From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965399AbbKDTbc (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Nov 2015 14:31:32 -0500 Received: from mail-pa0-f50.google.com ([209.85.220.50]:35289 "EHLO mail-pa0-f50.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965309AbbKDTba (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Nov 2015 14:31:30 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. To: Andrew Morton , "Eric W. Biederman" References: <1446574204-15567-1-git-send-email-dcashman@android.com> <20151103160410.34bbebc805c17d2f41150a19@linux-foundation.org> <87k2pyppfk.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20151103173156.9ca17f52.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux@arm.linux.org.uk, keescook@chromium.org, mingo@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, corbet@lwn.net, dzickus@redhat.com, xypron.glpk@gmx.de, jpoimboe@redhat.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com, aarcange@redhat.com, mgorman@suse.de, tglx@linutronix.de, rientjes@google.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, salyzyn@android.com, jeffv@google.com, nnk@google.com, dcashman From: Daniel Cashman Message-ID: <563A5D0D.9030109@android.com> Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2015 11:31:25 -0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.3.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20151103173156.9ca17f52.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 11/3/15 5:31 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Tue, 03 Nov 2015 18:40:31 -0600 ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) wrote: > >> Andrew Morton writes: >> >>> On Tue, 3 Nov 2015 10:10:03 -0800 Daniel Cashman wrote: >>> >>>> ASLR currently only uses 8 bits to generate the random offset for the >>>> mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to >>>> prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such >>>> a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all >>>> platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that >>>> platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place >>>> the trade-off. >>> >>> Can we please include a very good description of the motivation for this >>> change? What is inadequate about the current code, what value does the >>> enhancement have to our users, what real-world problems are being solved, >>> etc. >>> >>> Because all we have at present is "greater ASLR protection", which doesn't >>> really tell anyone anything. >> >> The description seemed clear to me. >> >> More random bits, more entropy, more work needed to brute force. >> >> 8 bits only requires 256 tries (or a 1 in 256) chance to brute force >> something. > > Of course, but that's not really very useful. > >> We have seen in the last couple of months on Android how only having 8 bits >> doesn't help much. > > Now THAT is important. What happened here and how well does the > proposed fix improve things? How much longer will a brute-force attack > take to succeed, with a particular set of kernel parameters? Is the > new duration considered to be sufficiently long and if not, are there > alternative fixes we should be looking at? > > Stuff like this. > >> Each additional bit doubles the protection (and unfortunately also >> increases fragmentation of the userspace address space). > > OK, so the benefit comes with a cost and people who are configuring > systems (and the people who are reviewing this patchset!) need to > understand the tradeoffs. Please. The direct motivation here was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at: http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html The attack there specifically used the limited randomness used in generating the mmap base address as part of a brute-force-based exploit. In this particular case, the attack was against the mediaserver process on Android, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, giving the attacker an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds each). With change to the maximum proposed value of 16 bits, this would change to over 45 hours (32768 tries), which would make the user of such a system much more likely to notice such an attack. I understand the desire for this clarification, and will happily try to improve the explanation for this change, especially so that those considering use of this option understand the tradeoffs, but I also view this as one particular hardening change which is a component of making attacks such as these harder, rather than the only solution. As for the clarification itself, where would you like it? I could include a cover letter for this patch-set, elaborate more in the commit message itself, add more to the Kconfig help description, or some combination of the above. Thank You, Dan