[PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability

[PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability

[Alexey Budankov]

Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and
observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1]
with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].

This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would
assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
and observability subsystems of the kernel.

CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during performance 
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is 
available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to
performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability
singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements
the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability 
operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security
design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those
privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

CAP_PERFMON intends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring
and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass
users of a system, and securely unblock accessibility of system performance 
monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.

CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system
performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man
page [2] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to
kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for
secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged
with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.

Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities
balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations
more secure and accessible could be to use the existing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability
to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
However CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability still provides users with more credentials
than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations
and this excess is avoided by the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.

Although software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related
hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the
official hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software
itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to
maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability
operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies
backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.

The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core
sha1: 0cc4bd8f70d1ea2940295f1050508c663fe9eff9

---
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks in perfmon_capable() to explicitly advertise CAP_PERFMON
  usage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamed CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CAP_PERFMON
- extended perfmon_capable() with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- converted perfmon_capable() into an inline function
- made perf_events kprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available
  to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- applied perfmon_capable() to drivers/perf and drivers/oprofile
- extended __cmd_ftrace() with support of CAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implemented perfmon_capable() macros aggregating required capabilities checks
Changes in v2:
- made perf_events trace points available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- made perf_event_paranoid_check() treat CAP_SYS_PERFMON equally to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- applied CAP_SYS_PERFMON to i915_perf, bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system
  performance monitoring and observability related subsystems

---
Alexey Budankov (10):
  capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
  perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
  drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
  drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c           |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c         |  4 ++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c    | 13 ++++++-------
 drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c     |  2 +-
 drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c          |  4 ++--
 include/linux/capability.h          |  4 ++++
 include/linux/perf_event.h          |  6 +++---
 include/uapi/linux/capability.h     |  8 +++++++-
 kernel/events/core.c                |  6 +++---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c            |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  4 ++--
 tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c         |  5 +++--
 tools/perf/design.txt               |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h               |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c             | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c              |  1 +
 16 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

---
Testing and validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+, x86_64):

libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply CAP_PERFMON 
capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the
scope permitted by the system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting [9] and
below are the steps for evaluation:

  - patch, build and boot the kernel
  - patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf
  ...
  # git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap
  # pushd libcap
  # patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1]
  # make
  # pushd progs
  # ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
  # ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
  /home/user/perf: OK
  # ./getcap /home/user/perf
  /home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep
  # echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
  # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 
  2
  ...
  $ /home/user/perf top
    ... works as expected ...
  $ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status
  Name:	perf
  Umask:	0002
  State:	S (sleeping)
  Tgid:	2958
  Ngid:	0
  Pid:	2958
  PPid:	9847
  TracerPid:	0
  Uid:	500	500	500	500
  Gid:	500	500	500	500
  FDSize:	256
  ...
  CapInh:	0000000000000000
  CapPrm:	0000004400080000
  CapEff:	0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
                                     cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog
  CapBnd:	0000007fffffffff
  CapAmb:	0000000000000000
  NoNewPrivs:	0
  Seccomp:	0
  Speculation_Store_Bypass:	thread vulnerable
  Cpus_allowed:	ff
  Cpus_allowed_list:	0-7
  ...

Usage of cap_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess:

- with cap_sys_admin:
  CapEff:	0000007fffffffff => 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111

- with cap_perfmon:
  CapEff:	0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
                                    38   34               19
                               perfmon   syslog           sys_ptrace

---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html

-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

[Alexey Budankov]

Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
and observability subsystems.

CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.

CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.

Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/capability.h          | 4 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/capability.h     | 8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..027d7e4a853b 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
+{
+	return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..8b416e5f3afa 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
 
 #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37
 
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_PERFMON		38
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_PERFMON
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..c599b0c2b0e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
 	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
 
 #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
-		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon"
 
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON
 #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
 #endif
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under
CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials,
excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 2173c23c25b4..d956c81bd310 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.

perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index d956c81bd310..c6453320ffea 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9088,7 +9088,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/*
@@ -9148,7 +9148,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/*
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support

[Alexey Budankov]

Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option
to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check()
and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states 
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., 
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only 
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c |  5 +++--
 tools/perf/design.txt       |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h       |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c     | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c      |  1 +
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c
index d5adc417a4ca..55eda54240fb 100644
--- a/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c
+++ b/tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c
@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv)
 		.events = POLLIN,
 	};
 
-	if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) ||
+	      perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) {
 		pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n",
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT
-		"users with the SYS_ADMIN capability"
+		"users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability"
 #else
 		"root"
 #endif
diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt
index 0453ba26cdbd..a42fab308ff6 100644
--- a/tools/perf/design.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/design.txt
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for
 their own tasks.
 
 A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts
-all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
+all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+privilege.
 
 The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
index 051dc590ceee..ae52878c0b2e 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)
 #define CAP_SYSLOG	34
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CAP_PERFMON
+#define CAP_PERFMON	38
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index a69e64236120..a35f17723dd3 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2491,14 +2491,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
 		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
 		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
+		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
 		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
+		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
 		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
 		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
 				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 969ae560dad9..51cf3071db74 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)
 bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level)
 {
 	return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+			perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) ||
 			perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that
a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities)
necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time
that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_perf subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure i915_perf monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
index 2ae14bc14931..d89347861b7d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c
@@ -3375,10 +3375,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct i915_perf *perf,
 	/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option
 	 * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option
 	 * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters
-	 * without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
+	 * without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
 	 */
 	if (privileged_op &&
-	    i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	    i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to open i915 perf stream\n");
 		ret = -EACCES;
 		goto err_ctx;
@@ -3571,9 +3571,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct i915_perf *perf,
 			} else
 				oa_freq_hz = 0;
 
-			if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate &&
-			    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-				DRM_DEBUG("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n",
+			if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable()) {
+				DRM_DEBUG("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n",
 					  i915_oa_max_sample_rate);
 				return -EACCES;
 			}
@@ -3994,7 +3993,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -4141,7 +4140,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 	}
 
-	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable()) {
 		DRM_DEBUG("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n");
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that
a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities)
necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time
that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index e5ef4ae9edb5..334f1d71ebb1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)
 	u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and
only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
index cb50a9e1fd2d..e837717492e4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/* Return if this is a couting event */
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and
only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and
only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
index 4e4984a55cd1..5dff81bc3324 100644
--- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
 		reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT);
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
 		reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT);
 
 	return reg;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
+	if (!perfmon_capable() &&
 	    (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) |
 		    BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) |
 		    BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without 
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c b/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c
index 12ea4a4ad607..6c9edc8bbc95 100644
--- a/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c
+++ b/drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	int err = -EPERM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &buffer_opened))
-- 
2.20.1

Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

[Stephen Smalley]

On 2/5/20 12:30 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> 
> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
> and observability subsystems.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
> monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
> is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
> to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
> Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
> or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
> to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
> privileges are actually required)
> 
> CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
> observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
> multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
> environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
> mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
> 
> CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
> monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
> developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
> performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
> usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
> is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
> 
> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
> following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
> in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
> process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
> and observability operations.
> 
> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

This will require a small update to the selinux-testsuite to correctly 
reflect the new capability requirements, but that's easy enough.

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

> ---
>   include/linux/capability.h          | 4 ++++
>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     | 8 +++++++-
>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
>   3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index ecce0f43c73a..027d7e4a853b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
> +{
> +	return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +}
>   
>   /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>   extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 240fdb9a60f6..8b416e5f3afa 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>   
>   #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37
>   
> +/*
> + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
> + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
> + */
> +
> +#define CAP_PERFMON		38
>   
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_PERFMON
>   
>   #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>   
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 7db24855e12d..c599b0c2b0e7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
>   	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
>   
>   #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> -		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
> +		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon"
>   
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON
>   #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
>   #endif
>   
> 

Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

[Alexey Budankov]

On 06.02.2020 21:23, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 2/5/20 12:30 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>
>> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance
>> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
>> and observability subsystems.
>>
>> CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
>> monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
>> is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
>> to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
>> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
>> chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
>> Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
>> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle
>> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
>> or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
>> to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
>> privileges are actually required)
>>
>> CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
>> observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
>> multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
>> environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
>> mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
>>
>> CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
>> monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>> credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
>> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
>> developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
>> performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
>> usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
>> is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
>>
>> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
>> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
>> following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
>> in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
>> process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
>> and observability operations.
>>
>> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
>> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> 
> This will require a small update to the selinux-testsuite to correctly reflect the new capability requirements, but that's easy enough.

