From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
jreck@google.com, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>,
jlayton@kernel.org, Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>,
Lei.Yang@windriver.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
marcandre.lureau@redhat.com,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
minchan@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 13:40:56 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <A7EC46BC-441A-4A06-9E2F-A26DA88B5320@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez1h=v-JYnDw81HaYJzOfrNhwYksxmc2r=cJvdQVgYM+NA@mail.gmail.com>
> On Nov 9, 2018, at 1:06 PM, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>
> +linux-api for API addition
> +hughd as FYI since this is somewhat related to mm/shmem
>
> On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 9:46 PM Joel Fernandes (Google)
> <joel@joelfernandes.org> wrote:
>> Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward
>> to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly
>> remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also
>> benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers
>> are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime.
>>
>> One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region
>> and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any
>> "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed
>> writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where
>> receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while
>> the sender continues to write to the buffer.
>> See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details:
>> https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow
>>
>> This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal.
>> To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal
>> which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while
>> keeping the existing mmap active.
>
> Please CC linux-api@ on patches like this. If you had done that, I
> might have criticized your v1 patch instead of your v3 patch...
>
>> The following program shows the seal
>> working in action:
> [...]
>> Cc: jreck@google.com
>> Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
>> Cc: tkjos@google.com
>> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
>> Cc: hch@infradead.org
>> Reviewed-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
>> ---
> [...]
>> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
>> index 2bb5e257080e..5ba9804e9515 100644
>> --- a/mm/memfd.c
>> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> [...]
>> @@ -219,6 +220,25 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> + if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) &&
>> + !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) {
>> + /*
>> + * The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking
>> + * so we need them to be already set, or requested now.
>> + */
>> + int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) &
>> + (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
>> +
>> + if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) {
>> + error = -EINVAL;
>> + goto unlock;
>> + }
>> +
>> + spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
>> + file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE);
>> + spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
>> + }
>
> So you're fiddling around with the file, but not the inode? How are
> you preventing code like the following from re-opening the file as
> writable?
>
> $ cat memfd.c
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <printf.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <err.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
>
> int main(void) {
> int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_create, "testfd", 0);
> if (fd == -1) err(1, "memfd");
> char path[100];
> sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
> int fd2 = open(path, O_RDWR);
> if (fd2 == -1) err(1, "reopen");
> printf("reopen successful: %d\n", fd2);
> }
> $ gcc -o memfd memfd.c
> $ ./memfd
> reopen successful: 4
> $
>
> That aside: I wonder whether a better API would be something that
> allows you to create a new readonly file descriptor, instead of
> fiddling with the writability of an existing fd.
Every now and then I try to write a patch to prevent using proc to reopen a file with greater permission than the original open.
I like your idea to have a clean way to reopen a a memfd with reduced permissions. But I would make it a syscall instead and maybe make it only work for memfd at first. And the proc issue would need to be fixed, too.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-09 21:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-08 4:15 [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd Joel Fernandes (Google)
2018-11-08 4:15 ` [PATCH v3 resend 2/2] selftests/memfd: Add tests for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal Joel Fernandes (Google)
2018-11-09 8:49 ` [PATCH v3 resend 1/2] mm: Add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd Joel Fernandes
2018-11-09 20:36 ` Andrew Morton
2018-11-10 3:54 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-09 21:06 ` Jann Horn
2018-11-09 21:19 ` Jann Horn
2018-11-10 3:20 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-10 6:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-10 18:24 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-10 18:45 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-10 19:11 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-10 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-10 22:09 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-10 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 2:38 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-11 3:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 4:01 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-11 8:09 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-11 8:30 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-11 15:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 17:36 ` Joel Fernandes
[not found] ` <CAKOZuethC7+YrRyyGciUCfhSSa9cCcAFJ8g_qEw9uh3TBbyOcg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-11-10 17:10 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-09 21:40 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-09 20:02 ` Michael Tirado
2018-11-10 1:49 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-09 22:20 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-09 22:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-09 22:42 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-09 23:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-10 1:36 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-09 23:46 ` Joel Fernandes
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