From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>,
Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>,
Joseph Nuzman <joseph.nuzman@intel.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: Re: [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call depth tracking mitigation
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 21:55:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r12iurej.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220716230344.239749011@linutronix.de>
On Sun, Jul 17 2022 at 01:17, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> For 4 RET pathes randomized with randomize_kstack_offset=y and RSP bit 3, 6, 5:
>
> IBRS stuff stuff(pad) confuse
> microbench: +37.20% +18.46% +15.47% +7.46%
> sockperf 14 bytes: -23.76% -19.26% -14.31% -16.80%
> sockperf 1472 bytes: -22.51% -18.40% -12.25% -15.95%
>
> So for the more randomized variant sockperf tanks and is already slower
> than stuffing with thunks in the compiler provided padding space.
>
> I send out a patch in reply to this series which implements that variant,
> but there needs to be input from the security researchers how protective
> this is. If we could get away with 2 RET pathes (perhaps multiple instances
> with different bits), that would be amazing.
Here is goes.
---
Subject: x86/retbleed: Add confusion mitigation
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 11:41:05 +0200
- NOT FOR INCLUSION -
Experimental option to confuse the return path by randomization.
The following command line options enable this:
retbleed=confuse 4 return pathes
retbleed=confuse,4 4 return pathes
retbleed=confuse,3 3 return pathes
retbleed=confuse,2 2 return pathes
This need scrunity by security researchers.
Not-Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 23 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 6 +++
kernel/entry/common.c | 3 +
6 files changed, 153 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2538,6 +2538,18 @@ config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
Only enable this, when you are debugging call thunks as this
creates a noticable runtime overhead. If unsure say N.
+config RETURN_CONFUSION
+ bool "Mitigate RSB underflow with return confusion"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && RETHUNK && RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile the kernel with return path confusion to mitigate the
+ Intel SKL Return-Speculation-Buffer (RSB) underflow issue. The
+ mitigation is off by default and needs to be enabled on the
+ kernel command line via the retbleed=confuse option. For
+ non-affected systems the overhead of this option is marginal as
+ the return thunk jumps are patched to direct ret instructions.
+
config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -312,6 +312,29 @@ static inline void x86_set_skl_return_th
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION
+extern void __x86_return_confused_skl2(void);
+extern void __x86_return_confused_skl3(void);
+extern void __x86_return_confused_skl4(void);
+
+static inline void x86_set_skl_confused_return_thunk(int which)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case 2:
+ x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_confused_skl2;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_confused_skl3;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ x86_return_thunk = &__x86_return_confused_skl4;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#else
+static inline void x86_set_skl_confused_return_thunk(void) { }
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
#define GEN(reg) \
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
@@ -785,6 +786,7 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_CONFUSE,
};
enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -793,6 +795,7 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB,
RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_CONFUSE,
};
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
@@ -802,6 +805,7 @@ const char * const retbleed_strings[] =
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF] = "Mitigation: Stuffing",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_CONFUSE] = "Mitigation: Return confusion",
};
static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -810,6 +814,7 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retb
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
+static int __ro_after_init rethunk_confuse_skl = 4;
static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
@@ -833,8 +838,19 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "stuff")) {
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "confuse")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_CONFUSE;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
retbleed_nosmt = true;
+ } else if (retbleed_cmd == RETBLEED_CMD_CONFUSE &&
+ !kstrtouint(str, 10, &rethunk_confuse_skl)) {
+
+ if (rethunk_confuse_skl < 2 ||
+ rethunk_confuse_skl > 4) {
+ pr_err("Ignoring out-of-bound stuff count (%d).",
+ rethunk_confuse_skl);
+ rethunk_confuse_skl = 4;
+ }
} else {
pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str);
}
@@ -896,6 +912,25 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
}
break;
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_CONFUSE:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION) &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE &&
+ random_kstack_offset_enabled()) {
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_CONFUSE;
+ } else {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION) &&
+ random_kstack_offset_enabled())
+ pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=confuse depends on randomize_kstack_offset=y\n");
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION) &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled != SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+ pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=confuse depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
+ else
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETURN_CONFUSION.\n");
+
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ }
+ break;
+
do_cmd_auto:
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
@@ -939,6 +974,11 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
x86_set_skl_return_thunk();
break;
+ case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_CONFUSE:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ x86_set_skl_confused_return_thunk(rethunk_confuse_skl);
+ break;
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1389,6 +1429,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF &&
+ retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_CONFUSE &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -230,3 +230,71 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_skl)
SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_return_skl)
#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION
+ .align 64
+SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_confused_skl4)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ testq $3, %rsp
+ jz 1f
+
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+1:
+ testq $6, %rsp
+ jz 2f
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+
+2:
+ testq $5, %rsp
+ jz 3f
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+3:
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_return_confused_skl4)
+
+ .align 64
+SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_confused_skl3)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ testq $3, %rsp
+ jz 1f
+
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+1:
+ testq $6, %rsp
+ jz 2f
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+
+2:
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_return_confused_skl3)
+
+ .align 64
+SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_confused_skl2)
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ testq $3, %rsp
+ jz 1f
+
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+1:
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(__x86_return_confused_skl2)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETURN_CONFUSION */
--- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
+++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
@@ -84,9 +84,15 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \
} \
} while (0)
+
+#define random_kstack_offset_enabled() \
+ static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
+ &randomize_kstack_offset)
+
#else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { } while (0)
#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { } while (0)
+#define random_kstack_offset_enabled() false
#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
#endif
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ void syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work(stru
noinstr void irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ add_random_kstack_offset();
__enter_from_user_mode(regs);
}
@@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_en
{
irqentry_state_t irq_state;
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ add_random_kstack_offset();
irq_state.lockdep = lockdep_hardirqs_enabled();
