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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 09:29:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170725102657.GD21822@nazgul.tnic>

On 7/25/2017 5:26 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:42PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
>> Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.  SME is identified by
>> CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
>> MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR).  Only show the SEV feature
>> as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |  2 ++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |  1 +
>>   4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> ...
> 
>> @@ -637,6 +642,21 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>   			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
>>   		}
>>   	}
>> +
>> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
>> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
>> +			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>> +		} else {
>> +			u64 syscfg, hwcr;
>> +
>> +			/* Check if SEV is enabled */
>> +			rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
>> +			rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
>> +			if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
>> +			    !(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
>> +				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>> +		}
>> +	}
> 
> Let's simplify this and read the MSRs only once. Diff ontop. Please
> check if I'm missing a case:

Yup, we can do something like that.  I believe the only change that
would be needed to your patch would be to move the IS_ENABLED() check
to after the physical address space reduction check.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index c413f04bdd41..79af07731ab1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -546,6 +546,48 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   	}
>   }
>   
> +static void early_detect_mem_enc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> +	u64 syscfg, hwcr;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
> +	 *   For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
> +	 *	      the SME physical address space reduction value.
> +	 *	      If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
> +	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
> +	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
> +	 *            SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
> +	 *
> +	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
> +	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
> +	 */
> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) ||
> +	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
> +
> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
> +			goto clear;
> +
> +		/* Check if SME is enabled */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
> +		if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
> +			goto clear;
> +
> +		c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
> +
> +		/* Check if SEV is enabled */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
> +		if (!(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
> +			goto clear_sev;
> +
> +		return;
> +clear:
> +		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> +clear_sev:
> +		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   {
>   	u32 dummy;
> @@ -617,46 +659,8 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   	if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
>   		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
> -	 *   For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
> -	 *	      the SME physical address space reduction value.
> -	 *	      If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
> -	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
> -	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
> -	 *            SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
> -	 *
> -	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
> -	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
> -	 */
> -	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
> -		u64 msr;
> -
> -		/* Check if SME is enabled */
> -		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
> -		if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
> -			c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
> -			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
> -				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> -		} else {
> -			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
> -		}
> -	}
> +	early_detect_mem_enc(c);
>   
> -	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
> -		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
> -			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> -		} else {
> -			u64 syscfg, hwcr;
> -
> -			/* Check if SEV is enabled */
> -			rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
> -			rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
> -			if (!(syscfg & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
> -			    !(hwcr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
> -				clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
> -		}
> -	}
>   }
>   
>   static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-25 14:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov

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