linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Avoid writing MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL when writing it is not supported
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 09:32:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e446bfb-a45d-5146-7617-48d1d4798fee@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c076b593-815b-f7b2-4eab-9d2087580a71@citrix.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2196 bytes --]

Hi,

On 9/7/22 01:00, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 06/09/2022 22:00, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> On Tue, Sep 06, 2022 at 10:56:47PM +0200, Hans de Goede wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 9/6/22 22:43, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Sep 06, 2022 at 10:17:43PM +0200, Hans de Goede wrote:
>>>>> On an Intel Atom N2600 (and presumable other Cedar Trail models)
>>>>> MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL can be read, causing saved_msr.valid to be set for it
>>>>> by msr_build_context().
>>>>>
>>>>> This causes restore_processor_state() to try and restore it, but writing
>>>>> this MSR is not allowed on the Intel Atom N2600 leading to:
>>>> FWIW, virt tends to do this same thing a lot. They'll allow reading
>>>> random MSRs and only fail on write.
>>> Right. So I guess I should send a v2 with an updated commit
>>> message mentioning this ?
>> Nah, just saying this is a somewhat common pattern with MSRs.
>>
>> The best ones are the one where writing the value read is invalid :/ or
>> those who also silently eat a 0 write just for giggles. Luckily that
>> doesn't happen often.
> 
> Several comments.  First of all, MSR_TSX_CTRL is a fully read/write
> MSR.  If virt is doing this wrong, fix the hypervisor.  But this doesn't
> look virt related?
> 
> More importantly, MSR_TSX_CTRL does not plausibly exist on an Atom
> N2600, as it is more than a decade old.
> 
> MSR_TSX_CTRL was retrofitted in microcode to the MDS_NO, TAA-vulnerable
> CPUs which is a very narrow range from about 1 quarter of 2019 which
> includes Cascade Lake, and then included architecturally on subsequent
> parts which support TSX.
> 
> pm_save_spec_msr() is totally broken.  It's poking MSRs blindly without
> checking the enumeration of the capability first.

Note I did to a different version of this patch before this which did
add a capability check, but I only send that to various x86-folks +
x86@kernel.org which as Peter pointed out is an alias not a list,
so you will not have seen that earlier version.

I have attached the earlier version to this email.

> In this case, I bet the N2600 has a model specific MSR living at index
> 0x122 which has absolutely nothing at all to do with TSX.

That is my guess too.

Regards,

Hans

[-- Attachment #2: 0001-x86-cpu-Avoid-writing-MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL-when-tsx_ctr.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 4991 bytes --]

From 51bac2c734e0f2fd7e2acb406afd8a201ddf3400 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 18:00:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Avoid writing MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL when
 !tsx_ctrl_is_supported()

On an Intel Atom N2600 (and presumable other Cedar Trail models)
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL can be read, causing saved_msr.valid to be set for it
by msr_build_context().

This causes restore_processor_state() to try and restore it, but writing
this MSR is not allowed on the Intel Atom N2600 leading to:

[   99.955141] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x122 (tried to write 0x0000000000000002) at rIP: 0xffffffff8b07a574 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[   99.955176] Call Trace:
[   99.955186]  <TASK>
[   99.955195]  restore_processor_state+0x275/0x2c0
[   99.955246]  x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel+0x10e/0x140
[   99.955273]  acpi_suspend_enter+0xd3/0x100
[   99.955297]  suspend_devices_and_enter+0x7e2/0x830
[   99.955341]  pm_suspend.cold+0x2d2/0x35e
[   99.955368]  state_store+0x68/0xd0
[   99.955402]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15e/0x210
[   99.955442]  vfs_write+0x225/0x4b0
[   99.955523]  ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
[   99.955557]  do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
[   99.955579]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[   99.955600]  ? up_read+0x17/0x20
[   99.955631]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
[   99.955670]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[   99.955688]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[   99.955710]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   99.955723] RIP: 0033:0x7f7d0fb018f7
[   99.955741] Code: 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
[   99.955753] RSP: 002b:00007ffd03292ee8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   99.955771] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7d0fb018f7
[   99.955781] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007ffd03292fd0 RDI: 0000000000000004
[   99.955790] RBP: 00007ffd03292fd0 R08: 000000000000c0fe R09: 0000000000000000
[   99.955799] R10: 00007f7d0fb85fb0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
[   99.955808] R13: 000055df564173e0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 00007f7d0fbf49e0
[   99.955910]  </TASK>

Make tsx_ctrl_is_supported() from kernel/cpu/tsx.c non static and only pass
pass MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL to msr_build_context() when that returns true.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
---
Important note for reviewers: In its current form this patch changes the order in
which MSR-s are restored, it used to be:

        MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
        MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
        MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,
        MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL,
        MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,

Which is now changed to:

        MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
        MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,
        MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL,
        MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,
        MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,

I am not sure if this may have an impact on the various CPU
vulnerability mitigations, please review carefully.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c  | 2 +-
 arch/x86/power/cpu.c       | 4 +++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
index 8cbf623f0ecf..9047701d1966 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
 extern bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip);
 extern void handle_bus_lock(struct pt_regs *regs);
 u8 get_this_hybrid_cpu_type(void);
+bool tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init sld_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
 static inline bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
@@ -67,6 +68,11 @@ static inline u8 get_this_hybrid_cpu_type(void)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline bool tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
index ec7bbac3a9f2..be7e8d4cc0fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static void tsx_enable(void)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
 }
 
-static bool tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+bool tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
index bb176c72891c..9c95099d1add 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
@@ -515,13 +515,15 @@ static void pm_save_spec_msr(void)
 {
 	u32 spec_msr_id[] = {
 		MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
-		MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
 		MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,
 		MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL,
 		MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,
 	};
+	u32 tsx_ctrl_msr_id[] = { MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL };
 
 	msr_build_context(spec_msr_id, ARRAY_SIZE(spec_msr_id));
+	if (tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+		msr_build_context(tsx_ctrl_msr_id, ARRAY_SIZE(tsx_ctrl_msr_id));
 }
 
 static int pm_check_save_msr(void)
-- 
2.37.2


  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-07  7:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-06 20:17 [PATCH] x86/cpu: Avoid writing MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL when writing it is not supported Hans de Goede
2022-09-06 20:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-06 20:56   ` Hans de Goede
2022-09-06 21:00     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-09-06 23:00       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-07  7:32         ` Hans de Goede [this message]
2022-09-08 13:34           ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-08  1:03         ` Pawan Gupta
2022-09-08 13:46           ` Andrew Cooper

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5e446bfb-a45d-5146-7617-48d1d4798fee@redhat.com \
    --to=hdegoede@redhat.com \
    --cc=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rafael@kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).