e_listdel;
+
+	sev->info_token = entry->token;
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_listdel:
+	list_replace_init(&entry->regions_list, &sev->regions_list);
+
+	kfree(entry);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_intra_host_receive(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_info_migration_node *entry;
+	struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive params;
+	struct kvm_sev_info old_info;
+	void __user *user_param = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (sev->es_active)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (sev->handle != 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!list_empty(&sev->regions_list))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, user_param, sizeof(params)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+	entry = find_migration_info(params.info_token);
+	if (!entry || !entry->valid)
+		goto err_unlock;
+
+	memcpy(&old_info, sev, sizeof(old_info));
+
+	/*
+	 * The source VM always frees @entry On the target we simply
+	 * mark the token as invalid to notify the source the sev info
+	 * has been moved successfully.
+	 */
+	entry->valid = false;
+	sev->active = true;
+	sev->asid = entry->asid;
+	sev->handle = entry->handle;
+	sev->pages_locked = entry->pages_locked;
+	sev->misc_cg = entry->misc_cg;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
+	list_replace_init(&entry->regions_list, &sev->regions_list);
+
+	spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+
+	params.handle = sev->handle;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(user_param, &params, sizeof(params))) {
+		list_replace_init(&sev->regions_list, &entry->regions_list);
+		entry->valid = true;
+		memcpy(sev, &old_info, sizeof(*sev));
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	sev_asid_free(&old_info);
+	return 0;
+
+err_unlock:
+	spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
 static int
 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
@@ -1499,6 +1672,19 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static bool is_intra_host_mig_active(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.info_token;
+}
+
+static bool cmd_allowed_during_intra_host_mig(u32 cmd_id)
+{
+	if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1521,6 +1707,17 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * If this VM has started exporting its SEV contents to another VM,
+	 * it's not allowed to do any more SEV operations that may modify the
+	 * SEV state.
+	 */
+	if (is_intra_host_mig_active(kvm) &&
+	    !cmd_allowed_during_intra_host_mig(sev_cmd.id)) {
+		r = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	switch (sev_cmd.id) {
 	case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
 		if (!sev_es_enabled) {
@@ -1561,6 +1758,12 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
 		r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_SEND:
+		r = sev_intra_host_send(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE:
+		r = sev_intra_host_receive(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
 		r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
@@ -1794,6 +1997,7 @@ static void unregister_enc_regions(struct kvm *kvm,
 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_info_migration_node *mig_entry;
 
 	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
 		return;
@@ -1804,25 +2008,49 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-
 	/*
-	 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
-	 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
-	 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
+	 * If userspace has requested that we migrate the SEV info to a new VM,
+	 * then we own and must remove an entry node in the tracking data
+	 * structure. Whether we clean up the data in our SEV info struct and
+	 * entry node depends on whether userspace has done the migration,
+	 * which transfers ownership to a new VM. We can identify that
+	 * migration has occurred by checking if the node is marked invalid.
 	 */
-	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+	if (sev->info_token != 0) {
+		spin_lock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+		mig_entry = find_migration_info(sev->info_token);
+		if (!WARN_ON(!mig_entry))
+			hash_del(&mig_entry->hnode);
+		spin_unlock(&sev_info_migration_hash_lock);
+	} else
+		mig_entry = NULL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
 	/*
-	 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
-	 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
+	 * Adding memory regions after a intra host send has started
+	 * is dangerous.
 	 */
+	WARN_ON(sev->info_token && !list_empty(&sev->regions_list));
 	unregister_enc_regions(kvm, &sev->regions_list);
 
+	if (mig_entry)
+		unregister_enc_regions(kvm, &mig_entry->regions_list);
+
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
-	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
-	sev_asid_free(sev);
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
+	 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
+	 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
+	 */
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+	if (!mig_entry || !mig_entry->valid) {
+		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
+		sev_asid_free(sev);
+	}
+
+	kfree(mig_entry);
 }
 
