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From: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:05:04 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8z0aRQyD-6Krqntk8UD9WQjK5JSqEai2Pt5oeFU2EplgxoWiHlX5nlJXwCDHQ1WcS1oIprXimgz7UvwHCWDB9Z3dYFrEmZmtkEJSqaYMel8=@protonmail.ch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFzPo-dip8dgyo0U+g5qai9SAJU+D1c+AFJ0zV9_PBAB8Q@mail.gmail.com>

On April 11, 2018 8:09 PM, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 9:24 AM, David Howells dhowells@redhat.com wrote:
> 
> > Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
> > 
> > should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
> > 
> > allow the running kernel image to be changed, including:
> > 
> > -   /dev/mem and similar
> > -   Loading of unauthorised modules
> > -   Fiddling with MSR registers
> > -   Suspend to disk managed by the kernel
> > -   Use of device DMA
> 
> So what I stlll absolutely detest about this series is that I think
> 
> many of these things should simply be done as separate config options.
> 
> For example, if the distro is sure that it doesn't need /dev/mem, then
> 
> why the hell is this tied to "lockdown" that then may have to be
> 
> disabled because other changes may not be acceptable (eg people may
> 
> need that device DMA, or whatever).
> 
> If that /dev/mem access prevention was just instead done as an even
> 
> stricter mode of the existing CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, it could just be
> 
> enabled unconditionally.

CONFIG_DEVMEM=n

> 
> So none of these patches raise my hackles per se. But what continues
> 
> to makes me very very uncomfortable is how this is all tied together.
> 
> Why is this one magical mode that then - because it has such a big
> 
> impact - has to be enabled/disabled as a single magical mode and with
> 
> very odd rules?
> 
> I think a lot of people would be happier if this wasn't so incestuous
> 
> and mixing together independent things under one name, and one flag.
> 
> I think a lot of the secure boot problems were exacerbated by that mixup.
> 
> So I would seriously ask that the distros that have been using these
> 
> patches look at which parts of lockdown they could make unconditional
> 
> (because it doesn't break machines), and which ones need that escape
> 
> clause.
> 
> Linus
> 

​Jordan

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-11 21:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-11 16:24 [PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2018-04-11 16:44   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-11 17:37   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50     ` Miguel Ojeda
2018-04-11 19:56       ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 17:49   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 18:09   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-11 18:35     ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-11 21:05     ` Jordan Glover [this message]
2018-04-11 22:38       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12 13:09         ` Justin Forbes
2018-04-12 16:52           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-12  2:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2018-04-11 17:05   ` Jann Horn
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-11 16:24 ` [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2018-04-11 19:00   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 20:09     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-12 11:38       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-04-11 20:05   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:38   ` David Howells
2018-04-22 14:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-26  7:26     ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-26  7:34       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2018-04-26  8:20       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-05-23  8:46         ` joeyli
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:25 ` [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2018-04-11 17:22   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2018-04-11 16:26 ` [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf David Howells
2018-04-11 16:27 ` [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-04-11 17:26   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-11 18:50   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-04-11 19:54   ` Greg KH
2018-04-11 20:08   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:09   ` David Howells
2018-04-11 20:33     ` Greg KH
2018-04-12  2:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-12  8:23         ` Greg KH
2018-04-12 14:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-13 20:22   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-19 14:35   ` David Howells
2018-05-10 11:01     ` Pavel Machek

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