From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chomium.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
Patricia Alfonso <trishalfonso@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 19:40:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <721BDA47-9998-4F0B-80B4-F4E4765E4885@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b35768f5-8e06-ebe6-1cdd-65f7fe67ff7a@arm.com>
On October 14, 2021 1:12:54 AM PDT, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> wrote:
>
>
>On 10/13/21 5:00 PM, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
>> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
>>
>> Calling memcmp() and memchr() with an intentional buffer overflow
>> is now caught at compile time:
>>
>> In function 'memcmp',
>> inlined from 'kasan_memcmp' at lib/test_kasan.c:897:2:
>> include/linux/fortify-string.h:263:25: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
>> 263 | __read_overflow();
>> | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> In function 'memchr',
>> inlined from 'kasan_memchr' at lib/test_kasan.c:872:2:
>> include/linux/fortify-string.h:277:17: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
>> 277 | __read_overflow();
>> | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>
>> Change the kasan tests to wrap those inside of a noinline function
>> to prevent the compiler from noticing the bug and let kasan find
>> it at runtime.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
>
>Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
How about just explicitly making the size invisible to the compiler?
I did this for similar issues in the same source:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20211006181544.1670992-1-keescook@chromium.org/T/#u
-Kees
>
>> ---
>> lib/test_kasan.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
>> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
>> index 67ed689a0b1b..903215e944f1 100644
>> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
>> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
>> @@ -852,6 +852,21 @@ static void kmem_cache_invalid_free(struct kunit *test)
>> kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
>> }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * noinline wrappers to prevent the compiler from noticing the overflow
>> + * at compile time rather than having kasan catch it.
>> + * */
>> +static noinline void *__kasan_memchr(const void *s, int c, size_t n)
>> +{
>> + return memchr(s, c, n);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static noinline int __kasan_memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n)
>> +{
>> + return memcmp(s1, s2, n);
>> +}
>> +
>> +
>> static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
>> {
>> char *ptr;
>> @@ -870,7 +885,7 @@ static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
>> KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
>>
>> KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
>> - kasan_ptr_result = memchr(ptr, '1', size + 1));
>> + kasan_ptr_result = __kasan_memchr(ptr, '1', size + 1));
>>
>> kfree(ptr);
>> }
>> @@ -895,7 +910,7 @@ static void kasan_memcmp(struct kunit *test)
>> memset(arr, 0, sizeof(arr));
>>
>> KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
>> - kasan_int_result = memcmp(ptr, arr, size+1));
>> + kasan_int_result = __kasan_memcmp(ptr, arr, size+1));
>> kfree(ptr);
>> }
>>
>>
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-15 2:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-13 15:00 [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers Arnd Bergmann
2021-10-13 15:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] kasan: use fortified strings for hwaddress sanitizer Arnd Bergmann
2021-10-18 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-10-18 20:09 ` Arnd Bergmann
2021-10-14 8:12 ` [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers Vincenzo Frascino
2021-10-15 2:40 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-10-28 20:15 ` Andrew Morton
2021-10-28 20:42 ` Kees Cook
2021-10-18 19:47 ` Kees Cook
2021-10-18 19:55 ` Arnd Bergmann
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