 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index f89b623bb591..559ce44682a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	u64 ap_jump_table;	/* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
 	struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */
 	struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */
+	u64 info_token; /* Token for SEV info intra host migration */
 };
 
 struct kvm_svm {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 68c9e6d8bbda..01a42a7134af 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1709,6 +1709,9 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
 	KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT,
 	/* Guest Migration Extension */
 	KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL,
+	/* Intra host migration commands */
+	KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_SEND,
+	KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE,
 
 	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
 };
@@ -1806,6 +1809,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {
 	__u32 trans_len;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_intra_host_send {
+	__u64 info_token;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive {
+	__u64 info_token;
+	__u32 handle;
+};
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
-- 
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

[PATCH 3/3 V2] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration

[Peter Gonda]

For SEV-ES to work with intra host migration the VMSAs, GHCB metadata,
and other SEV-ES info needs to be preserved along with the guest's
memory.

Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 132 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 03b5e690ca56..e292e2cd7c99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -77,6 +77,19 @@ struct enc_region {
 	unsigned long size;
 };
 
+struct vmsa_node {
+	struct list_head list;
+	int vcpu_id;
+	struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	u64 ghcb_gpa;
+
+	void *ghcb_sa;
+	u64 ghcb_sa_len;
+	bool ghcb_sa_sync;
+	bool ghcb_sa_free;
+};
+
 struct sev_info_migration_node {
 	struct hlist_node hnode;
 	u64 token;
@@ -87,6 +100,11 @@ struct sev_info_migration_node {
 	unsigned long pages_locked;
 	struct list_head regions_list;
 	struct misc_cg *misc_cg;
+
+	/* The following fields are for SEV-ES guests */
+	bool es_enabled;
+	struct list_head vmsa_list;
+	u64 ap_jump_table;
 };
 
 #define SEV_INFO_MIGRATION_HASH_BITS    7
@@ -1157,6 +1175,84 @@ static int place_migration_node(struct sev_info_migration_node *entry)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void process_vmsa_list(struct kvm *kvm, struct list_head *vmsa_list)
+{
+	struct vmsa_node *vmsa_node, *q;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Move any stashed VMSAs back to their respective VMCBs and delete
+	 * those nodes.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(vmsa_node, q, vmsa_list, list) {
+		vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(kvm, vmsa_node->vcpu_id);
+		if (WARN_ON(!vcpu))
+			continue;
+
+		svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+		svm->vmsa = vmsa_node->vmsa;
+		svm->ghcb = vmsa_node->ghcb;
+		svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = vmsa_node->ghcb_gpa;
+		svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
+		svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->vmsa);
+		svm->ghcb_sa = vmsa_node->ghcb_sa;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_len = vmsa_node->ghcb_sa_len;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_sync = vmsa_node->ghcb_sa_sync;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_free = vmsa_node->ghcb_sa_free;
+
+		list_del(&vmsa_node->list);
+		kfree(vmsa_node);
+	}
+}
+
+static int create_vmsa_list(struct kvm *kvm,
+			    struct sev_info_migration_node *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+	const int num_vcpus = atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus);
+	struct vmsa_node *node;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->vmsa_list);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_vcpus; ++i) {
+		node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!node)
+			goto e_freelist;
+
+		vcpu = kvm->vcpus[i];
+		if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+			goto e_freelist;
+
+		node->vcpu_id = vcpu->vcpu_id;
+		svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+		node->vmsa = svm->vmsa;
+		svm->vmsa = NULL;
+		node->ghcb = svm->ghcb;
+		svm->ghcb = NULL;
+		node->ghcb_gpa = svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
+		node->ghcb_sa = svm->ghcb_sa;
+		svm->ghcb_sa = NULL;
+		node->ghcb_sa_len = svm->ghcb_sa_len;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_len = 0;
+		node->ghcb_sa_sync = svm->ghcb_sa_sync;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_sync = false;
+		node->ghcb_sa_free = svm->ghcb_sa_free;
+		svm->ghcb_sa_free = false;
+
+		list_add_tail(&node->list, &entry->vmsa_list);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_freelist:
+	process_vmsa_list(kvm, &entry->vmsa_list);
+	return -1;
+}
+
 static int sev_intra_host_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
@@ -1167,9 +1263,6 @@ static int sev_intra_host_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
-	if (sev->es_active)
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (sev->handle == 0)
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -1196,13 +1289,28 @@ static int sev_intra_host_send(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->regions_list);
 	list_replace_init(&sev->regions_list, &entry->regions_list);
 
