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From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.de.marchi@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] module: signature infrastructure
Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 17:25:27 +0930	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87a9x3io0g.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKi4VA+R0EY9OteOCc=JGOqtshAJd5_CWu9tyJqjjkvG6qZUjw@mail.gmail.com>

Lucas De Marchi <lucas.de.marchi@gmail.com> writes:
> Sorry to come up with this suggestion only now (and after you have
> already talked to me at LPC). Only after seeing this implementation I
> thought about the implications of having the module signed in this
> format.
...
> I'm worried about performance here. Module loading can take a fair
> amount of boot time. It may not be critical for servers or desktops
> that we rarely boot, but it is for embedded uses.
...
> Letting it in be32 is the simplest solution IMO. it's way simpler then
> the loop above.
...
>> Scanning the module is the least of our issues since we've just copied
>> it and we're about to SHA it.
>
> Yeah, but I don't think we need to scan it one more time. On every
> boot. For every module

Regretfully, I don't have Linus' talent for flamage.

There's no measurable performance impact.  Scanning 1k takes about
5usec; we've wasted about enough time on this subject to load a billion
kernel modules.

I know this.  Not because I'm brilliant, but because I *measured* it.  I
even pulled out my original module signature signing check code, and
that was both faster and simpler.  See below.

Your assertion that the length-prepended version is "way simpler" is
wrong.  Again, I know this because I *read the code*:

        https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git;a=commitdiff;h=19eef6e4e529ccf2b3a6ab5c19dd40f2eaf8fcaf

Don't send any more lazy, unthoughtful mails to the list.  It's
disrespectful and makes me grumpy.

Rusty.
PS.  Pushed updated version to my kernel.org linux.git/module-signing branch.

#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
			    const void *mod, unsigned long *len)
{
	int err = 0;
	const unsigned long markerlen = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
	const void *p = mod, *end = mod + *len;

	/* Poor man's memmem. */
	while ((p = memchr(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING[0], end - p))) {
		if (p + markerlen > end)
			break;

		if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
			const void *sig = p + markerlen;
			/* Truncate module up to signature. */
			*len = p - mod;
			err = mod_verify_sig(mod, *len,
					     sig, end - sig,
					     &info->sig_ok);
			break;
		}
		p++;
	}

	/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
	if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce)
		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
	return err;
}

  reply	other threads:[~2012-09-06  8:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-08-16  1:34 [PATCH 00/25] Crypto keys and module signing David Howells
2012-08-16  1:34 ` [PATCH 01/25] KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update David Howells
2012-08-16  1:34 ` [PATCH 02/25] MPILIB: Provide count_leading/trailing_zeros() based on arch functions David Howells
2012-09-10  7:13   ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-09-13  5:14     ` James Morris
2012-09-13 14:09       ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-08-16  1:34 ` [PATCH 03/25] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations David Howells
2012-08-16  1:34 ` [PATCH 04/25] KEYS: Add signature verification facility David Howells
2012-08-16  1:35 ` [PATCH 05/25] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key subtype David Howells
2012-08-16  1:35 ` [PATCH 06/25] MPILIB: Reinstate mpi_cmp[_ui]() and export for RSA signature verification David Howells
2012-08-16  1:35 ` [PATCH 07/25] KEYS: RSA: Implement signature verification algorithm [PKCS#1 / RFC3447] David Howells
2012-08-16  1:35 ` [PATCH 08/25] KEYS: RSA: Fix signature verification for shorter signatures David Howells
2012-08-16  1:35 ` [PATCH 09/25] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 10/25] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 11/25] PGPLIB: Signature parser David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 12/25] KEYS: PGP data parser David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 13/25] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 14/25] KEYS: PGP format signature parser David Howells
2012-08-16  1:36 ` [PATCH 15/25] KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration David Howells
2012-08-16  1:37 ` [PATCH 16/25] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob David Howells
2012-08-16  1:37 ` [PATCH 17/25] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files David Howells
2012-08-16  1:37 ` [PATCH 18/25] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options David Howells
2012-08-16  1:37 ` [PATCH 19/25] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process David Howells
2012-08-16  1:37 ` [PATCH 20/25] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel David Howells
2012-08-31 14:33   ` Michal Marek
2012-08-16  1:38 ` [PATCH 21/25] MODSIGN: Module signature verification David Howells
2012-08-16  1:38 ` [PATCH 22/25] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing David Howells
2012-08-16  1:38 ` [PATCH 23/25] MODSIGN: Panic the kernel if FIPS is enabled upon module signing failure David Howells
2012-08-16  1:38 ` [PATCH 24/25] MODSIGN: Allow modules to be signed with an unknown key unless enforcing David Howells
2012-08-16  1:38 ` [PATCH 25/25] MODSIGN: Fix documentation of signed-nokey behavior when not enforcing David Howells
2012-08-21  5:04 ` [PATCH 00/25] Crypto keys and module signing Rusty Russell
2012-08-22 10:50 ` David Howells
2012-08-22 11:52   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-08-22 16:07   ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-09-04  5:55 ` [RFC] module: signature infrastructure Rusty Russell
2012-09-04 12:07   ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-09-04 12:21     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-09-04 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-05  0:29     ` Rusty Russell
2012-09-05 13:34       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-06  2:05         ` Rusty Russell
2012-09-04 14:25   ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-09-04 15:04     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-09-05  0:19     ` Rusty Russell
2012-09-05 23:41       ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-09-06  7:55         ` Rusty Russell [this message]
2012-09-04 22:51   ` David Howells
2012-09-04 23:17     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry

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