From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755223AbeD3RBS (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Apr 2018 13:01:18 -0400 Received: from mail-io0-f171.google.com ([209.85.223.171]:46635 "EHLO mail-io0-f171.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755166AbeD3RBQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Apr 2018 13:01:16 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZpF8eTxUdPR5D0RC0kXZzK3cPzhgAxPJPhiaM+R/D0L+ftU+dhq3WV5sCPTClemfX2me39exQWCGmDusddH4zE= MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20180430124135.0cce92e3@gandalf.local.home> In-Reply-To: From: Linus Torvalds Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 17:01:04 +0000 Message-ID: Subject: Re: Hashed pointer issues To: Steven Rostedt Cc: Kees Cook , Anna-Maria Gleixner , Linux Kernel Mailing List , tcharding Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Apr 30, 2018 at 9:57 AM Linus Torvalds < torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > Although in *practice* we'd have tons of entropy on any modern development > CPU too, since any new hardware will have the hardware random number > generation. Some overly cautious person might not trust it, of course. In fact, maybe that's the right policy. Avoid a boot-time parameter by just saying "if you have hardware random number generation, we can fill entropy immediately" No kernel command line needed in practice any more. That's assuming any kernel developer will have an IvyBridge or newer. The "I don't trust my hardware" people can still disable that with "nordrand". Hmm? Linus