+	if (sev_es_guest(kvm)) {
+		/*
+		 * If this is an ES guest, we need to move each VMCB's VMSA into a
+		 * list for migration.
+		 */
+		entry->es_enabled = true;
+		entry->ap_jump_table = sev->ap_jump_table;
+		if (create_vmsa_list(kvm, entry))
+			goto e_listdel;
+	}
+
 	if (place_migration_node(entry))
-		goto e_listdel;
+		goto e_vmsadel;
 
 	sev->info_token = entry->token;
 
 	return 0;
 
+e_vmsadel:
+	if (sev_es_guest(kvm))
+		process_vmsa_list(kvm, &entry->vmsa_list);
+
 e_listdel:
 	list_replace_init(&entry->regions_list, &sev->regions_list);
 
@@ -1223,9 +1331,6 @@ static int sev_intra_host_receive(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
 		return -ENOTTY;
 
-	if (sev->es_active)
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (sev->handle != 0)
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -1242,6 +1347,13 @@ static int sev_intra_host_receive(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 	memcpy(&old_info, sev, sizeof(old_info));
 
+	if (entry->es_enabled) {
+		process_vmsa_list(kvm, &entry->vmsa_list);
+
+		sev->es_active = true;
+		sev->ap_jump_table = entry->ap_jump_table;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The source VM always frees @entry On the target we simply
 	 * mark the token as invalid to notify the source the sev info
@@ -2034,8 +2146,16 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 	WARN_ON(sev->info_token && !list_empty(&sev->regions_list));
 	unregister_enc_regions(kvm, &sev->regions_list);
 
-	if (mig_entry)
+	if (mig_entry) {
+		/*
+		 * If there are any saved VMSAs, restore them so they can be
+		 * destructed through the normal path.
+		 */
+		if (mig_entry->es_enabled)
+			process_vmsa_list(kvm, &mig_entry->vmsa_list);
+
 		unregister_enc_regions(kvm, &mig_entry->regions_list);
+	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
@@ -2222,9 +2342,11 @@ void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
-	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+	if (svm->ghcb && vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
 		sev_flush_guest_memory(svm, svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
-	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->vmsa));
+
+	if (svm->vmsa)
+		__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->vmsa));
 
 	if (svm->ghcb_sa_free)
 		kfree(svm->ghcb_sa);
-- 
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog

Re: [PATCH 2/3 V2] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration

[Brijesh Singh]

On 7/14/21 11:01 AM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> For SEV to work with intra host migration, contents of the SEV info struct
> such as the ASID (used to index the encryption key in the AMD SP) and
> the list of memory regions need to be transferred to the target VM.
> This change adds commands for sending and receiving the sev info.
> 
> To avoid exposing this internal state to userspace and prevent other
> processes from importing state they shouldn't have access to, the send
> returns a token to userspace that is handed off to the target VM. The
> target passes in this token to receive the sent state. The token is only
> valid for one-time use. Functionality on the source becomes limited
> after send has been performed. If the source is destroyed before the
> target has received, the token becomes invalid.
> 
> The target is expected to be initialized (sev_guest_init), but not
> launched state (sev_launch_start) when performing receive. Once the
> target has received, it will be in a launched state and will not
> need to perform the typical SEV launch commands.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

thanks

Re: [PATCH 3/3 V2] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration

[Brijesh Singh]

On 7/14/21 11:01 AM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> For SEV-ES to work with intra host migration the VMSAs, GHCB metadata,
> and other SEV-ES info needs to be preserved along with the guest's
> memory.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>   1 file changed, 132 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 

Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

thanks