From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <email@example.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Ingo Molnar <email@example.com>, Borislav Petkov <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
X86 ML <email@example.com>, Herbert Xu <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
"Williams, Dan J" <email@example.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
"Shankar, Ravi V" <email@example.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] x86: Support Intel Key Locker
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 18:21:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <C08CCADB-864B-48E0-89E0-4BF6841771E8@intel.com> (raw)
On May 15, 2021, at 11:01, Andy Lutomirski <email@example.com> wrote:
> On 5/14/21 1:14 PM, Chang S. Bae wrote:
>> Key Locker  is a new security feature available in new Intel CPUs to
>> protect data encryption keys for the Advanced Encryption Standard
>> algorithm. The protection limits the amount of time an AES key is exposed
>> in memory by sealing a key and referencing it with new AES instructions.
>> The new AES instruction set is a successor of Intel's AES-NI (AES New
>> Instruction). Users may switch to the Key Locker version from crypto
>> libraries. This series includes a new AES implementation for the Crypto
>> API, which was validated through the crypto unit tests. The performance in
>> the test cases was measured and found comparable to the AES-NI version.
>> Key Locker introduces a (CPU-)internal key to encode AES keys. The kernel
>> needs to load it and ensure it unchanged as long as CPUs are operational.
> I have high-level questions:
> What is the expected use case?
The wrapping key here is only used for new AES instructions.
I’m aware of their potential use cases for encrypting file system or disks.
> My personal hypothesis, based on various
> public Intel slides, is that the actual intended use case was internal
> to the ME, and that KL was ported to end-user CPUs more or less
No, this is a separate one. The feature has nothing to do with the firmware
except that in some situations it merely helps to back up the key in its
> I certainly understand how KL is valuable in a context where
> a verified boot process installs some KL keys that are not subsequently
> accessible outside the KL ISA, but Linux does not really work like this.
Do you mind elaborating on the concern? I try to understand any issue with
PATCH3 , specifically.
> I'm wondering what people will use it for.
> On a related note, does Intel plan to extend KL with ways to securely
> load keys? (E.g. the ability to, in effect, LOADIWKEY from inside an
> enclave? Key wrapping/unwrapping operations?) In other words, is
> should we look at KL the way we look at MKTME, i.e. the foundation of
> something neat but not necessarily very useful as is, or should we
> expect that KL is in its more or less final form?
All I have is pretty much in the spec. So, I think the latter is the case.
I don’t see anything about that LOADIWKEY inside an enclave in the spec. (A
relevant section is A.6.1 Key Locker Usage with TEE.)
> What is the expected interaction between a KL-using VM guest and the
> host VMM? Will there be performance impacts (to context switching, for
> example) if a guest enables KL, even if the guest does not subsequently
> do anything with it? Should Linux actually enable KL if it detects that
> it's a VM guest? Should Linux have use a specific keying method as a guest?
First of all, there is an RFC series for KVM .
Each CPU has one internal key state so it needs to reload it between guest and
host if both are enabled. The proposed approach enables it exclusively; expose
it to guests only when disabled in a host. Then, I guess a guest may enable it.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-17 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-14 20:14 [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] x86: Support Intel Key Locker Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] x86/cpufeature: Enumerate Key Locker feature Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/11] x86/insn: Add Key Locker instructions to the opcode map Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/11] x86/cpu: Load Key Locker internal key at boot-time Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/11] x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for Key Locker internal key Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/11] x86/power: Restore Key Locker internal key from the ACPI S3/4 sleep states Chang S. Bae
2021-05-24 14:21 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/11] x86/cpu: Add a config option and a chicken bit for Key Locker Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/11] selftests/x86: Test Key Locker internal key maintenance Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/11] crypto: x86/aes-ni - Improve error handling Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/11] crypto: x86/aes-ni - Refactor to prepare a new AES implementation Chang S. Bae
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/11] crypto: x86/aes-kl - Support AES algorithm using Key Locker instructions Chang S. Bae
2021-05-17 21:34 ` Eric Biggers
2021-05-17 22:20 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-05-17 23:33 ` Eric Biggers
2021-05-18 16:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/11] x86/cpu: Support the hardware randomization option for Key Locker internal key Chang S. Bae
2021-05-15 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] x86: Support Intel Key Locker Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-17 18:21 ` Bae, Chang Seok [this message]
2021-05-17 18:45 ` Dan Williams
2021-05-17 22:20 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2021-05-17 20:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-18 17:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-18 17:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-19 23:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-19 23:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-20 0:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-12-06 21:48 ` Bae, Chang Seok
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