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* [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
                   ` (6 more replies)
  0 siblings, 7 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

While tying to add support for the MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT MSR in KVM,
I realized that we were still in a world where user space has no control
over what happens with MSR emulation in KVM.

That is bad for multiple reasons. In my case, I wanted to emulate the
MSR in user space, because it's a CPU specific register that does not
exist on older CPUs and that really only contains informational data that
is on the package level, so it's a natural fit for user space to provide
it.

However, it is also bad on a platform compatibility level. Currrently,
KVM has no way to expose different MSRs based on the selected target CPU
type.

This patch set introduces a way for user space to indicate to KVM which
MSRs should be handled in kernel space. With that, we can solve part of
the platform compatibility story. Or at least we can not handle AMD specific
MSRs on an Intel platform and vice versa.

In addition, it introduces a way for user space to get into the loop
when an MSR access would generate a #GP fault, such as when KVM finds an
MSR that is not handled by the in-kernel MSR emulation or when the guest
is trying to access reserved registers.

In combination with filtering, user space trapping allows us to emulate
arbitrary MSRs in user space, paving the way for target CPU specific MSR
implementations from user space.

v1 -> v2:

  - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
  - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
    That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
  - fix emulator case
  - new patch: KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation
  - new patch: KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling

v2 -> v3:

  - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
  - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
  - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
  - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
  - Simplify trapping code
  - document flags for KVM_X86_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST
  - generalize exit path, always unlock when returning
  - s/KVM_CAP_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST/KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_ALLOWLIST/g
  - Add KVM_X86_CLEAR_MSR_ALLOWLIST
  - Add test to clear whitelist
  - Adjust to reply-less API
  - Fix asserts
  - Actually trap on MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL writes

v3 -> v4:

  - Mention exit reasons in re-enter mandatory section of API documentation
  - Clear padding bytes
  - Generalize get/set deflect functions
  - Remove redundant pending_user_msr field
  - lock allow check and clearing
  - free bitmaps on clear

v4 -> v5:

  - use srcu 

v5 -> v6:

  - Switch from allow list to filtering API with explicit fallback option
  - Support and test passthrough MSR filtering
  - Check for filter exit reason
  - Add .gitignore
  - send filter change notification
  - change to atomic set_msr_filter ioctl with fallback flag
  - use EPERM for filter blocks
  - add bit for MSR user space deflection
  - check for overflow of BITS_TO_LONGS (thanks Dan Carpenter!)
  - s/int i;/u32 i;/
  - remove overlap check
  - Introduce exit reason mask to allow for future expansion and filtering
  - s/emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)/vcpu/
  - imported patch: KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs
  - new patch: KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering
  - new patch: KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied
  - new patch: KVM: x86: VMX: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied

v6 -> v7:

  - s/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSGHROUGH_MSRS/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS/g
  - Fire #GP without skipping the MSR instruction
  - uapi: Fix padding
  - selftest: trap on KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER as well
  - selftest: fix asserts
  - selftest: add test for invalid msr handling

Aaron Lewis (1):
  KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs

Alexander Graf (6):
  KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space
  KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering
  KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied
  KVM: x86: VMX: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied
  KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering
  KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                | 176 +++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |  18 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  19 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c                        |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        | 135 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   7 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        | 303 ++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                        |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            | 267 ++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h                            |   1 +
 include/trace/events/kvm.h                    |   2 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  17 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore        |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c      | 247 ++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 1088 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c

-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering Alexander Graf
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER.
Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very
interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical.
Others again are really just windows into package configuration.

Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in
kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against
certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level
are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have
accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled
by in-kernel KVM code.

This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user
space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can
be handled in user space.

Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with
something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you
can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care
about proper MSR handling.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

---

v1 -> v2:

  - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
  - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
    That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
  - fix emulator case

v2 -> v3:

  - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
  - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
  - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
  - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
  - Simplify trapping code

v3 -> v4:

  - Mention exit reasons in re-inter mandatory section of API documentation
  - Clear padding bytes
  - Generalize get/set deflect functions
  - Remove redundant pending_user_msr field

v5 -> v6:

  - Introduce exit reason mask to allow for future expansion and filtering
  - s/emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)/vcpu/

v6 -> v7:

  - Fire #GP without skipping the MSR instruction
  - Fix padding
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  73 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c          |  18 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/trace/events/kvm.h      |   2 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |  12 ++++
 6 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index d2b733dc7892..cb998af8b4d9 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -4869,8 +4869,8 @@ to the byte array.
 
 .. note::
 
-      For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR and
-      KVM_EXIT_EPR the corresponding
+      For KVM_EXIT_IO, KVM_EXIT_MMIO, KVM_EXIT_OSI, KVM_EXIT_PAPR,
+      KVM_EXIT_EPR, KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR the corresponding
 
 operations are complete (and guest state is consistent) only after userspace
 has re-entered the kernel with KVM_RUN.  The kernel side will first finish
@@ -5163,6 +5163,42 @@ Note that KVM does not skip the faulting instruction as it does for
 KVM_EXIT_MMIO, but userspace has to emulate any change to the processing state
 if it decides to decode and emulate the instruction.
 
+::
+
+		/* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
+		struct {
+			__u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
+			__u8 pad[7];
+			__u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
+			__u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
+			__u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
+		} msr;
+
+Used on x86 systems. When the VM capability KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is
+enabled, MSR accesses to registers that would invoke a #GP by KVM kernel code
+will instead trigger a KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR exit for reads and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR
+exit for writes.
+
+The "reason" field specifies why the MSR trap occurred. User space will only
+receive MSR exit traps when a particular reason was requested during through
+ENABLE_CAP. Currently valid exit reasons are:
+
+	KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL - access to invalid MSRs or reserved bits
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
+writes the respective data into the "data" field and must continue guest
+execution to ensure the read data is transferred into guest register state.
+
+If the RDMSR request was unsuccessful, user space indicates that with a "1" in
+the "error" field. This will inject a #GP into the guest when the VCPU is
+executed again.
+
+For KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
+wants to write. Once finished processing the event, user space must continue
+vCPU execution. If the MSR write was unsuccessful, user space also sets the
+"error" field to "1".
+
 ::
 
 		/* Fix the size of the union. */
@@ -5852,6 +5888,28 @@ controlled by the kvm module parameter halt_poll_ns. This capability allows
 the maximum halt time to specified on a per-VM basis, effectively overriding
 the module parameter for the target VM.
 
+7.21 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+-------------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] contains the mask of KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_* events to report
+:Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This capability enables trapping of #GP invoking RDMSR and WRMSR instructions
+into user space.
+
+When a guest requests to read or write an MSR, KVM may not implement all MSRs
+that are relevant to a respective system. It also does not differentiate by
+CPU type.
+
+To allow more fine grained control over MSR handling, user space may enable
+this capability. With it enabled, MSR accesses that match the mask specified in
+args[0] and trigger a #GP event inside the guest by KVM will instead trigger
+KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space
+can then handle to implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
+to inform a user that an MSR was not handled.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
@@ -6173,3 +6231,14 @@ specific interfaces must be consistent, i.e. if one says the feature
 is supported, than the other should as well and vice versa.  For arm64
 see Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vcpu.rst "KVM_ARM_VCPU_PVTIME_CTRL".
 For x86 see Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst "MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME".
+
+8.25 KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
+----------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports deflection of MSR reads and
+writes to user space. It can be enabled on a VM level. If enabled, MSR
+accesses that would usually trigger a #GP by KVM into the guest will
+instead get bounced to user space through the KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and
+KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 5303dbc5c9bc..12c3f048f18b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -961,6 +961,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	bool guest_can_read_msr_platform_info;
 	bool exception_payload_enabled;
 