Is the suite a part of the kernel sources or something else?

~Alexey

> 
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> 
>> ---
>>   include/linux/capability.h          | 4 ++++
>>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     | 8 +++++++-
>>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
>>   3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
>> index ecce0f43c73a..027d7e4a853b 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
>>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
>> +{
>> +    return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> +}
>>     /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>>   extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> index 240fdb9a60f6..8b416e5f3afa 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>> @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>>     #define CAP_AUDIT_READ        37
>>   +/*
>> + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
>> + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
>> + */
>> +
>> +#define CAP_PERFMON        38
>>   -#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
>> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_PERFMON
>>     #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>>   diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> index 7db24855e12d..c599b0c2b0e7 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
>>           "audit_control", "setfcap"
>>     #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
>> -        "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
>> +        "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon"
>>   -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
>> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON
>>   #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
>>   #endif
>>  
> 

Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

[Stephen Smalley]

On 2/6/20 1:26 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> 
> On 06.02.2020 21:23, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 2/5/20 12:30 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>>
>>> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance
>>> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist
>>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
>>> and observability subsystems.
>>>
>>> CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
>>> monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
>>> is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
>>> to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
>>> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
>>> chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
>>> Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
>>> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle
>>> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
>>> or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
>>> to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
>>> privileges are actually required)
>>>
>>> CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
>>> observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
>>> multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
>>> environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
>>> mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
>>>
>>> CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
>>> monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>>> credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
>>> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
>>> developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
>>> performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
>>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
>>> usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
>>> is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
>>>
>>> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
>>> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
>>> following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
>>> in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
>>> process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
>>> and observability operations.
>>>
>>> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>>> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
>>> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>>
>> This will require a small update to the selinux-testsuite to correctly reflect the new capability requirements, but that's easy enough.
> 
> Is the suite a part of the kernel sources or something else?

It is external,
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite

I wasn't suggesting that your patch be blocked on updating the 
testsuite, just noting that it will need to be done.

Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

[Alexey Budankov]

On 06.02.2020 21:30, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 2/6/20 1:26 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>
>> On 06.02.2020 21:23, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On 2/5/20 12:30 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance
>>>> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist
>>>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring
>>>> and observability subsystems.
>>>>
>>>> CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
>>>> monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
>>>> is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
>>>> to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
>>>> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
>>>> chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.
>>>> Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
>>>> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle
>>>> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
>>>> or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
>>>> to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
>>>> privileges are actually required)
>>>>
>>>> CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
>>>> observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
>>>> multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
>>>> environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
>>>> mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.
>>>>
>>>> CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
>>>> monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>>>> credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
>>>> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
>>>> developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
>>>> performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
>>>> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
>>>> usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
>>>> is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
>>>>
>>>> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
>>>> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
>>>> following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
>>>> in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
>>>> process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
>>>> and observability operations.
>>>>
>>>> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>>>> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
>>>> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>>>
>>> This will require a small update to the selinux-testsuite to correctly reflect the new capability requirements, but that's easy enough.
>>
>> Is the suite a part of the kernel sources or something else?
> 
> It is external,
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite
> 
> I wasn't suggesting that your patch be blocked on updating the testsuite, just noting that it will need to be done.

Ok. Thanks!

~Alexey

Re: [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[James Morris]

On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
> index cb50a9e1fd2d..e837717492e4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
> @@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>  	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
>  		return -ENOENT;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!perfmon_capable())
>  		return -EACCES;
>  
>  	/* Sampling not supported */
> @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>  	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
>  		return -ENOENT;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!perfmon_capable())
>  		return -EACCES;
>  
>  	/* Return if this is a couting event */
> 


Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

[PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
index cb50a9e1fd2d..e837717492e4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	/* Return if this is a couting event */
-- 
2.20.1