From: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>,
Calin Juravle <calin@google.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
"Cc: Android Kernel" <kernel-team@android.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>,
Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
Nitin Gupta <nigupta@nvidia.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 12:39:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+EESO7N7gFkG_Vqy5j1oCZif8RaiCJ146GrQAKq3P1SCUi+ng@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201026210052.3775167-1-lokeshgidra@google.com>
On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 2:00 PM Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> wrote:
>
> This patch series is split from [1]. The other series enables SELinux
> support for userfaultfd file descriptors so that its creation and
> movement can be controlled.
>
> It has been demonstrated on various occasions that suspending kernel
> code execution for an arbitrary amount of time at any access to
> userspace memory (copy_from_user()/copy_to_user()/...) can be exploited
> to change the intended behavior of the kernel. For instance, handling
> page faults in kernel-mode using userfaultfd has been exploited in [2, 3].
> Likewise, FUSE, which is similar to userfaultfd in this respect, has been
> exploited in [4, 5] for similar outcome.
>
> This small patch series adds a new flag to userfaultfd(2) that allows
> callers to give up the ability to handle kernel-mode faults with the
> resulting UFFD file object. It then adds a 'user-mode only' option to
> the unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob to require unprivileged
> callers to use this new flag.
>
> The purpose of this new interface is to decrease the chance of an
> unprivileged userfaultfd user taking advantage of userfaultfd to
> enhance security vulnerabilities by lengthening the race window in
> kernel code.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/
> [2] https://duasynt.com/blog/linux-kernel-heap-spray
> [3] https://duasynt.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit
> [4] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html
> [5] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808
>
> Changes since v5:
>
> - Added printk_once when unprivileged_userfaultfd is set to 0 and
> userfaultfd syscall is called without UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY in the
> absence of CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability.
>
> Changes since v4:
>
> - Added warning when bailing out from handling kernel fault.
>
> Changes since v3:
>
> - Modified the meaning of value '0' of unprivileged_userfaultfd
> sysctl knob. Setting this knob to '0' now allows unprivileged users
> to use userfaultfd, but can handle page faults in user-mode only.
> - The default value of unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob is changed
> to '0'.
>
> Changes since v2:
>
> - Removed 'uffd_flags' and directly used 'UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY' in
> userfaultfd().
>
> Changes since v1:
>
> - Added external references to the threats from allowing unprivileged
> users to handle page faults from kernel-mode.
> - Removed the new sysctl knob restricting handling of page
> faults from kernel-mode, and added an option for the same
> in the existing 'unprivileged_userfaultfd' knob.
>
> Lokesh Gidra (2):
> Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY
> Add user-mode only option to unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 15 ++++++++++-----
> fs/userfaultfd.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
> include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++++++++
> 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
>
It's been quite some time since this patch-series has received
'Reviewed-by' by Andrea. Please let me know if anything is blocking it
from taking forward.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-19 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-26 21:00 [PATCH v6 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling Lokesh Gidra
2020-10-26 21:00 ` [PATCH v6 1/2] Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY Lokesh Gidra
2020-10-26 21:00 ` [PATCH v6 2/2] Add user-mode only option to unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob Lokesh Gidra
2020-11-19 20:39 ` Lokesh Gidra [this message]
2020-11-20 1:22 ` [PATCH v6 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling Andrew Morton
2020-11-20 3:04 Lokesh Gidra
2020-11-20 3:08 ` Lokesh Gidra
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