+	/* Deflect RDMSR and WRMSR to user space when they trigger a #GP */
+	u32 user_space_msr_mask;
+
 	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
 	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 1d450d7710d6..1f97037d9190 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -3701,11 +3701,18 @@ static int em_dr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static int em_wrmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
+	u64 msr_index = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
 	u64 msr_data;
+	int r;
 
 	msr_data = (u32)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX)
 		| ((u64)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) << 32);
-	if (ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), msr_data))
+	r = ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, msr_index, msr_data);
+
+	if (r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED)
+		return r;
+
+	if (r)
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
@@ -3713,9 +3720,16 @@ static int em_wrmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static int em_rdmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
+	u64 msr_index = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
 	u64 msr_data;
+	int r;
+
+	r = ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, msr_index, &msr_data);
+
+	if (r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED)
+		return r;
 
-	if (ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), &msr_data))
+	if (r)
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 
 	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = (u32)msr_data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 17f4995e80a7..3aea25fa9f00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1589,12 +1589,87 @@ int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr);
 
+static int complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_read)
+{
+	if (vcpu->run->msr.error) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (is_read) {
+		kvm_rax_write(vcpu, (u32)vcpu->run->msr.data);
+		kvm_rdx_write(vcpu, vcpu->run->msr.data >> 32);
+	}
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return complete_emulated_msr(vcpu, true);
+}
+
+static int complete_emulated_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return complete_emulated_msr(vcpu, false);
+}
+
+static u64 kvm_msr_reason(int r)
+{
+	switch (r) {
+	default:
+		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int kvm_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index,
+			      u32 exit_reason, u64 data,
+			      int (*completion)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu),
+			      int r)
+{
+	u64 msr_reason = kvm_msr_reason(r);
+
+	/* Check if the user wanted to know about this MSR fault */
+	if (!(vcpu->kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask & msr_reason))
+		return 0;
+
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = exit_reason;
+	vcpu->run->msr.error = 0;
+	memset(vcpu->run->msr.pad, 0, sizeof(vcpu->run->msr.pad));
+	vcpu->run->msr.reason = msr_reason;
+	vcpu->run->msr.index = index;
+	vcpu->run->msr.data = data;
+	vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = completion;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int kvm_get_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, int r)
+{
+	return kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, index, KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, 0,
+				   complete_emulated_rdmsr, r);
+}
+
+static int kvm_set_msr_user_space(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data, int r)
+{
+	return kvm_msr_user_space(vcpu, index, KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR, data,
+				   complete_emulated_wrmsr, r);
+}
+
 int kvm_emulate_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u32 ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
 	u64 data;
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_get_msr(vcpu, ecx, &data);
 
-	if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, ecx, &data)) {
+	/* MSR read failed? See if we should ask user space */
+	if (r && kvm_get_msr_user_space(vcpu, ecx, r)) {
+		/* Bounce to user space */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* MSR read failed? Inject a #GP */
+	if (r) {
 		trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx);
 		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
 		return 1;
@@ -1612,8 +1687,18 @@ int kvm_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u32 ecx = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
 	u64 data = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
+	int r;
 
-	if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, ecx, data)) {
+	r = kvm_set_msr(vcpu, ecx, data);
+
+	/* MSR write failed? See if we should ask user space */
+	if (r && kvm_set_msr_user_space(vcpu, ecx, data, r)) {
+		/* Bounce to user space */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* MSR write failed? Inject a #GP */
+	if (r) {
 		trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
 		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
 		return 1;
@@ -3511,6 +3596,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_EXCEPTION_PAYLOAD:
 	case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG:
 	case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
@@ -5031,6 +5117,10 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 		kvm->arch.exception_payload_enabled = cap->args[0];
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
+		kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0];
+		r = 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
@@ -6360,13 +6450,33 @@ static void emulator_set_segment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 selector,
 static int emulator_get_msr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			    u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
 {
-	return kvm_get_msr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), msr_index, pdata);
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_get_msr(vcpu, msr_index, pdata);
+
+	if (r && kvm_get_msr_user_space(vcpu, msr_index, r)) {
+		/* Bounce to user space */
+		return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+	}
+
+	return r;
 }
 
