From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v6 12/16] x86/speculation: Add 'seccomp' Spectre v2 app to app protection mode
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:54:32 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <79be3a64-9f25-a1e2-6926-baea677ccdb6@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811210142540.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
On 11/20/2018 04:44 PM, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Nov 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> index d2255f7..89b193c 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> @@ -4227,12 +4227,17 @@
>> and STIBP mitigations against Spectre V2 attacks.
>> If the CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected.
>> If the CPU is vulnerable, the default mitigation
>> - is "prctl".
>> + is architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
>> prctl - Enable mitigations per thread by restricting
>> indirect branch speculation via prctl.
>> Mitigation for a thread is not enabled by default to
>> avoid mitigation overhead. The state of
>> of the control is inherited on fork.
>> + seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
>> + will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
>
> As Dave already pointed out elsewhere -- the "SSB" here is probably a
> copy/paste error. It should read something along the lines of "... will
> restrict indirect branch speculation ..."
>
Thanks. Should have caught it.
Tim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-21 0:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-20 23:59 [Patch v6 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 01/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 02/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 03/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 04/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 05/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 06/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 07/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 08/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 09/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 10/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 11/16] x86/speculation: Enable IBPB for tasks with TIF_SPEC_BRANCH_SPECULATION Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 12/16] x86/speculation: Add 'seccomp' Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:44 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 0:54 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-21 1:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 6:14 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 17:41 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 19:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 20:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-21 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 15/16] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:00 ` [Patch v6 16/16] x86/smt: Allow disabling of SMT when last SMT is offlined Tim Chen
2018-11-21 0:44 ` [Patch v6 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
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