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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 09:13:32 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6cd2ae51-2d2a-9c68-df7c-45b49e0a813f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181109003225.GQ3074@bombadil.infradead.org>

On 11/8/18 4:32 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>> Now, looking at Yu-cheng's specific example, it doesn't matter.  We've
>> got 64-bit types and natural 64-bit alignment.  Without __packed, we
>> need to look out for natural alignment screwing us up.  With __packed,
>> it just does what it *looks* like it does.
> The question is whether Yu-cheng's struct is ever embedded in another
> struct.  And if so, what does the hardware do?

It's not really.

+struct cet_user_state {
+	u64 u_cet;	/* user control flow settings */
+	u64 user_ssp;	/* user shadow stack pointer */
+} __packed;

This ends up embedded in 'struct fpu'.  The hardware tells us what the
sum of all the sizes of all the state components are, and also tells us
the offsets inside the larger buffer.

We double-check that the structure sizes exactly match the sizes that
the hardware tells us that the buffer pieces are via XCHECK_SZ().

But, later versions of the hardware have instructions that don't have
static offsets for the state components (when the XSAVES/XSAVEC
instructions are used).  So, for those, the structure embedding isn't
used at *all* since some state might not be present.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-09 17:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 16:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-17 10:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 22:39     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-17 22:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 23:17         ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18  9:26           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18  9:31             ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-18 12:10               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18 18:33             ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18  9:24         ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-08 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 23:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-11 11:31       ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 11:31     ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 14:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 19:02         ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-08 20:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:01     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 21:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:31         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 22:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 22:18             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 21:48         ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-08 22:00           ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-08 23:35             ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09  0:32               ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09  0:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-09 17:13                 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-11-09 17:17                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09 17:20                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 17:28                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-11 11:31         ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-13 18:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-13 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 18:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-14 20:19     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:39   ` Jann Horn
2018-10-11 20:49     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-12 21:49       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-12 13:17     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-11 20:49   ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-12 10:24     ` Florian Weimer
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-06 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-06 18:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-06 20:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-10-11 19:29   ` Yu-cheng Yu

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