 static int emulator_set_msr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			    u32 msr_index, u64 data)
 {
-	return kvm_set_msr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), msr_index, data);
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	int r;
+
+	r = kvm_set_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+
+	if (r && kvm_set_msr_user_space(vcpu, msr_index, data, r)) {
+		/* Bounce to user space */
+		return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
+	}
+
+	return r;
 }
 
 static u64 emulator_get_smbase(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
diff --git a/include/trace/events/kvm.h b/include/trace/events/kvm.h
index 9417a34aad08..26cfb0fa8e7e 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/kvm.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/kvm.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 	ERSN(NMI), ERSN(INTERNAL_ERROR), ERSN(OSI), ERSN(PAPR_HCALL),	\
 	ERSN(S390_UCONTROL), ERSN(WATCHDOG), ERSN(S390_TSCH), ERSN(EPR),\
 	ERSN(SYSTEM_EVENT), ERSN(S390_STSI), ERSN(IOAPIC_EOI),          \
-	ERSN(HYPERV), ERSN(ARM_NISV)
+	ERSN(HYPERV), ERSN(ARM_NISV), ERSN(X86_RDMSR), ERSN(X86_WRMSR)
 
 TRACE_EVENT(kvm_userspace_exit,
 	    TP_PROTO(__u32 reason, int errno),
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 7d8eced6f459..8bd9baaa9eb3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_exit {
 #define KVM_EXIT_IOAPIC_EOI       26
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERV           27
 #define KVM_EXIT_ARM_NISV         28
+#define KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR        29
+#define KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR        30
 
 /* For KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR */
 /* Emulate instruction failed. */
@@ -413,6 +415,15 @@ struct kvm_run {
 			__u64 esr_iss;
 			__u64 fault_ipa;
 		} arm_nisv;
+		/* KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR / KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR */
+		struct {
+			__u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
+			__u8 pad[7];
+#define KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL	(1 << 0)
+			__u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
+			__u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
+			__u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
+		} msr;
 		/* Fix the size of the union. */
 		char padding[256];
 	};
@@ -1037,6 +1048,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR 185
 #define KVM_CAP_S390_DIAG318 186
 #define KVM_CAP_STEAL_TIME 187
+#define KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR 188
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 2/7] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs Alexander Graf
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

In the following commits we will add pieces of MSR filtering.
To ensure that code compiles even with the feature half-merged, let's add
a few stubs and struct definitions before the real patches start.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              | 1 +
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 12c3f048f18b..9bc4fa34c90b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1230,6 +1230,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	int (*enable_direct_tlbflush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	void (*migrate_timers)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	void (*msr_filter_changed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 0780f97c1850..50650cfd235a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
 	__u32 indices[0];
 };
 
+#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ  (1 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE (1 << 1)
 
 struct kvm_cpuid_entry {
 	__u32 function;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3aea25fa9f00..99234244d97b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1487,6 +1487,12 @@ void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits);
 
+bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_msr_allowed);
+
 /*
  * Write @data into the MSR specified by @index.  Select MSR specific fault
  * checks are bypassed if @host_initiated is %true.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 941f288c38aa..3900ab0c6004 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ bool kvm_vcpu_exit_request(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
 			      struct x86_exception *e);
 int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva);
+bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type);
 
 #define  KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID  2
 
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied Alexander Graf
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel,
	Oliver Upton

From: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>

Prepare vmx and svm for a subsequent change that ensures the MSR permission
bitmap is set to allow an MSR that userspace is tracking to force a vmx_vmexit
in the guest.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
[agraf: rebase, adapt SVM scheme to nested changes that came in between]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c    | 60 ++++++++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 83 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h    |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3da5b2f1b4a1..41aaee666751 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr)
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
 {
 	u8 bit_write;
 	unsigned long tmp;
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr)
 	return !!test_bit(bit_write,  &tmp);
 }
 
