From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> To: "\'Mickaël Salaün\'" <mic@digikod.net>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "Deven Bowers" <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>, "Eric Chiang" <ericchiang@google.com>, "Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Lakshmi Ramasubramanian" <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>, "Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>, "Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>, "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, "Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Scott Shell" <scottsh@microsoft.com>, "Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>, "Steve Grubb" <sgrubb@redhat.com>, "Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, "linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 09:44:18 +0000 Message-ID: <635df0655b644408ac4822def8900383@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <64426377-7fc4-6f37-7371-2e2a584e3032@digikod.net> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > Sent: 07 May 2020 10:30 > On 07/05/2020 11:00, David Laight wrote: > > From: Mickaël Salaün > >> Sent: 07 May 2020 09:37 > > ... > >>> None of that description actually says what the patch actually does. > >> > >> "Add support for O_MAYEXEC" "to enable to control script execution". > >> What is not clear here? This seems well understood by other commenters. > >> The documentation patch and the talks can also help. > > > > I'm guessing that passing O_MAYEXEC to open() requests the kernel > > check for execute 'x' permissions (as well as read). > > Yes, but only with openat2(). It can't matter if the flag is ignored. It just means the kernel isn't enforcing the policy. If openat2() fail because the flag is unsupported then the application will need to retry without the flag. So if the user has any ability create executable files this is all pointless (from a security point of view). The user can either copy the file or copy in an interpreter that doesn't request O_MAYEXEC. It might stop accidental issues, but nothing malicious. > > Then kernel policy determines whether 'read' access is actually enough, > > or whether 'x' access (possibly masked by mount permissions) is needed. > > > > If that is true, two lines say what is does. > > The "A simple system-wide security policy" paragraph introduce that, but > I'll highlight it in the next cover letter. No it doesn't. It just says there is some kind of policy that some flags change. It doesn't say what is being checked for. > The most important point is > to understand why it is required, before getting to how it will be > implemented. But you don't say what is required. Just a load of buzzword ramblings. David - Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-05 15:31 Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2) Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-12 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-12 21:40 ` Christian Heimes 2020-05-12 22:56 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-13 10:13 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-12 21:09 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-14 8:14 ` Lev R. Oshvang . 2020-05-14 15:48 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-17 16:57 ` Lev R. Oshvang . 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:44 ` Randy Dunlap 2020-05-05 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 17:40 ` Randy Dunlap 2020-05-12 21:48 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-13 11:09 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-13 15:37 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-05-13 23:27 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-14 3:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-14 10:12 ` David Laight 2020-05-14 12:22 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-05-14 14:41 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-14 15:52 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-05-14 15:45 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-14 16:10 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-05-14 19:16 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-15 0:58 ` Tetsuo Handa 2020-05-15 8:01 ` How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC) Kees Cook 2020-05-15 8:43 ` Florian Weimer 2020-05-15 14:37 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-15 14:43 ` Florian Weimer 2020-05-15 15:50 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-18 7:26 ` Florian Weimer 2020-05-19 2:23 ` Aleksa Sarai 2020-05-19 10:13 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-15 11:04 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-15 15:46 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-15 18:24 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-14 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-12 21:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-13 11:18 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-12 22:00 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-13 11:20 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ima: add policy support for the new file open MAY_OPENEXEC flag Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-05 15:36 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-06 13:58 ` Lev R. Oshvang . 2020-05-06 15:41 ` Aleksa Sarai 2020-05-07 8:30 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-07 8:05 ` David Laight 2020-05-07 8:36 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-07 9:00 ` David Laight 2020-05-07 9:30 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-07 9:44 ` David Laight [this message] 2020-05-07 13:38 ` Mickaël Salaün 2020-05-08 7:15 ` Lev R. Oshvang . 2020-05-08 14:01 ` Mimi Zohar
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