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From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v4] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 16:19:00 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <95c83ff6-0dee-d81d-6a3c-12de24cbbf32@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230203051459.1354589-1-aik@amd.com>

Ping? Thanks,

On 3/2/23 16:14, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> Prior to SEV-ES, KVM stored/loaded host debug registers upon switching
> to/from a VM. Changing those registers inside a running SEV VM
> triggered #VC exit to KVM.
> 
> SEV-ES added the encrypted state (ES) which uses an encrypted guest page
> for the VM state (VMSA). The hardware saves/restores certain registers on
> VMRUN/VMEXIT according to a swap type (A, B, C), see
> "Table B-3. Swap Types" in the AMD Architecture Programmer’s Manual
> volume 2.
> 
> AMD Milan (Fam 19h) introduces support for the debug registers swapping.
> DR6 and DR7 are always swapped. DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK are swapped
> a type B when SEV_FEATURES[5] ("DebugSwap") is set.
> 
> Enable DebugSwap in VMSA. But only do so if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0]
> ("NoNestedDataBp", "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints") is
> supported by the SOC as otherwise a malicious SEV-ES guest can set up
> data breakpoints on the #VC IDT entry/stack and cause an infinite loop.
> 
> Eliminate DR7 and #DB intercepts as:
> - they are not needed when DebugSwap is supported;
> - #VC for these intercepts is most likely not supported anyway and
> kills the VM.
> Keep DR7 intercepted unless DebugSwap enabled to prevent the infinite #DB
> loop DoS.
> 
> While at this, move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c and move #DB intercept
> next to DR7 intercept.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
> ---
> Changes:
> v4:
> * removed sev_es_is_debug_swap_enabled() helper
> * made sev_es_debug_swap_enabled (module param) static
> * set sev_feature early in sev_es_init_vmcb() and made intercepts
>    dependend on it vs. module param
> * move set_/clr_dr_intercepts to .c
> 
> v3:
> * rewrote the commit log again
> * rebased on tip/master to use recently defined X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP
> * s/boot_cpu_has/cpu_feature_enabled/
> 
> v2:
> * debug_swap moved from vcpu to module_param
> * rewrote commit log
> 
> ---
> Tested with:
> ===
> int x;
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
>          x = 1;
>          return 0;
> }
> ===
> gcc -g a.c
> rsync a.out ruby-954vm:~/
> ssh -t ruby-954vm 'gdb -ex "file a.out" -ex "watch x" -ex r'
> 
> where ruby-954vm is a VM.
> 
> With "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/debug_swap = 0", gdb does not stop
> on the watchpoint, with "= 1" - gdb does.
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h     | 42 -------------
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c     | 24 ++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c     | 65 +++++++++++++++++++-
>   4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index cb1ee53ad3b1..665515c7edae 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ enum avic_ipi_failure_cause {
>   #define AVIC_HPA_MASK	~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
>   #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK		0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
>   
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
>   
>   struct vmcb_seg {
>   	u16 selector;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 4826e6cc611b..653fd09929df 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -389,48 +389,6 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3
>   	return test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
>   }
>   
> -static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> -{
> -	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> -
> -	if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
> -	}
> -
> -	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> -	vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> -
> -	recalc_intercepts(svm);
> -}
> -
> -static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> -{
> -	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> -
> -	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
> -
> -	/* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */
> -	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> -		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> -	}
> -
> -	recalc_intercepts(svm);
> -}
> -
>   static inline void set_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 bit)
>   {
>   	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 86d6897f4806..af775410c5eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>   #include <asm/pkru.h>
>   #include <asm/trapnr.h>
>   #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
> +#include <asm/debugreg.h>
>   
>   #include "mmu.h"
>   #include "x86.h"
> @@ -52,9 +53,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
>   static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
> +
> +/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
> +static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
> +module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0644);
>   #else
>   #define sev_enabled false
>   #define sev_es_enabled false
> +#define sev_es_debug_swap false
>   #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
>   
>   static u8 sev_enc_bit;
> @@ -2249,6 +2255,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   out:
>   	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
>   	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
> +	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
> +		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
>   #endif
>   }
>   
> @@ -2940,6 +2948,7 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
>   static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>   {
>   	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> +	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
>   
>   	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
>   	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
> @@ -2988,6 +2997,9 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>   		if (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
>   			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
>   	}
> +
> +	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
> +		save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
>   }
>   
>   void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> @@ -3027,6 +3039,18 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
>   
>   	/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
>   	hostsa->xss = host_xss;
> +
> +	/* The DebugSwap SEV feature does Type B swaps of DR[0-3] */
> +	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
> +		hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
> +		hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
> +		hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
> +		hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
> +		hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
> +		hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
> +		hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
> +		hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 60c7c880266b..f8e222bee22a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -671,6 +671,65 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>   
>   }
>   
> +static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> +	bool intercept;
> +
> +	if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
> +		struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
> +
> +		intercept = !(save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP);
> +	} else {
> +		intercept = true;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (intercept) {
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> +		set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
> +	}
> +
> +	recalc_intercepts(svm);
> +}
> +
> +static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> +	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
> +
> +	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest unless DebugSwap
> +	 * (depends on NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) is enabled as otherwise a VM writing to DR7
> +	 * from the #DB handler may trigger infinite loop of #DB's.
> +	 */
> +	if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && (save->sev_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP)) {
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
> +		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
> +	}
> +
> +	recalc_intercepts(svm);
> +}
> +
>   static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
>   {
>   	u32 i;
> @@ -1184,13 +1243,11 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
>   		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
>   
> -	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
> -
>   	set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
>   	set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
>   	set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
>   	set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
> -	set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
>   	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
> @@ -1308,6 +1365,8 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
>   		sev_init_vmcb(svm);
>   
> +	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
> +
>   	svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
>   	init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
>   

-- 
Alexey

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-21  5:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-20  3:10 [PATCH kernel v3 0/3] KVM: SEV: Enable AMD SEV-ES DebugSwap Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-20  3:10 ` [PATCH kernel v3 1/3] x86/amd: Cache debug register values in percpu variables Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 19:27   ` [tip: x86/cpu] " tip-bot2 for Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-20  3:10 ` [PATCH kernel v3 2/3] KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-31 19:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-01  2:20     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-01 19:32       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-03 12:26         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-01  2:18   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-03  3:37     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-03  5:14       ` [PATCH kernel v4] " Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-02-21  5:19         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2023-03-14  9:43           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-03-21  6:56             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-03-23 17:40         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-29 15:13           ` Tom Lendacky
2023-03-23 16:39       ` [PATCH kernel v3 2/3] " Sean Christopherson
2023-03-24  4:05         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-20  3:10 ` [PATCH kernel v3 3/3] x86/sev: Do not handle #VC for DR7 read/write Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-20  5:12   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-20 10:23     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-20 12:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-25  3:11         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-25  5:44           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-24 10:37       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-24 12:37         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-01-24 13:17           ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-01-30  0:56   ` [PATCH kernel v4 " Alexey Kardashevskiy

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