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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>,
	"Geert Uytterhoeven" <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Luis Chamberlain" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Muhammad Usama Anjum" <usama.anjum@collabora.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>,
	"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"LSM List" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 18:09:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e8d9f8a-f119-6d1a-7861-0493dc513aa7@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whb=XuU=LGKnJWaa7LOYQz9VwHs8SLfgLbT5sf2VAbX1A@mail.gmail.com>


On 05/04/2022 01:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 3:25 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

[...]

> 
>> I think this already exists as AT_EACCESS? It was added with
>> faccessat2() itself, if I'm reading the history correctly.
> 
> Yeah, I noticed myself, I just hadn't looked (and I don't do enough
> user-space programming to be aware of if that way).

I think AT_EACCESS should be usable with the new EXECVE_OK too.


> 
>>>      (a) "what about suid bits that user space cannot react to"
>>
>> What do you mean here? Do you mean setid bits on the file itself?
> 
> Right.
> 
> Maybe we don't care.

I think we don't. I think the only corner case that could be different 
is for files that are executable, SUID and non-readable. In this case it 
wouldn't matter because userspace could not read the file, which is 
required for interpretation/execution. Anyway, S[GU]ID bits in scripts 
are just ignored by execve and we want to follow the same semantic.


> 
> Maybe we do.
> 
> Is the user-space loader going to honor them? Is it going to ignore
> them? I don't know. And it actually interacts with things like
> 'nosuid', which the kernel does know about, and user space has a hard
> time figuring out.
> 
> So if the point is "give me an interface so that I can do the same
> thing a kernel execve() loader would do", then those sgid/suid bits
> actually may be exactly the kind of thing that user space wants the
> kernel to react to - should it ignore them, or should it do something
> special when it sees that they are set?
> 
> I'm not saying that they *should* be something we care about. All I'm
> saying is that I want that *discussion* to happen.
> 
>                 Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-05 23:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-21 16:15 [GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-21 17:38 ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-03-21 18:05   ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-03-21 23:32     ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-03-30 16:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-04 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-04 18:47   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-04-04 20:30     ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-04 21:28       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-04-04 21:40         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-04-04 22:25         ` Kees Cook
2022-04-04 23:26           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-04-05 16:09             ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2022-04-05 16:17               ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-08 19:32               ` Kees Cook
2023-02-09 15:43                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-05 22:21             ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-04-05 15:55           ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-05 15:38         ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-04-05 14:54       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-04-05 16:14         ` Mickaël Salaün

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