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Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:58:59 -0400 Received: from mail-io0-f193.google.com ([209.85.223.193]:42809 "EHLO mail-io0-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754363AbeDCX65 (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:58:57 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx48nWRTjoYDSuoGze+jljTc8TB949uCPux8nMjSUvBhFaT0DC0HoeYfgLtFbfBT2F9ncPOd2SQyawJBhs4IuLLE= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <11444.1522799762@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <4136.1522452584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <186aeb7e-1225-4bb8-3ff5-863a1cde86de@kernel.org> <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <11444.1522799762@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 16:58:55 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: cyyq1T8pU33kVQr3hGhmfEyM2kY Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot To: David Howells Cc: Matthew Garrett , Andrew Lutomirski , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Justin Forbes , linux-man , joeyli , LSM List , Linux API , Kees Cook , linux-efi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:56 PM, David Howells wrote: => > Most users haven't even given this a moment's thought, aren't even aware of > the issues, don't even know to ask and, for them, it makes no difference. > They trust their distribution to deal with stuff they don't know about. Right. Like perhaps trusting the distribution to just enable all those security measures _regaredless_ of whether they booted in using secure boot or not? See? If lockdown breaks something, the distro would need to fix it regardless of secure boot. So why is the enablement dependent on it again? I'm not arguing "lockdown shouldn't be on". I'm arguing "lockdown being on or off has _nothing_ to do with whether the machine was booted in EFI mode with secure boot or not". You don't seem to get it. Linus