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Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:27:31 -0400 Received: from mail-it0-f66.google.com ([209.85.214.66]:36106 "EHLO mail-it0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754164AbeDCX13 (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:27:29 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx48JAvvgTtOslSOrj99G6nHl4soy4xLRBiL0qFq6knrYqTXJxnr8y0tNz93BEH+zH/2NtGd8Y/OCFLWfGY2R4ME= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <10232.1522797179@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <4136.1522452584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <186aeb7e-1225-4bb8-3ff5-863a1cde86de@kernel.org> <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <10232.1522797179@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 16:27:28 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: 0bhHB1E77AOJB1NVuqIlkK30iso Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot To: David Howells Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Matthew Garrett , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Justin Forbes , linux-man , joeyli , LSM List , Linux API , Kees Cook , linux-efi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-efi-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:12 PM, David Howells wrote: > > What use is secure boot if processes run as root can subvert your kernel? Stop this idiocy. The above has now been answered multiple times, several different ways. The "point" of secure boot may be that you had no choice, or there was no point at all, it just came that way. Or the "point" of secure boot may be that you don't trust anybody else than yourself, but once you've booted you do trust what you booted. But the *real* point is that this has nothing what-so-ever to do with secure boot. You may want (or not want) lockdown independently of it. Don't tie magic boot issues with kernel runtime behavior. Linus