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Tue, 3 Apr 2018 20:15:13 -0400 Received: from mail-io0-f196.google.com ([209.85.223.196]:39747 "EHLO mail-io0-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754966AbeDDAPL (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Apr 2018 20:15:11 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx48oVLoOXDA+jXmQRwBMgYkhWS/iQwg//AFHdXC6pQ/yJ4WGFjJ3waKC8otuOj82Y1ON5Q+LUCirIcrvje6pdC4= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <4136.1522452584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <186aeb7e-1225-4bb8-3ff5-863a1cde86de@kernel.org> <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 17:15:09 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: seTIHpaoucqkbwHdl9tYGO6t8do Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Andrew Lutomirski , David Howells , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Justin Forbes , linux-man , joeyli , LSM List , Linux API , Kees Cook , linux-efi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-efi-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > >> Exactly like EVERY OTHER KERNEL CONFIG OPTION. > > So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse? Without > some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater. > There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for > verifying that you booted something you trust. Wow. Way to snip the rest of the email where I told you what the solution was. Let me repeat it here, since you so conveniently missed it and deleted it: >> Or, like a lot of other kernel options, maybe have a way to just >> disable it on the kernel command line, and let the user know about it. >> >> That would still be better than disabling secure boot entirely in your >> world view, so it's (a) more convenient and (b) better. Matthew, it's simply not worth continuing talking with you. I'll just not pull this crap, and vendors that you convince to do stupid things have only themselves to blame. You clearly have an agenda, and are not willing to look at arguments against your idiotic choices. Linus