linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	fuse-devel <fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] fuse: Add support for mounts from pid/user namespaces
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 11:05:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wq8reftb.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJfpegs3QNdKMZWmN324OqHFw+e2qwU9kfkQ491==yP_JRrcWw@mail.gmail.com> (Miklos Szeredi's message of "Thu, 25 Sep 2014 17:04:04 +0200")

Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> writes:

> On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 7:10 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>
>
>> So in summary I see:
>> - Low utility in being able to manipulate files with bad uids.
>> - Bad uids are mostly likely malicious action.
>> - make_bad_inode is trivial to analyze.
>> - No impediments to change if I am wrong.
>>
>> So unless there is a compelling case, right now I would recommend
>> returning -EIO initially.   That allows us to concentrate on the easier
>> parts of this and it leaves the changes only in fuse.
>
> The problem with marking the inode bad is that it will mark it bad for
> all instances of this filesystem.  Including ones which are in a
> namespace where the UIDs make perfect sense.

There are two cases:
app <-> fuse
fuse <-> server

I proposed mark_bad_inode for "userspace server -> fuse".
Where we have one superblock and one server so and one namespace that
they decide to talk in when the filesystem was mounted.

I think bad_inode is a reasonable response when the filesystem server
starts spewing non-sense.

> So that really doesn't look like a good solution.
>
> Doing the check in inode_permission() might be too heavyweight, but
> it's still the only one that looks sane.

For the "app <-> fuse" case we already have checks in inode_permision
that are kuid based that handle that case.  We use kuids not for
performance (although there is a small advatnage) but to much more to
keep the logic simple and maintainable.


For the "app -> fuse" case in .setattr we do need a check to verify
that the uid and gid are valid.  However that check was added with
the basic user namespace support and fuse current returns -EOVERFLOW
when that happens.

Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-25 18:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-02 15:44 [PATCH v2 0/3] fuse: Add support for mounts from pid/user namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-09-02 15:44 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] vfs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2014-09-05 17:05   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-05 19:00     ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-05 19:23       ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-02 15:44 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] fuse: Translate pids passed to userspace into pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-09-05 17:10   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-02 15:44 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] fuse: Add support for mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-09-05 16:48   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-05 17:36     ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-05 19:25       ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-05 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] fuse: Add support for mounts from pid/user namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-09-10 12:35 ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-10 16:21   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-09-10 16:42     ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-11 18:10       ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-23 22:29         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-09-24 13:29           ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-24 17:10             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-09-25 15:04               ` Miklos Szeredi
2014-09-25 16:21                 ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-25 18:05                 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2014-09-25 18:44                   ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-25 18:53                     ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-25 19:14                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-09-25 19:48                       ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-27  1:41                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-09-27  4:24                           ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-29 19:34                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-09-30 16:25                               ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-05 16:48                                 ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-06 16:00                                   ` Serge Hallyn
2014-10-06 16:31                                     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-06 16:36                                       ` Serge Hallyn
2014-09-23 16:07 ` Miklos Szeredi
2014-09-23 16:26   ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-23 17:03     ` Miklos Szeredi
2014-09-23 17:33       ` Seth Forshee
2014-09-23 21:46       ` Eric W. Biederman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87wq8reftb.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org \
    --to=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
    --cc=serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).