From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 14:43:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <564953d7ffb847365236a37639b81cbb7bca2aa6.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c88bc01f-3b65-f320-b42b-5ecde3e29448@schaufler-ca.com>
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 11:22 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/28/2020 9:54 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Casey,
> >
> > On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> >> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> >> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> >> structure to be used instead.
> >>
> >> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> >> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> >> security modules built into the system that would
> >> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> >> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> >> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> >> slots.
> >>
> >> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> >> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> >> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> >> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
> >>
> >> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> >> security module data rather than a single instance.
> >> Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is
> >> affected as well.
> > This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would
> > limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule
> > change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit
> > changes aren't hidden.
>
> Breaking up the patch in any meaningful way would require
> scaffolding code that is as extensive and invasive as the
> final change. I can do that if you really need it, but it
> won't be any easier to read.
Hidden in this patch is the new behavior of security_audit_rule_init(),
security_audit_rule_free(), and security_audit_rule_match(). My
concern is with label collision. Details are in a subsequent post.
Can an LSM prevent label collision?
>
> > In addition, here are a few high level nits:
> > - The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75
> > columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe
> > this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.)
>
> Will fix.
>
> > - The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing period.
> > Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period.
> > Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.)
>
> Will fix.
>
> > - For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines aren't
> > formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change,
> > please fix the comment and function description.
>
> Can you give an example? There are multiple comment styles
> used in the various components.
Never mind. All three examples are in tomoyo.
> I don't see any comments on the ima code changes. I really
> don't want to spin a new patch set that does nothing but change
> two periods in comments only to find out two months from now
> that the code changes are completely borked. I really don't
> want to go through the process of breaking up the patch that has
> been widely Acked if there's no reason to expect it would require
> significant work otherwise.
Understood.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-28 23:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20201120201507.11993-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 17:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-12-28 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 20:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 1:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-29 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-29 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 16/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 17/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 18/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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