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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 07/10] x86/mm: Handle tagged memory accesses from kernel threads
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 15:30:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <878rr6x4iu.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220511022751.65540-9-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, May 11 2022 at 05:27, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> index f9fe71d1f42c..b320556e1c22 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> @@ -185,6 +185,34 @@ static u8 gen_lam(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
>  	if (!tsk)
>  		return LAM_NONE;
>  
> +	if (tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
> +		/*
> +		 * For kernel thread use the most permissive LAM
> +		 * used by the mm. It's required to handle kernel thread
> +		 * memory accesses on behalf of a process.
> +		 *
> +		 * Adjust thread flags accodringly, so untagged_addr() would
> +		 * work correctly.
> +		 */
> +
> +		tsk->thread.features &= ~(X86_THREAD_LAM_U48 |
> +					  X86_THREAD_LAM_U57);
> +
> +		switch (mm->context.lam) {
> +		case LAM_NONE:
> +			return LAM_NONE;
> +		case LAM_U57:
> +			tsk->thread.features |= X86_THREAD_LAM_U57;
> +			return LAM_U57;
> +		case LAM_U48:
> +			tsk->thread.features |= X86_THREAD_LAM_U48;
> +			return LAM_U48;

Pretending that LAM is configurable per thread and then having a magic
override in the per process mm when accessing that process' memory from
a kernel thread is inconsistent, a horrible hack and a recipe for
hard to diagnose problems.

LAM has to be enabled by the process _before_ creating threads and then
stay enabled until the whole thing dies. That's the only sensible use
case.

I understand that tsk->thread.features is conveniant for the untagging
mechanism, but the whole setup should be:

prctl(ENABLE, which)
     if (can_enable_lam(which)) {
     	mm->lam.c3_mask = CR3_LAM(which);
        mm->lam.untag_mask = UNTAG_LAM(which);
        current->thread.lam_untag_mask = mm->lam.untag_mask;
     }

and

can_enable_lam(which)
    if (current_is_multithreaded())
    	return -ETOOLATE;
    if (current->mm->lam_cr3_mask)
    	return -EBUSY;
    ....
    	

Now vs. kernel threads. Doing this like the above is just the wrong
place. If a kernel thread accesses user space memory of a process then
it has to invoke kthread_use_mm(), right? So the obvious point to cache
that setting is in kthread_use_mm() and kthread_unuse_mm() clears it:

kthread_use_mm()
     current->thread.lam_untag_mask = mm->lam.untag_mask;

kthread_unuse_mm()
     current->thread.lam_untag_mask = 0;

This makes all of the mechanics trivial because CR3 switch then simply
does:

     new_cr3 |= mm->lam.c3_mask;

No conditionals and evaluations, nothing. Just straight forward and
comprehensible code.

Thanks,

        tglx

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-12 13:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-11  2:27 [RFCv2 00/10] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [PATCH] x86: Implement Linear Address Masking support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 13:01   ` David Laight
2022-05-12 14:07     ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-05-12 15:06       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 15:33         ` David Laight
2022-05-12 14:35     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 17:00     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 01/10] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 02/10] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 03/10] x86: Introduce userspace API to handle per-thread features Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 12:02   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 12:04     ` [PATCH] x86/prctl: Remove pointless task argument Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 12:30       ` [tip: x86/cleanups] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 14:09   ` [RFCv2 03/10] x86: Introduce userspace API to handle per-thread features Alexander Potapenko
2022-05-13 17:34     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-13 23:09       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-13 23:50         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-14  8:37           ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-14 23:06             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-15  9:02               ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 18:24                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-15 19:38                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 22:01                     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 04/10] x86/mm: Introduce X86_THREAD_LAM_U48 and X86_THREAD_LAM_U57 Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  7:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 12:24     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 14:37       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 05/10] x86/mm: Provide untagged_addr() helper Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  7:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-11  7:45     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 13:06   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 14:23     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 15:16       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 23:14         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 10:14           ` David Laight
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 06/10] x86/uaccess: Remove tags from the address before checking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 13:02   ` David Laight
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 07/10] x86/mm: Handle tagged memory accesses from kernel threads Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  7:23   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 13:30   ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 08/10] x86/mm: Make LAM_U48 and mappings above 47-bits mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 13:36   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 23:22     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-14  8:37       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18  8:43   ` Bharata B Rao
2022-05-18 17:08     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 09/10] x86/mm: Add userspace API to enable Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  7:26   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-11 14:15   ` H.J. Lu
2022-05-12 14:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-11  2:27 ` [RFCv2 10/10] x86: Expose thread features status in /proc/$PID/arch_status Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-11  6:49 ` [RFCv2 00/10] Linear Address Masking enabling Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-12 15:42   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 16:56     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 19:31       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 23:21         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 17:22   ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-12 19:39     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 21:24       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 14:43         ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-05-13 22:59         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-12 21:51       ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-12 22:10         ` H.J. Lu
2022-05-12 23:35           ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13  0:08             ` H.J. Lu
2022-05-13  0:46               ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-13  1:27                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13  3:05                   ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-13  8:28                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 22:48                     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-13  9:14                   ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-13  9:26                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13  0:46               ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 11:07         ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-05-13 11:28           ` David Laight
2022-05-13 12:26             ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-05-13 14:26               ` David Laight
2022-05-13 15:28                 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-05-13 23:01           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-05-14 10:00             ` Thomas Gleixner

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