From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96A48C433E1 for ; Tue, 19 May 2020 00:35:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F27320657 for ; Tue, 19 May 2020 00:35:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728187AbgESAff (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 20:35:35 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:37512 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726494AbgESAfd (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 20:35:33 -0400 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jaqEG-0000Vb-7M; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:35:32 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jaqEF-0003a2-Dh; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:35:32 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Greg Ungerer , Rob Landley , Bernd Edlinger , , Al Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski References: <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9l4zyla.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 19:31:51 -0500 In-Reply-To: <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Mon, 18 May 2020 19:29:00 -0500") Message-ID: <87imgszrwo.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1jaqEF-0003a2-Dh;;;mid=<87imgszrwo.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+zSDC+oPj2CKUq9mJvOsL3qCDQjL7cYcM= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binfmt unconditionally X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Add a flag preserve_creds that binfmt_misc can set to prevent credentials from being updated. This allows binfmt_misc to always call prepare_binfmt. Allowing the credential computation logic to be consolidated. Not replacing the credentials with the interpreters credentials is safe because because an open file descriptor to the executable is passed to the interpreter. As the interpreter does not need to reopen the executable it is guaranteed to see the same file that exec sees. Ref: c407c033de84 ("[PATCH] binfmt_misc: improve calculation of interpreter's credentials") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 15 +++------------ fs/exec.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- include/linux/binfmts.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c index cdb45829354d..264829745d6f 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c @@ -218,19 +218,10 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) goto error; bprm->file = interp_file; - if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) { - loff_t pos = 0; - - /* - * No need to call prepare_binprm(), it's already been - * done. bprm->buf is stale, update from interp_file. - */ - memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); - retval = kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, - &pos); - } else - retval = prepare_binprm(bprm); + if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) + bprm->preserve_creds = 1; + retval = prepare_binprm(bprm); if (retval < 0) goto error; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 8e3b93d51d31..028e0e323af5 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1631,15 +1631,20 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int retval; loff_t pos = 0; - /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ - bprm->active_secureexec = 0; - bprm_fill_uid(bprm); - retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); - if (retval) - return retval; + /* Can the interpreter get to the executable without races? */ + if (!bprm->preserve_creds) { + int retval; + + /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ + bprm->active_secureexec = 0; + bprm_fill_uid(bprm); + retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); + if (retval) + return retval; + } + bprm->preserve_creds = 0; memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos); diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 8605ab4a0f89..dbb5614d62a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct linux_binprm { unsigned long p; /* current top of mem */ unsigned long argmin; /* rlimit marker for copy_strings() */ unsigned int + /* It is safe to use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */ + preserve_creds:1, /* * True if most recent call to security_bprm_set_creds * resulted in elevated privileges. -- 2.25.0