From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 08:30:02 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87eepe6x7p.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871rle8bw2.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Tue, 14 Jul 2020 08:27:41 -0500")
Currently it is necessary for the usermode helper code and the code that
launches init to use set_fs so that pages coming from the kernel look like
they are coming from userspace.
To allow that usage of set_fs to be removed cleanly the argument copying
from userspace needs to happen earlier. Move the allocation and
initialization of bprm->mm into alloc_bprm so that the bprm->mm is
available early to store the new user stack into. This is a prerequisite
for copying argv and envp into the new user stack early before ther rest of
exec.
To keep the things consistent the cleanup of bprm->mm is moved into
free_bprm. So that bprm->mm will be cleaned up whenever bprm->mm is
allocated and free_bprm are called.
Moving bprm_mm_init earlier is safe as it does not depend on any files,
current->in_execve, current->fs->in_exec, bprm->unsafe, or the if the file
table is shared. (AKA bprm_mm_init does not depend on any of the code that
happens between alloc_bprm and where it was previously called.)
This moves bprm->mm cleanup after current->fs->in_exec is set to 0. This
is safe because current->fs->in_exec is only used to preventy taking an
additional reference on the fs_struct.
This moves bprm->mm cleanup after current->in_execve is set to 0. This is
safe because current->in_execve is only used by the lsms (apparmor and
tomoyou) and always for LSM specific functions, never for anything to do
with the mm.
This adds bprm->mm cleanup into the successful return path. This is safe
because being on the successful return path implies that begin_new_exec
succeeded and set brpm->mm to NULL. As bprm->mm is NULL bprm cleanup I am
moving into free_bprm will do nothing.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
fs/exec.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7e8af27dd199..afb168bf5e23 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1543,6 +1543,10 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
+ if (bprm->mm) {
+ acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
+ mmput(bprm->mm);
+ }
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
@@ -1582,6 +1586,10 @@ static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename)
bprm->filename = bprm->fdpath;
}
bprm->interp = bprm->filename;
+
+ retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out_free;
return bprm;
out_free:
@@ -1911,10 +1919,6 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
close_on_exec(fd, rcu_dereference_raw(current->files->fdt)))
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE;
- retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
- if (retval)
- goto out_unmark;
-
retval = prepare_arg_pages(bprm, argv, envp);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
@@ -1962,10 +1966,6 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
*/
if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current))
force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
- if (bprm->mm) {
- acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
- mmput(bprm->mm);
- }
out_unmark:
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
--
2.25.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-14 13:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-14 13:27 [PATCH 0/7] Implementing kernel_execve Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 13:28 ` [PATCH 1/7] exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:29 ` [PATCH 2/7] exec: Factor out alloc_bprm Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:29 ` [PATCH 3/7] exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:30 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2020-07-14 21:37 ` [PATCH 4/7] exec: Move bprm_mm_init " Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:30 ` [PATCH 5/7] exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:31 ` [PATCH 6/7] exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:41 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:38 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-14 13:31 ` [PATCH 7/7] exec: Implement kernel_execve Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 21:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 6:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-15 14:55 ` David Laight
2020-07-15 15:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 16:46 ` David Laight
2020-07-15 15:00 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-15 18:20 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-15 6:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-07-15 18:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-07-14 15:32 ` [PATCH 0/7] Implementing kernel_execve Linus Torvalds
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