From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx4/FCYHSlkSu58ua2QSNe+df3diDqJSayZKhd60RwsNSYX5Woe7QIoMKK6Yi60V1FUQcFikn ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1523464894; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=ER++7DmpGuSX/rxkw+hJdSeaTQufUS7EL8yH+OdLKITz6/UF8VGaRCsBUaC7RbYxlL /oP1fsM3zkv3MvUZ9Jx9HDl+3EnqTGAlOH+sAGYyJ4ux0ewvDnJaL9/WB7NfiLxZ+m0M Ny8tEPMcq+Exl1CPDSlB6WVS/87xgEX7z66gKZPyxU5iJVUzl8ldfCjar5QdP5xjxMgf D8kNLqcaqQ7W8bD97YqkyulHoASub6vSapGhI9P4fffxrmWrfkNjcATrx3E06GLy7NAi BmasW/OQ2Bpk4VpGlBW7OZVNQywXNiPJmkCsPOFoj7NWvgUcJ7A+ezDHqiSURDGL3Au3 h82w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=subject:mime-version:user-agent:message-id:in-reply-to:date :references:cc:to:from:arc-authentication-results; bh=diBYqF2Fp2au6HW5o5mKcKeLkhIgSsPnQATwEp4wGrI=; b=TTVcCqtJGvAANo+Yx/owlpxgC8PSGpCKesRl/HKQ2sC3VEvTzTyWAu+kGfp4USNGHm GLR1sQQExymNQQylE1qRbJoZqmok6G2dONOjK2MmxHJIoE3si5qzBfjulLv4M8ZZFl8k b7mDMnupzUqG/fqvAhmYkEJnVzNjjKufbgrwVN67PviLMJ6ef4nEjzDionpn9gy4Sq4k NBV8sCMJKo1Tq+hz6WYBiBuqAsvYiXRMhHzwS0g6TsTHoYVwGf3t3T24+iH42x0KU4n1 ylj8BNbdf5pA7xwKgNV4cWK2oTSKWOe2umPoj7P9K9z+AUJGx/srWoGP/gKpPPjkMIUL Q9lw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of ebiederm@xmission.com designates 166.70.13.231 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=ebiederm@xmission.com Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of ebiederm@xmission.com designates 166.70.13.231 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=ebiederm@xmission.com From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Christian Brauner Cc: Kirill Tkhai , davem@davemloft.net, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, avagin@virtuozzo.com, serge@hallyn.com References: <20180404194857.29375-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> <442e89b8-e947-6eeb-1bcb-fa28f22a25f0@virtuozzo.com> <20180405140709.GA1697@gmail.com> <941de2b9-332f-75fc-f8ac-4059a9b5426f@virtuozzo.com> <20180405144130.GB26043@gmail.com> <87in953ryi.fsf@xmission.com> <20180409154627.GA15157@gmail.com> <878t9wx8xw.fsf@xmission.com> <20180410143515.GA14186@gmail.com> <87in8zumpd.fsf@xmission.com> <20180411090907.GA20340@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 11:40:14 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20180411090907.GA20340@gmail.com> (Christian Brauner's message of "Wed, 11 Apr 2018 11:09:08 +0200") Message-ID: <87tvshlms1.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1f6IoK-0000dv-UN;;;mid=<87tvshlms1.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=97.119.140.30;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+ulIwkHJLsC1RwWPQTFoanrWA9hza7xn8= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 97.119.140.30 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 1.0 T_XMDrugObfuBody_04 obfuscated drug references X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Christian Brauner X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 2538 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.08 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 8 (0.3%), b_tie_ro: 7 (0.3%), parse: 3.1 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 60 (2.4%), get_uri_detail_list: 20 (0.8%), tests_pri_-1000: 17 (0.7%), tests_pri_-950: 2.6 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 1.83 (0.1%), tests_pri_-400: 90 (3.6%), check_bayes: 81 (3.2%), b_tokenize: 40 (1.6%), b_tok_get_all: 19 (0.7%), b_comp_prob: 12 (0.5%), b_tok_touch_all: 5 (0.2%), b_finish: 0.86 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 2332 (91.9%), check_dkim_signature: 1.50 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 6 (0.2%), tests_pri_500: 13 (0.5%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] netns: filter uevents correctly X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1596846368169451603?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1597468725773475610?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Christian Brauner writes: > On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 10:04:46AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Christian Brauner writes: >> >> > On Mon, Apr 09, 2018 at 06:21:31PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> Christian Brauner writes: >> >> >> >> > On Thu, Apr 05, 2018 at 10:59:49PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> >> Christian Brauner writes: >> >> >> >> >> >> > On Thu, Apr 05, 2018 at 05:26:59PM +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote: >> >> >> >> On 05.04.2018 17:07, Christian Brauner wrote: >> >> >> >> > On Thu, Apr 05, 2018 at 04:01:03PM +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On 04.04.2018 22:48, Christian Brauner wrote: >> >> >> >> >>> commit 07e98962fa77 ("kobject: Send hotplug events in all network namespaces") >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> enabled sending hotplug events into all network namespaces back in 2010. >> >> >> >> >>> Over time the set of uevents that get sent into all network namespaces has >> >> >> >> >>> shrunk. We have now reached the point where hotplug events for all devices >> >> >> >> >>> that carry a namespace tag are filtered according to that namespace. