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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>,
	Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>,
	NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	containers@lists.linuxfoundation.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Lukasz Pawelczyk <havner@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/11] user_ns: 3 new LSM hooks for user namespace operations
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 15:49:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5632A265.7020402@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1444826525-9758-2-git-send-email-l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>

On 10/14/2015 5:41 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> This commit implements 3 new LSM hooks that provide the means for LSMs
> to embed their own security context within user namespace, effectively
> creating some sort of a user_ns related security namespace.
>
> The first one to take advantage of this mechanism is Smack.
>
> The hooks has been documented in the in the security.h below.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h      | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/security.h       | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h |  4 ++++
>  kernel/user.c                  |  3 +++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c            | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  6 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index ec3a6ba..18c9160 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1261,6 +1261,23 @@
>   *	audit_rule_init.
>   *	@rule contains the allocated rule
>   *
> + * @userns_create:
> + *	Allocates and fills the security part of a new user namespace.
> + *	@ns points to a newly created user namespace.
> + *	Returns 0 or an error code.
> + *
> + * @userns_free:
> + *	Deallocates the security part of a user namespace.
> + *	@ns points to a user namespace about to be destroyed.
> + *
> + * @userns_setns:
> + *	Run during a setns syscall to add a process to an already existing
> + *	user namespace. Returning failure here will block the operation
> + *	requested from userspace (setns() with CLONE_NEWUSER).
> + *	@nsproxy contains nsproxy to which the user namespace will be assigned.
> + *	@ns contains user namespace that is to be incorporated to the nsproxy.
> + *	Returns 0 or an error code.
> + *
>   * @inode_notifysecctx:
>   *	Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
>   *	should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
> @@ -1613,6 +1630,12 @@ union security_list_options {
>  				struct audit_context *actx);
>  	void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +	int (*userns_create)(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +	void (*userns_free)(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +	int (*userns_setns)(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct user_namespace *ns);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
>  };
>  
>  struct security_hook_heads {
> @@ -1824,6 +1847,11 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct list_head audit_rule_match;
>  	struct list_head audit_rule_free;
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +	struct list_head userns_create;
> +	struct list_head userns_free;
> +	struct list_head userns_setns;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2f4c1f7..91ffba2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1584,6 +1584,29 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +int security_userns_create(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +void security_userns_free(struct user_namespace *ns);
> +int security_userns_setns(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct user_namespace *ns);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline int security_userns_create(struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_userns_free(struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{ }
> +
> +static inline int security_userns_setns(struct nsproxy *nsproxy,
> +					struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
>  
>  extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 8297e5b..a9400cc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ struct user_namespace {
>  	struct key		*persistent_keyring_register;
>  	struct rw_semaphore	persistent_keyring_register_sem;
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +	void *security;
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
> diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
> index b069ccb..ce5419e 100644
> --- a/kernel/user.c
> +++ b/kernel/user.c
> @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
>  	.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
>  	__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +	.security = NULL,
> +#endif
>  };
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 88fefa6..daef188 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/ctype.h>
>  #include <linux/projid.h>
>  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  
>  static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
>  static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> @@ -109,6 +110,15 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>  
>  	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +	ret = security_userns_create(ns);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
> +		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
> +		return ret;
> +	}
> +#endif
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>  	init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
>  #endif
> @@ -144,6 +154,9 @@ void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
>  		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +		security_userns_free(ns);
> +#endif
>  		ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
>  		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
>  		ns = parent;
> @@ -970,6 +983,7 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
>  {
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns);
>  	struct cred *cred;
> +	int err;
>  
>  	/* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
>  	 * the same user namespace.
> @@ -987,6 +1001,10 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
>  	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> +	err = security_userns_setns(nsproxy, user_ns);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
>  	cred = prepare_creds();
>  	if (!cred)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 46f405c..e571127 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
>  #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  #include <net/flow.h>
>  
>  #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
> @@ -1538,6 +1539,25 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +
> +int security_userns_create(struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, ns);
> +}
> +
> +void security_userns_free(struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	call_void_hook(userns_free, ns);
> +}
> +
> +int security_userns_setns(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(userns_setns, 0, nsproxy, ns);
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
> +
>  struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
>  	.binder_set_context_mgr =
>  		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr),
> @@ -1882,4 +1902,12 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
>  	.audit_rule_free =
>  		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free),
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +	.userns_create =
> +		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.userns_create),
> +	.userns_free =
> +		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.userns_free),
> +	.userns_setns =
> +		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.userns_setns),
> +#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
>  };


  reply	other threads:[~2015-10-29 22:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-14 12:41 [PATCH v4 00/11] Smack namespace Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-14 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] user_ns: 3 new LSM hooks for user namespace operations Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:49   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2015-10-14 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] lsm: /proc/$PID/attr/label_map file and getprocattr_seq hook Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:49   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] lsm: add file opener's cred to a setprocattr arguments Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:49   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-10  4:16   ` Al Viro
2015-11-10 10:15     ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-14 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] lsm: inode_pre_setxattr hook Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-05  5:16   ` John Johansen
2015-10-14 12:41 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] smack: extend capability functions and fix 2 checks Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] smack: don't use implicit star to display smackfs/syslog Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] smack: abstraction layer for 2 common Smack operations Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:51   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] smack: misc cleanups in preparation for a namespace patch Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:51   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] smack: namespace groundwork Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:51   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] smack: namespace implementation Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:52   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-10-14 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] smack: documentation for the Smack namespace Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-10-29 22:52   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-09 15:40 ` [PATCH v4 00/11] " Lukasz Pawelczyk

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