From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, srutherford@google.com,
ashish.kalra@amd.com, darren.kenny@oracle.com,
venu.busireddy@oracle.com, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/3] Expose Confidential Computing capabilities on sysfs
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 14:40:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8498cff4-3c31-f596-04fe-62013b94d7a4@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309220608.16844-1-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
On 3/9/22 14:06, Alejandro Jimenez wrote:>
> On EPYC Milan host:
>
> $ grep -r . /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/*
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/c_bit_position:51
Why on earth would we want to expose this to userspace?
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev/nr_sev_asid:509
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev/status:enabled
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev/nr_asid_available:509
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev_es/nr_sev_es_asid:0
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev_es/status:enabled
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sev_es/nr_asid_available:509
> /sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/sme/status:active
For all of this... What will userspace *do* with it?
For nr_asid_available, I get it. It tells you how many guests you can
still run. But, TDX will need the same logical thing. Should TDX hosts
go looking for this in:
/sys/kernel/mm/mem_encrypt/tdx/available_guest_key_ids
?
If it's something that's common, it needs to be somewhere common.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 22:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 22:06 [RFC 0/3] Expose Confidential Computing capabilities on sysfs Alejandro Jimenez
2022-03-09 22:06 ` [RFC 1/3] x86: Expose Secure Memory Encryption capabilities in sysfs Alejandro Jimenez
2022-03-09 22:06 ` [RFC 2/3] x86: Expose SEV " Alejandro Jimenez
2022-03-09 22:06 ` [RFC 3/3] x86: Expose SEV-ES " Alejandro Jimenez
2022-03-09 22:40 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-03-10 18:07 ` [RFC 0/3] Expose Confidential Computing capabilities on sysfs Alejandro Jimenez
2022-03-14 22:43 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-03-15 1:17 ` Kai Huang
2022-03-15 13:30 ` Dave Hansen
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