From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24B12C43142 for ; Mon, 25 Jun 2018 09:41:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9ED6256E1 for ; Mon, 25 Jun 2018 09:41:17 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C9ED6256E1 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754928AbeFYJlQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Jun 2018 05:41:16 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:61801 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754378AbeFYJlO (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Jun 2018 05:41:14 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Jun 2018 02:41:13 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,269,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="66080172" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com ([10.237.50.42]) by fmsmga004.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 25 Jun 2018 02:41:09 -0700 Message-ID: <73b7e4e3712074b73f4ac8211699d24dfdced6bf.camel@linux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v11 13/13] intel_sgx: in-kernel launch enclave From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Nathaniel McCallum , sean.j.christopherson@intel.com Cc: jethro@fortanix.com, luto@kernel.org, Neil Horman , x86@kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, intel-sgx-kernel-dev@lists.01.org, hpa@zytor.com, dvhart@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, andy@infradead.org, Peter Jones Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 12:41:08 +0300 In-Reply-To: References: <20180608171216.26521-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20180611115255.GC22164@hmswarspite.think-freely.org> <20180612174535.GE19168@hmswarspite.think-freely.org> <20180620210158.GA24328@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.28.1-2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2018-06-21 at 08:32 -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote: > This implies that it should be possible to create MSR activation (and > an embedded launch enclave?) entirely as a UEFI module. The kernel > would still get to manage who has access to /dev/sgx and other > important non-cryptographic policy details. Users would still be able > to control the cryptographic policy details (via BIOS Secure Boot > configuration that exists today). Distributions could still control > cryptographic policy details via signing of the UEFI module with their > own Secure Boot key (or using something like shim). The UEFI module > (and possibly the external launch enclave) could be distributed via > linux-firmware. > > Andy/Neil, does this work for you? Nothing against having UEFI module for MSR activation step. And we would move the existing in-kernel LE to firmware so that it is avaible for locked-in-to-non-Intel-values case? /Jarkko