From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1761442Ab3BNBKs (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Feb 2013 20:10:48 -0500 Received: from terminus.zytor.com ([198.137.202.10]:46623 "EHLO mail.zytor.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761424Ab3BNBKi (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Feb 2013 20:10:38 -0500 Message-ID: <511C3927.90603@zytor.com> Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 17:08:55 -0800 From: "H. Peter Anvin" User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130110 Thunderbird/17.0.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Matthew Garrett CC: Casey Schaufler , Borislav Petkov , Kees Cook , LKML , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "x86@kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot References: <51157C9C.6030501@zytor.com> <20130208230655.GB28990@pd.tnic> <1360366012.18083.21.camel@x230.lan> <5115A4CC.3080102@zytor.com> <1360373383.18083.23.camel@x230.lan> <20130209092925.GA17728@pd.tnic> <1360422712.18083.24.camel@x230.lan> <511AE2CC.5040705@zytor.com> <1360733962.18083.30.camel@x230.lan> <511B2EB9.5070406@zytor.com> <1360736860.18083.33.camel@x230.lan> <511B33BC.9080307@zytor.com> <1360737709.18083.36.camel@x230.lan> <511BCB6E.8080102@zytor.com> <1360776399.18083.39.camel@x230.lan> <511BD291.1040003@schaufler-ca.com> <511C1325.5060601@zytor.com> <511C1A94.8020804@schaufler-ca.com> <511C2F0C.3060803@zytor.com > <511C3389.5090604@schaufler-ca.com> <1360803872.18083.46.camel@x230.lan> In-Reply-To: <1360803872.18083.46.camel@x230.lan> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 02/13/2013 05:04 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Wed, 2013-02-13 at 16:44 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > >> If you want that sort of granularity throw yourself on the SELinux >> bandwagon. Fine grained capabilities are insane and unmanageable >> and will only lead to tears. Security is despised because of the >> notion that making systems impossible to use is a good thing. > > SELinux is completely unusable for this specific case. > Well, for at least things with device nodes (/dev/mem, /dev/msr and so on) it should be possible, no? ioperm() and iopl() are another matter. -hpa