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Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:42 -0400
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/13] seccomp_filters: new mode with configurable
 syscall filters
From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
        torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@elte.hu,
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On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 4:34 PM, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> (Any thoughts specifically on the mutex use would be greatly appreciated!)
>
> This change adds a new seccomp mode which specifies the allowed system
> calls dynamically.

One thing to consider (not sure if it's been discussed, but I think
not) is whether some of the LSMs should hook this.

Notably, it looks like SELinux doesn't have an access vector for prctl
at all now; it doesn't hook task_prctl from what I see, and so we fall
back to cap_task_prctl.  While I know the idea of restricting a
process' ability to enter seccomp is a bit perverse, we should
probably at least allow mandatory controls.  James?