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> Specifically, they are filtered whenever the namespace tag of the kobject >> >> >> >> >>> does not match the namespace tag of the netlink socket. One example are >> >> >> >> >>> network devices. Uevents for network devices only show up in the network >> >> >> >> >>> namespaces these devices are moved to or created in. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> However, any uevent for a kobject that does not have a namespace tag >> >> >> >> >>> associated with it will not be filtered and we will *try* to broadcast it >> >> >> >> >>> into all network namespaces. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> The original patchset was written in 2010 before user namespaces were a >> >> >> >> >>> thing. With the introduction of user namespaces sending out uevents became >> >> >> >> >>> partially isolated as they were filtered by user namespaces: >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> net/netlink/af_netlink.c:do_one_broadcast() >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), p->net)) { >> >> >> >> >>> if (!(nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID)) >> >> >> >> >>> return; >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> if (!peernet_has_id(sock_net(sk), p->net)) >> >> >> >> >>> return; >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> if (!file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, p->net->user_ns, >> >> >> >> >>> CAP_NET_BROADCAST)) >> >> >> >> >>> j return; >> >> >> >> >>> } >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> The file_ns_capable() check will check whether the caller had >> >> >> >> >>> CAP_NET_BROADCAST at the time of opening the netlink socket in the user >> >> >> >> >>> namespace of interest. This check is fine in general but seems insufficient >> >> >> >> >>> to me when paired with uevents. The reason is that devices always belong to >> >> >> >> >>> the initial user namespace so uevents for kobjects that do not carry a >> >> >> >> >>> namespace tag should never be sent into another user namespace. This has >> >> >> >> >>> been the intention all along. But there's one case where this breaks, >> >> >> >> >>> namely if a new user namespace is created by root on the host and an >> >> >> >> >>> identity mapping is established between root on the host and root in the >> >> >> >> >>> new user namespace. Here's a reproducer: >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> sudo unshare -U --map-root >> >> >> >> >>> udevadm monitor -k >> >> >> >> >>> # Now change to initial user namespace and e.g. do >> >> >> >> >>> modprobe kvm >> >> >> >> >>> # or >> >> >> >> >>> rmmod kvm >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> will allow the non-initial user namespace to retrieve all uevents from the >> >> >> >> >>> host. This seems very anecdotal given that in the general case user >> >> >> >> >>> namespaces do not see any uevents and also can't really do anything useful >> >> >> >> >>> with them. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> Additionally, it is now possible to send uevents from userspace. As such we >> >> >> >> >>> can let a sufficiently privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the owning user >> >> >> >> >>> namespace of the network namespace of the netlink socket) userspace process >> >> >> >> >>> make a decision what uevents should be sent. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> This makes me think that we should simply ensure that uevents for kobjects >> >> >> >> >>> that do not carry a namespace tag are *always* filtered by user namespace >> >> >> >> >>> in kobj_bcast_filter(). Specifically: >> >> >> >> >>> - If the owning user namespace of the uevent socket is not init_user_ns the >> >> >> >> >>> event will always be filtered. >> >> >> >> >>> - If the network namespace the uevent socket belongs to was created in the >> >> >> >> >>> initial user namespace but was opened from a non-initial user namespace >> >> >> >> >>> the event will be filtered as well. >> >> >> >> >>> Put another way, uevents for kobjects not carrying a namespace tag are now >> >> >> >> >>> always only sent to the initial user namespace. The regression potential >> >> >> >> >>> for this is near to non-existent since user namespaces can't really do >> >> >> >> >>> anything with interesting devices. >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner >> >> >> >> >>> --- >> >> >> >> >>> lib/kobject_uevent.c | 10 +++++++++- >> >> >> >> >>> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c >> >> >> >> >>> index 15ea216a67ce..cb98cddb6e3b 100644 >> >> >> >> >>> --- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c >> >> >> >> >>> +++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c >> >> >> >> >>> @@ -251,7 +251,15 @@ static int kobj_bcast_filter(struct sock *dsk, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) >> >> >> >> >>> return sock_ns != ns; >> >> >> >> >>> } >> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> - return 0; >> >> >> >> >>> + /* >> >> >> >> >>> + * The