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From: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@magna.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.ogness@linutronix.de,
	akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:59:21 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <873d7e08-7a70-a1a3-f486-882d1d515965@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210204214944.GA13103@amd>

On 2/4/21 3:49 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> This machine is insecure. Yet I don't see ascii-art *** all around..
> 
> "Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which is bad for security."

I'll use whatever wording everyone can agree on, but I really don't see 
much difference between "which may compromise security on your system" 
and "which is bad for security".  "may compromise" doesn't see any more 
alarmist than "bad".  Frankly, "bad" is a very generic term.

I think the reason behind the large banner has less to do how insecure 
the system is, and more about making sure vendors and sysadmins don't 
enable it by default everywhere.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-04 22:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-02 20:18 [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-02 22:19   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 22:34     ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-02 22:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-02-03 18:53         ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:48 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 20:54   ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 21:49     ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 21:59       ` Timur Tabi [this message]
2021-02-04 22:06         ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 22:11         ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:17           ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 22:20             ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:51             ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:57               ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:05       ` Steven Rostedt

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