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From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 12:15:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <BL0PR11MB3281D8D615FA521401B8E320E7CE0@BL0PR11MB3281.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202003241604.7269C810B@keescook>


> > Also, are you sure that it isn't possible to make the syscall that
> > leaked its stack pointer never return to userspace (via ptrace or
> > SIGSTOP or something like that), and therefore never realign its
> > stack, while keeping some controlled data present on the syscall's
> > stack?

How would you reliably detect that a stack pointer has been leaked
to userspace while it has been in a syscall? Does not seem to be a trivial
task to me. 

Best Regards,
Elena. 

  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-25 12:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-24 20:32 Kees Cook
2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook
2020-03-24 22:06   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds Kees Cook
2020-03-26 15:48   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2020-03-30 11:25   ` Mark Rutland
2020-03-30 18:18     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-30 18:27     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook
2020-03-28 22:26   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook
2020-03-25 13:21   ` Mark Rutland
2020-03-25 20:22     ` Kees Cook
2020-03-26 11:15       ` Mark Rutland
2020-03-26 16:31         ` Kees Cook
2020-03-30 11:26           ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-20 20:54   ` Will Deacon
2020-04-20 22:34     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-21  7:02       ` Will Deacon
2020-03-24 21:28 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Jann Horn
2020-03-24 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 12:15     ` Reshetova, Elena [this message]
2020-03-25 20:27       ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 23:20         ` Jann Horn
2020-03-26 17:18           ` Kees Cook

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