From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<x86@kernel.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add warning for CVE-2021-3656
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2021 10:51:07 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8f4be85e44f5997e24d534423b9d9b4dbcaa5d84.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4c04106a-fd8e-fb54-799f-06331a3e65b9@intel.com>
On Tue, 2021-10-12 at 01:30 +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 9/14/2021 11:48 PM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > Just in case, add a warning ensuring that on guest entry,
> > either both VMLOAD and VMSAVE intercept is enabled or
> > vVMLOAD/VMSAVE is enabled.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > index 861ac9f74331..deeebd05f682 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> > @@ -3784,6 +3784,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >
> > WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu));
> >
> > + /* Check that CVE-2021-3656 can't happen again */
> > + if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE) ||
> > + !svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE))
>
> either one needs to be INTERCEPT_VMLOAD, right?
Oops! Of course.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
>
> > + WARN_ON(!(svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &
> > + VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK));
> > +
> > sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
> >
> > if (unlikely(svm->asid != svm->vmcb->control.asid)) {
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-12 7:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-14 15:48 [PATCH 00/14] nSVM fixes and optional features Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 01/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: restore int_vector in svm_clear_vintr Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 02/14] KVM: x86: selftests: test simultaneous uses of V_IRQ from L1 and L0 Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 03/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: test eax for 4K alignment for GP errata workaround Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 04/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: don't copy pause related settings Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 05/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: don't copy virt_ext from vmcb12 Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 06/14] KVM: x86: SVM: don't set VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts on vCPU reset Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 16:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 07/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add warning for CVE-2021-3656 Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 16:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-12 0:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-10-11 17:30 ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-10-12 7:51 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 08/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add module param to control LBR virtualization Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 09/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 10/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested LBR virtualization Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 11/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 12/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add module param to control TSC scaling Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 13/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested " Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 14/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: support PAUSE filter threshold and count Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 16:54 ` [PATCH 00/14] nSVM fixes and optional features Paolo Bonzini
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=8f4be85e44f5997e24d534423b9d9b4dbcaa5d84.camel@redhat.com \
--to=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsd@redhat.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
--cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
--cc=wei.huang2@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).