From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 11:26:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+5PVA7SivAegwxdxuiAFL41Apie4JLK5KbtGGHLr1fP0p3MsQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu96ihE7pHrCCeCpy78man-r821b3Vs4Tn_RsYyzY4HV2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:18 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 16 November 2016 at 18:11, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>> From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
>>
>> If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
>> for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
>> MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
>> variable if it is found.
>>
>
> Similar concern as in the previous patch: it appears to me that you
> can DoS a machine by setting MokIgnoreDB if, e.g., its modules are
> signed against a cert that resides in db, and shim/mokmanager are not
> being used.
If shim/mokmanager aren't used, then you can't actually modify
MokIgnoreDB. Again, it requires physical access and a reboot into
mokmanager to actually take effect.
josh
>> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>
>> certs/load_uefi.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>> 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/certs/load_uefi.c b/certs/load_uefi.c
>> index b44e464c3ff4..3d8845986019 100644
>> --- a/certs/load_uefi.c
>> +++ b/certs/load_uefi.c
>> @@ -13,6 +13,26 @@ static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GU
>> static __initdata efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
>>
>> /*
>> + * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
>> + * it does.
>> + *
>> + * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use
>> + * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes. If it
>> + * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates
>> + * this.
>> + */
>> +static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
>> +{
>> + efi_status_t status;
>> + unsigned int db = 0;
>> + unsigned long size = sizeof(db);
>> + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
>> +
>> + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db);
>> + return status == EFI_SUCCESS;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
>> */
>> static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> @@ -113,7 +133,9 @@ static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_ty
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> - * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases
>> + * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the secondary trusted
>> + * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
>> + * keyring.
>> */
>> static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
>> {
>> @@ -129,15 +151,17 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
>> /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't
>> * an error if we can't get them.
>> */
>> - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
>> - if (!db) {
>> - pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
>> - } else {
>> - rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
>> - db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
>> - if (rc)
>> - pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
>> - kfree(db);
>> + if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
>> + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
>> + if (!db) {
>> + pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
>> + } else {
>> + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
>> + db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
>> + if (rc)
>> + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc);
>> + kfree(db);
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
>>
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-21 16:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring David Howells
2016-11-17 6:41 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 9:56 ` David Howells
2016-11-17 10:22 ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-17 11:18 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 14:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43 ` Mat Martineau
2016-11-17 9:44 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:25 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-24 19:22 ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57 ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
2016-11-21 16:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 16:26 ` Josh Boyer [this message]
2016-11-21 16:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:05 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28 ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11 3:20 ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08 ` joeyli
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