From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752882AbeB0KhB (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Feb 2018 05:37:01 -0500 Received: from szxga05-in.huawei.com ([45.249.212.191]:5712 "EHLO huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752680AbeB0KhA (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Feb 2018 05:37:00 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] f2fs: allocate buffer for decrypting filename to avoid panic To: Yunlong Song , , , CC: , , , , , References: <1519463698-60555-1-git-send-email-yunlong.song@huawei.com> <1519613876-153437-1-git-send-email-yunlong.song@huawei.com> From: Chao Yu Message-ID: <6dae7b72-3ce4-1b5b-37ff-821d15de7101@huawei.com> Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 18:40:39 +0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.3.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1519613876-153437-1-git-send-email-yunlong.song@huawei.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [10.134.22.195] X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2018/2/26 10:57, Yunlong Song wrote: > In some platforms (such as arm), high memory is used, then the > decrypting filename will cause panic, the reason see commit > 569cf1876a32e574ba8a7fb825cd91bafd003882 ("f2fs crypto: allocate buffer > for decrypting filename"): > > We got dentry pages from high_mem, and its address space directly goes into the > decryption path via f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr. > But, sg_init_one assumes the address is not from high_mem, so we can get this > panic since it doesn't call kmap_high but kunmap_high is triggered at the end. > > kernel BUG at ../../../../../../kernel/mm/highmem.c:290! > Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM > ... > (kunmap_high+0xb0/0xb8) from [] (__kunmap_atomic+0xa0/0xa4) > (__kunmap_atomic+0xa0/0xa4) from [] (blkcipher_walk_done+0x128/0x1ec) > (blkcipher_walk_done+0x128/0x1ec) from [] (crypto_cbc_decrypt+0xc0/0x170) > (crypto_cbc_decrypt+0xc0/0x170) from [] (crypto_cts_decrypt+0xc0/0x114) > (crypto_cts_decrypt+0xc0/0x114) from [] (async_decrypt+0x40/0x48) > (async_decrypt+0x40/0x48) from [] (f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr+0x124/0x304) > (f2fs_fname_disk_to_usr+0x124/0x304) from [] (f2fs_fill_dentries+0xac/0x188) > (f2fs_fill_dentries+0xac/0x188) from [] (f2fs_readdir+0x1f0/0x300) > (f2fs_readdir+0x1f0/0x300) from [] (vfs_readdir+0x90/0xb4) > (vfs_readdir+0x90/0xb4) from [] (SyS_getdents64+0x64/0xcc) > (SyS_getdents64+0x64/0xcc) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) > > Howerver, later patches: > commit e06f86e61d7a67fe6e826010f57aa39c674f4b1b ("f2fs crypto: avoid > unneeded memory allocation in ->readdir") > > reverts the codes, which causes panic again in arm, so let's add part of > the old patch again for dentry page. > > Signed-off-by: Yunlong Song > --- > fs/f2fs/dir.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c > index f00b5ed..23fff48 100644 > --- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c > +++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c > @@ -825,9 +825,15 @@ int f2fs_fill_dentries(struct dir_context *ctx, struct f2fs_dentry_ptr *d, > int save_len = fstr->len; > int err; > > + de_name.name = kmemdup(d->filename[bit_pos], How about using f2fs_kmalloc + memcpy here? Thanks, > + de_name.len, GFP_NOFS); > + if (!de_name.name) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(d->inode, > (u32)de->hash_code, 0, > &de_name, fstr); > + kfree(de_name.name); > if (err) > return err; > >