From: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>,
David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>,
Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com>,
Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa.rosenzweig@collabora.com>,
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>,
dri-devel <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] drm/panfrost: Avoid user size passed to kvmalloc()
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 09:48:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <68709772-b515-f4ab-676f-2bf1f510dfe6@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211217092817.GH1978@kadam>
On 17/12/2021 09:28, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 17, 2021 at 09:16:19AM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
>> On 17/12/2021 09:10, Dan Carpenter wrote:
>>> On Fri, Dec 17, 2021 at 08:55:50AM +0000, Steven Price wrote:
>>>> However this one is harder to fix without setting an arbitrary cap on
>>>> the number of BOs during a sumbit. I'm not sure how other drivers handle
>>>> this - the ones I've looked at so far all have the same issue. There's
>>>> obviously the list that Dan already sent, but e.g. msm has the same bug
>>>> in msm_gem_submit.c:submit_create() with an amusing bug where the check
>>>> for (sz > SIZE_MAX) will never hit, although the call is to kzalloc() so
>>>> large allocations are going to fail anyway.
>>>
>>> sz is u64 and SIZE_MAX is ULONG_MAX so the (sz > SIZE_MAX) condition
>>> does work to prevent an integer overflow on 32bit systems. But it's not
>>> beautiful.
>>
>> sz is the result of struct_size() which returns a size_t, and SIZE_MAX
>> in case of an overflow.
>
> Correct.
>
>> However the check is *greater than* SIZE_MAX
>> which will never occur even on 32 bit systems.
>
> You've missed a part. We add ((u64)nr_cmds * sizeof(submit->cmd[0]))
> to SIZE_MAX. If nr_cmds is zero then, whatever, the kzmalloc() will
> fail. No big deal. But if it's non-zero then "sz" is larger than
> SIZE_MAX and we allocate a smaller buffer than expected leading to
> memory corruption.
Ah, my bracket matching is obviously off today - somehow I hadn't
noticed that the second line wasn't part of the call to struct_size().
> Btw, it turns out that I had a hand in writing that check so hooray for
> me. :) #HoorayForMe
Indeed hooray for you! ;) Although it still all seems like a very
round-a-bout way of enforcing an arbitrary maximum on the size!
Thanks,
Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-17 9:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-16 16:16 [PATCH] drm/panfrost: Avoid user size passed to kvmalloc() Steven Price
2021-12-16 17:12 ` Rob Herring
2021-12-17 8:55 ` Steven Price
2021-12-17 9:10 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-12-17 9:16 ` Steven Price
2021-12-17 9:28 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-12-17 9:48 ` Steven Price [this message]
2021-12-16 17:49 ` Alyssa Rosenzweig
2021-12-17 6:40 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-12-17 7:38 ` Tomeu Vizoso
2021-12-17 8:56 ` Steven Price
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