From: "Fuchs, Andreas" <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net"
<tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"David Safford" <safford@us.ibm.com>,
"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: RE: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH 4/4] keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2015 18:57:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9F48E1A823B03B4790B7E6E69430724D9D7AE4FB@EXCH2010A.sit.fraunhofer.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151003102655.GA9372@intel.com>
Hi Jarkko,
thanks for the clearification...
However, I'd recommend against doing so.
Furthermore, if there is a resource-manager running in userspace, applications only get virtual handles and TPM might be empty actually...
If that's what you're aiming for, I'd recommend passing the pointer to a context-saved-blob and have the kernel load the key this way. That ensures no problems with resource-manager and handle-mixups.
Cheers,
Andreas
________________________________________
From: Jarkko Sakkinen [jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 03, 2015 12:26
To: Fuchs, Andreas
Cc: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; David Howells; gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; open list:KEYS-TRUSTED; open list:KEYS-TRUSTED; James Morris; David Safford; akpm@linux-foundation.org; Serge E. Hallyn
Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH 4/4] keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips
On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 10:00:59AM +0000, Fuchs, Andreas wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
>
> [snip]
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
> index ff001a5..fc32c47 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.h
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
> #define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
> #define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
>
> +/* Transient object handles start from 0x80000000 in TPM 2.0, which makes it
> + * a sane default.
> + */
> +
> +#define TPM1_SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
> +#define TPM2_SRKHANDLE 0x80000000
> +
> #define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
> #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
> #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
>
> This TPM2_SRKHANDLE is unfortunately wrong.
>
> Transient handles are assigned and returned by the TPM following the
> commands TPM2_CreatePrimary, TPM2_LoadObject and TPM2_ContextLoad. You
> can only use transient handles as returned by the TPM in order to
> refer to the corresponding object created inside the TPM via these
> commands. They can never assumed to be constant. The fact that TPMs
> return 0x80000000 for the first loaded Object and 0x80000001 for the
> second is merely a coincidence... ;-)
>
> TPM2 also has no (single) SRK anymore. You have to create your own SRK
> / Storage Primary Keys via TPM2_CreatePrimary and use the transient
> handle returned from there. This however requires SH-authorization,
> usually via Policy IMHO, so not easy to manage. So IMHO, this might be
> something for the future but for the moment relying on a persistent
> key would be better...
>
> For persistent SRKs it should become a convention to have those
> around. Those handles start with 0x81000000 and the SRKs (or Storage
> primary Keys) shall live within 0x81000000 to 0x8100FFFF (see
> http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/registry_of_reserved_tpm_20_handles_and_localities)
>
> I'd recommend to rely on the existence of a handle inside this range
> with an empty auth-value. So maybe install a persistent SRK to
> 0x81000000 via TPM2_EvictControl and then use this from within the
> kernel for anything following.
> P.S. You should check for the key's TPMA_OBJECT to have fixedTPM SET.
> I don't know if there is an actual test for owner-generated SRK
> testing. I'll ask around though...
>
> Note: you can query for handles in this range via
> TPM2_GetCapability(TPM_CAP_HANDLES, 0x81000000) and then look for
> fitting keys.
>
>
> Feel free to discuss other approaches.
I'm fully aware of all what you said. My take was to use 0x800000000 as
a default value if you don't the handle ID explicitly in 'description'
parameter of the add_key() syscall.
> Cheers,
> Andreas
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-04 18:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-02 8:38 [PATCH 0/4] Basic trusted keys support for TPM 2.0 Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-02 8:38 ` [PATCH 1/4] tpm: introduce struct tpm_buf Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-02 8:38 ` [PATCH 2/4] trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.h Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-02 8:38 ` [PATCH 3/4] tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0 Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-13 17:34 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2015-10-13 19:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-02 8:38 ` [PATCH 4/4] keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-03 10:00 ` [tpmdd-devel] " Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-03 10:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-03 10:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-04 18:57 ` Fuchs, Andreas [this message]
2015-10-05 8:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-05 9:00 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-05 11:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-05 12:20 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-05 13:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-05 13:36 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-05 13:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-05 14:13 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-05 14:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-05 15:20 ` Arthur, Will C
2015-10-06 6:22 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-06 12:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-06 13:16 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-06 15:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-07 10:04 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-07 10:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2015-10-07 10:32 ` Fuchs, Andreas
2015-10-07 11:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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