kobject does not carry a namespace tag so filter by user >> >> >> >> >>> + * namespace below. >> >> >> >> >>> + */ >> >> >> >> >>> + if (sock_net(dsk)->user_ns != &init_user_ns) >> >> >> >> >>> + return 1; >> >> >> >> >>> + >> >> >> >> >>> + /* Check if socket was opened from non-initial user namespace. */ >> >> >> >> >>> + return sk_user_ns(dsk) != &init_user_ns; >> >> >> >> >>> } >> >> >> >> >>> #endif >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> So, this prohibits to listen events of all devices except network-related >> >> >> >> >> in containers? If it's so, I don't think it's a good solution. Uevents is not >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > No, this is not correct: As it is right now *without my patch* no >> >> >> >> > non-initial user namespace is receiving *any uevents* but those >> >> >> >> > specifically namespaced such as those for network devices. This patch >> >> >> >> > doesn't change that at all. The commit message outlines this in detail >> >> >> >> > how this comes about. >> >> >> >> > There is only one case where this currently breaks and this is as I >> >> >> >> > outlined explicitly in my commit message when you create a new user >> >> >> >> > namespace and map container(0) -> host(0). This patch fixes this. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Could you please point the place, where non-initial user namespaces are filtered? >> >> >> >> I only see the kobj_bcast_filter() logic, and it used to return 0, which means "accepted". >> >> >> >> Now it will return 1 sometimes. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Oh sure, it's in the commit message though. The callchain is >> >> >> > lib/kobject_uevent.c:kobject_uevent_net_broadcast() -> >> >> >> > nnet/netlink/af_netlink.c:netlink_broadcast_filtered() -> >> >> >> > net/netlink/af_netlink.c:do_one_broadcast(): >> >> >> > >> >> >> > This codepiece will check whether the openened socket holds >> >> >> > CAP_NET_BROADCAST in the user namespace of the target network namespace >> >> >> > which it won't because we don't have device namespaces and all devices >> >> >> > belong to the initial set of namespaces. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > if (!file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, p->net->user_ns, >> >> >> > CAP_NET_BROADCAST)) >> >> >> > j return; >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> The above that only applies if someone has set NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID >> >> >> on their socket and has had someone with the appropriate privileges >> >> >> assign a peerrnetid. >> >> >> >> >> >> All of which is to say that file_ns_capable is not nearly as applicable >> >> >> as it might be, and if you can pass the other two checks I think it is >> >> >> pointless (because the peernet attributes are not generated for >> >> >> kobj_uevents) but valid to receive events from outside your network >> >> >> namespace. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I might be missing something but I don't see anything excluding network >> >> >> namespaces owned by !init_user_ns excluded from the kobject_uevent >> >> >> logic. >> >> >> >> >> >> The uevent_sock_list has one entry per network namespace. And >> >> >> kobject_uevent_net_broacast appears to walk each one. >> >> >> >> >> >> I had a memory of filtering uevent messages and I had a memory >> >> >> that the netlink_has_listeners had a per network namespace effect. >> >> >> Neither seems true from my inspection of the code tonight. >> >> >> >> >> >> If we are not filtering ordinary uevents at least at the user namespace >> >> >> level that does seem to be at least a nuisance. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Christian can you dig a little deeper into this. I have a feeling that >> >> >> there are some real efficiency improvements that we could make to >> >> >> kobject_uevent_net_broadcast if nothing else. >> >> >> >> >> >> Perhaps you could see where uevents are broadcast by poking >> >> >> the sysfs uevent of an existing device, and triggering a retransmit. >> >> > >> >> > @Eric, so I did some intensive testing over the weekend and forget everything I >> >> > said before. Uevents are not filtered by the kernel at the moment. This is >> >> > currently - apart from network devices - a pure userspace thing. Specifically, >> >> > anyone on the host can listen to all uevents from everywhere. It's neither >> >> > filtered by user nor by network namespace. The fact that I used >> >> > >> >> > udevadm --debug monitor >> >> > >> >> > to test my prior hypothesis was what led me to believe that uevents are already >> >> > correctly filtered. >> >> > Instead, what is actually happening is that every udev implementation out there >> >> > is discarding uevents that were send by uids != 0 in the CMSG_DATA. >> >> > Specifically, >> >> >> >> Yes. I remember something of the sort. I believe udev also filters to >> >> ensure that the netlink port id == 0 to ensure the message came from >> >> the kernel and was not spoofed in any way. >> >> >> >> > - legacy standalone udevd: >> >> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/hotplug/udev.git/snapshot/udev-062.tar.gz >> >> > - eudevd >> >> > https://github.com/gentoo/eudev/blob/6f630d32bf494a457171b3f99e329592497bf271/src/libudev/libudev-monitor.c#L645 >> >> > - systemd-udevd >> >> > https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/e89ab7f219a399ab719c78cf43c07c0da60bd151/src/libudev/libudev-monitor.c#L656 >> >> > - ueventd (Android) >> >> > https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core.git/+/android-8.1.0_r22/libcutils/uevent.c#81 >> >> > >> >> > For all of those I could trace this behavior back to the first released >> >> > version. (To be precise, for legacy udevd that eventually became systemd-udevd >> >> > I could trace it back to the first version that is still available on >> >> > git.kernel.org which is 062. Since eudevd is a fork of systemd-udevd it is >> >> > trivially true that it has the same behavior from the beginning.) >> >> > >> >> > In any case, userspace udev is not making use of uevents at all right now since >> >> > any uid != 0 events are **explicitly** discarded. >> >> > The fact that you receive uevents for >> >> > >> >> > sudo unshare -U --map-root -n >> >> > udevadm --debug monitor >> >> > >> >> > is simply explained by the fact that container(0) <=> host(0) at which point >> >> > the uid in CMSG_DATA will be 0 in the new user namespace and udev will not >> >> > discard it. >> >> > The use case for receiving uevents in containers/user namespaces is definitely >> >> > there but that's what the uevent injection patch series was for that we merged. >> >> > This is a much safer and saner solution. >> >> > The fact that all udev implementations filter uevents by uid != 0 very much >> >> > seems like a security mechanism in userspace that we probably should provide by >> >> > isolating uevents based on user and/or network namespaces. >> >> >> >> So in summary. Uevents are filtered in a user namespace (by userspace) >> >> because the received uid != 0. It instead == 65534 == "nobody" because >> >> the global root uid is not mapped. >> > >> > Exactly. >> > >> >> >> >> Which means that we can modify the kernel to not send to all network >> >> namespaces whose user_ns != &init_user_ns because we know that userspace >> >> will ignore the message because of the uid anyway. Which means when >> > >> > Yes. >> > >> >> net-next reopens you can send that patch. But please base it on just >> >> not including network namespaces in the list, as that is much more >> >> efficient than adding more conditions to the filter. >> > >> > I'll send a patch out once net-next reopens. I'll also make sure to >> > inform all udev userspace implementations of the change. It won't affect >> > them but it is nice for them to know that they're safer now. >> >> The real danger is in a user namespace or in a container really is too >> many daemons responding to events will generate a thundering hurd of >> activity when there is really nothing to do. >> >> > Something like this (Proper commit message and so on will be added once >> > I sent this out.): >> >> Exactly. >> >> I would make the comment say something like: "ignore all but the initial >> user namespace". > > Yeah, agreed. > But I think the patch is not complete. To guarantee that no non-initial > user namespace actually receives uevents we need to: > 1. only sent uevents to uevent sockets that are located in network > namespaces that are owned by init_user_ns > 2. filter uevents that are sent to sockets in mc_list that have opened a > uevent socket that is owned by init_user_ns *from* a > non-init_user_ns > > We account for 1. by only recording uevent sockets in the global uevent > socket list who are owned by init_user_ns. > But to account for 2. we need to filter by the user namespace who owns > the socket in mc_list. So in addition to that we also need to slightly > change the filter logic in kobj_bcast_filter() I think: > > diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c > index 22a2c1a98b8f..064d7d29ace5 100644 > --- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c > +++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c > @@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static int kobj_bcast_filter(struct sock *dsk, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) > return sock_ns != ns; > } > > - return 0; > + /* Check if socket was opened from non-initial user namespace. */ > + return sk_user_ns(dsk) != &init_user_ns; > } > #endif > > > But correct me if I'm wrong. You are worrying about NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID sockets. That has permissions and an explicit opt-in to receiving packets from multiple network namespaces. There is a netlink CMSG that tells you which network namespace the packet comes from. Something any sane person will use if they set NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID. There is no problem of confusion. There is no problem of permissions. So we don't need to worry about preventing NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID listeners from seeing the uevents. Eric