__nmi_enter();
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-18 19:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 142+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-16 23:17 [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call depth tracking mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 01/38] x86/paravirt: Ensure proper alignment Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 02/38] x86/cpu: Use native_wrmsrl() in load_percpu_segment() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 0:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-07-17 15:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-17 19:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 20:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 20:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 21:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 5:11 ` Juergen Gross
2022-07-18 6:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 8:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 9:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 10:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 11:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 0/3] x86/cpu: Sanitize switch_to_new_gdt() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 1/3] x86/cpu: Remove segment load from switch_to_new_gdt() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 18:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 2/3] x86/cpu: Get rid of redundant switch_to_new_gdt() invocations Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 17:52 ` [patch 3/3] x86/cpu: Re-enable stackprotector Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 03/38] x86/modules: Set VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS in module_alloc() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 04/38] x86/vdso: Ensure all kernel code is seen by objtool Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 05/38] btree: Initialize early when builtin Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 06/38] objtool: Allow GS relative relocs Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 07/38] objtool: Track init section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 08/38] objtool: Add .call_sites section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 09/38] objtool: Add .sym_sites section Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 10/38] objtool: Add --hacks=skylake Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 11/38] objtool: Allow STT_NOTYPE -> STT_FUNC+0 tail-calls Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 12/38] x86/entry: Make sync_regs() invocation a tail call Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 13/38] x86/modules: Make module_alloc() generally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 14/38] x86/Kconfig: Add CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 15/38] x86/retbleed: Add X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 16/38] modules: Make struct module_layout unconditionally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 17/38] module: Add arch_data to module_layout Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 18/38] mm/vmalloc: Provide huge page mappings Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 19/38] x86/module: Provide __module_alloc() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 20/38] x86/alternatives: Provide text_poke_[copy|set]_locked() Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 21/38] x86/entry: Make some entry symbols global Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 22/38] x86/paravirt: Make struct paravirt_call_site unconditionally available Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 23/38] x86/callthunks: Add call patching for call depth tracking Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 24/38] module: Add layout for callthunks tracking Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 25/38] x86/modules: Add call thunk patching Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 26/38] x86/returnthunk: Allow different return thunks Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 27/38] x86/asm: Provide ALTERNATIVE_3 Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 28/38] x86/retbleed: Add SKL return thunk Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 29/38] x86/retpoline: Add SKL retthunk retpolines Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:17 ` [patch 30/38] x86/retbleed: Add SKL call thunk Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 31/38] x86/calldepth: Add ret/call counting for debug Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 32/38] static_call: Add call depth tracking support Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 33/38] kallsyms: Take callthunks into account Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 34/38] x86/orc: Make it callthunk aware Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 35/38] kprobes: Add callthunk blacklisting Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 36/38] x86/ftrace: Make it call depth tracking aware Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 21:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-19 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 13:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 37/38] x86/bpf: Emit call depth accounting if required Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 5:30 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-07-19 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-16 23:18 ` [patch 38/38] x86/retbleed: Add call depth tracking mitigation Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 9:45 ` [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: Call " David Laight
2022-07-17 15:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-17 17:56 ` David Laight
2022-07-17 19:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 19:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 20:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 21:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 21:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 22:47 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-18 22:55 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 23:08 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-18 23:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 23:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 0:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-19 1:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 17:19 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-20 21:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 8:21 ` David Laight
2022-07-21 10:56 ` David Laight
2022-07-21 15:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 17:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 18:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-21 18:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-21 18:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-21 20:22 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-22 0:16 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-22 10:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-22 15:38 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-21 22:01 ` David Laight
2022-07-22 11:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-22 13:27 ` David Laight
2022-07-23 9:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 0:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 0:19 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-19 17:21 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 17:58 ` Joao Moreira
2022-07-19 8:26 ` David Laight
2022-07-19 16:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 17:23 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 17:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-19 18:06 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-19 20:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-18 22:48 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 22:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-18 23:10 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-18 23:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 23:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 9:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-20 16:55 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-20 19:42 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-07-22 20:11 ` Tim Chen
2022-07-22 22:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-18 19:55 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2022-07-19 10:24 ` Virt " Andrew Cooper
2022-07-19 14:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 16:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-07-19 21:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-07-19 14:45 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-07-19 20:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 16:57 ` [patch 00/38] x86/retbleed: " Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 17:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 17:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-20 17:50 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 18:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-20 19:11 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2022-07-20 19:43 ` Steven Rostedt
2022-07-20 21:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
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