From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755788AbdKBRaC convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Nov 2017 13:30:02 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:54962 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754138AbdKBRaA (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Nov 2017 13:30:00 -0400 DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 351F67D0F9 Authentication-Results: ext-mx02.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx02.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=fail smtp.mailfrom=dhowells@redhat.com Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <1508774083.3639.124.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1508774083.3639.124.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <150842468754.7923.10037578333644594134.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> To: Mimi Zohar Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <8968.1509643795.1@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 17:29:55 +0000 Message-ID: <8969.1509643795@warthog.procyon.org.uk> X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.26]); Thu, 02 Nov 2017 17:30:00 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Mimi, I've adjusted the patch as below. David --- commit bf33218ad2bf04f1b92f5c32499ab906f107864c Author: Chun-Yi Lee Date: Wed May 24 14:56:03 2017 +0100 kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down unless IMA can be used to validate the image. This code was showed in Matthew's patch but not in git: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/13/778 Cc: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: James Morris cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 9f48f4412297..3ba28fc3fab0 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -255,6 +255,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; + /* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not + * going to verify the signature on them + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && + !is_ima_appraise_enabled() && + kernel_is_locked_down("kexec of unsigned images")) + return -EPERM; + /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) return -EINVAL;