From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934345AbcKKQZb (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Nov 2016 11:25:31 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:44782 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752673AbcKKQZ3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Nov 2016 11:25:29 -0500 Subject: Re: Summary of LPC guest MSI discussion in Santa Fe To: Alex Williamson , Joerg Roedel References: <20161109151709.74927f83@t450s.home> <20161109222522.GS17771@arm.com> <20161109162458.39594fdb@t450s.home> <20161109233847.GT17771@arm.com> <20161109165957.62c1eb61@t450s.home> <83b6440a-31eb-c1b4-642c-a4c311f37ef2@redhat.com> <20161109175517.174e7803@t450s.home> <20161110020130.GA19108@arm.com> <20161110104601.0939ba9a@t450s.home> <20161111111944.GO2078@8bytes.org> <20161111085056.4cf8989d@t450s.home> Cc: Auger Eric , Will Deacon , drjones@redhat.com, Christoffer Dall , jason@lakedaemon.net, kvm@vger.kernel.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, punit.agrawal@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, pranav.sawargaonkar@gmail.com, arnd@arndb.de, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, jcm@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, robin.murphy@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, eric.auger.pro@gmail.com From: Don Dutile Message-ID: <5825F0F5.3070001@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 11:25:25 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.3.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20161111085056.4cf8989d@t450s.home> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Fri, 11 Nov 2016 16:25:29 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 11/11/2016 10:50 AM, Alex Williamson wrote: > On Fri, 11 Nov 2016 12:19:44 +0100 > Joerg Roedel wrote: > >> On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 10:46:01AM -0700, Alex Williamson wrote: >>> In the case of x86, we know that DMA mappings overlapping the MSI >>> doorbells won't be translated correctly, it's not a valid mapping for >>> that range, and therefore the iommu driver backing the IOMMU API >>> should describe that reserved range and reject mappings to it. >> >> The drivers actually allow mappings to the MSI region via the IOMMU-API, >> and I think it should stay this way also for other reserved ranges. >> Address space management is done by the IOMMU-API user already (and has >> to be done there nowadays), be it a DMA-API implementation which just >> reserves these regions in its address space allocator or be it VFIO with >> QEMU, which don't map RAM there anyway. So there is no point of checking >> this again in the IOMMU drivers and we can keep that out of the >> mapping/unmapping fast-path. > > It's really just a happenstance that we don't map RAM over the x86 MSI > range though. That property really can't be guaranteed once we mix > architectures, such as running an aarch64 VM on x86 host via TCG. > AIUI, the MSI range is actually handled differently than other DMA > ranges, so a iommu_map() overlapping a range that the iommu cannot map > should fail just like an attempt to map beyond the address width of the > iommu. > +1. As was stated at Plumbers, x86 MSI is in a fixed, hw location, so: 1) that memory space is never a valid page to the system to be used for IOVA, therefore, nothing to micro-manage in the iommu mapping (fast) path. 2) migration btwn different systems isn't an issue b/c all x86 systems have this mapping. 3) ACS resolves DMA writes to mem going to a device(-mmio space). For aarch64, without such a 'fixed' MSI location, whatever hole/used-space-struct concept that is contrived for MSI (DMA) writes on aarch64 won't guarantee migration failure across mixed aarch64 systems (migrate guest-G from sys-vendor-A to sys-vendor-B; sys-vendor-A has MSI at addr-A; sys-vendor-B has MSI at addr-B). Without agreement, migration only possilbe across the same systems (can even be broken btwn two sytems from same vendor). ACS in the PCIe path handles the iova->dev-mmio collision problem. q.e.d. ergo, my proposal to put MSI space as the upper-most, space of any system.... FFFF.FFFF.FFFE0.0000 ... and hw drops the upper 1's/F's, and uses that for MSI. Allows it to vary on each system based on max-memory. pseudo-fixed, but not right smack in the middle of mem-space. There is an inverse scenario for host phys addr's as well: Wiring the upper-most bit of HPA to be 1==mmio, 0=mem simplifies a lot of design issues in the cores & chipsets as well. Alpha-EV6, case in point (18+ yr old design decision). another q.e.d. I hate to admit it, but jcm has it right wrt 'fixed sys addr map', at least in this IO area. >>> For PCI devices userspace can examine the topology of the iommu group >>> and exclude MMIO ranges of peer devices based on the BARs, which are >>> exposed in various places, pci-sysfs as well as /proc/iomem. For >>> non-PCI or MSI controllers... ??? >> >> Right, the hardware resources can be examined. But maybe this can be >> extended to also cover RMRR ranges? Then we would be able to assign >> devices with RMRR mappings to guests. > > RMRRs are special in a different way, the VT-d spec requires that the > OS honor RMRRs, the user has no responsibility (and currently no > visibility) to make that same arrangement. In order to potentially > protect the physical host platform, the iommu drivers should prevent a > user from remapping RMRRS. Maybe there needs to be a different > interface used by untrusted users vs in-kernel drivers, but I think the > kernel really needs to be defensive in the case of user mappings, which > is where the IOMMU API is rooted. Thanks, > > Alex >