-static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
+static void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
 				 int read, int write)
 {
 	u8 bit_read, bit_write;
@@ -609,11 +609,10 @@ static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
 	msrpm[offset] = tmp;
 }
 
-static u32 *svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(void)
+static u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void)
 {
-	int i;
-	u32 *msrpm;
 	struct page *pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
+	u32 *msrpm;
 
 	if (!pages)
 		return NULL;
@@ -621,12 +620,18 @@ static u32 *svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(void)
 	msrpm = page_address(pages);
 	memset(msrpm, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER));
 
+	return msrpm;
+}
+
+static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm)
+{
+	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
 		if (!direct_access_msrs[i].always)
 			continue;
-		set_msr_interception(msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
 	}
-	return msrpm;
 }
 
 static void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
@@ -677,26 +682,26 @@ static void init_msrpm_offsets(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	u32 *msrpm = svm->msrpm;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
 	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
 }
 
-static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	u32 *msrpm = svm->msrpm;
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
 	svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 0, 0);
-	set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 0, 0);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
 }
 
 void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -1230,14 +1235,19 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	svm->nested.hsave = page_address(hsave_page);
 
-	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_init_msrpm();
+	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
 	if (!svm->msrpm)
 		goto error_free_hsave_page;
 
-	svm->nested.msrpm = svm_vcpu_init_msrpm();
+	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);
+
+	svm->nested.msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
 	if (!svm->nested.msrpm)
 		goto error_free_msrpm;
 
+	/* We only need the L1 pass-through MSR state, so leave vcpu as NULL */
+	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->nested.msrpm);
+
 	svm->vmcb = page_address(vmcb_page);
 	svm->vmcb_pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
 	svm->asid_generation = 0;
@@ -2572,7 +2582,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 		 * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
 		 * touching the MSR anyway now.
 		 */
-		set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
 		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
@@ -2587,7 +2597,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 			break;
 
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
-		set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
+		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
 		break;
 	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
 		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
@@ -2651,9 +2661,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 		svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl = data;
 		vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
 		if (data & (1ULL<<0))
-			svm_enable_lbrv(svm);
+			svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
 		else
-			svm_disable_lbrv(svm);
+			svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
 		break;
 	case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
 		svm->nested.hsave_msr = data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index b6ce9ce91029..d1cec5d71b34 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -4760,7 +4760,7 @@ static int enter_vmx_operation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
 		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = 0;
-		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vmx);
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 6f9a0c6d5dc5..3bb93da2a6f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
 
 static bool guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
-static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 							  u32 msr, int type);
 
 void vmx_vmexit(void);
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		 * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
 		 * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
 		 */
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu,
 					      MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
 					      MSR_TYPE_RW);
 		break;
@@ -2091,8 +2091,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
 		 * in the merging.
 		 */
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
-					      MSR_TYPE_W);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
 		if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
@@ -2142,7 +2141,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			return 1;
 		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
 		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
-		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vmx);
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
 		if (!pt_can_write_msr(vmx))
@@ -3661,9 +3660,11 @@ void free_vpid(int vpid)
 	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
 }
 
-static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 							  u32 msr, int type)
 {
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
 	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
 
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
@@ -3699,9 +3700,11 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bit
 	}
 }
 
-static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 							 u32 msr, int type)
 {
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
 	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
 
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
@@ -3737,13 +3740,13 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitm
 	}
 }
 
-static __always_inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
-			     			      u32 msr, int type, bool value)
+static __always_inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						      u32 msr, int type, bool value)
 {
 	if (value)
-		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, type);
 	else
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, type);
 }
 
 static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -3761,8 +3764,8 @@ static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return mode;
 }
 
-static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
-					 u8 mode)
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 unsigned long *msr_bitmap, u8 mode)
 {
 	int msr;
 
@@ -3777,11 +3780,11 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
 		 * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
 		 * delivery is not in use.
 		 */
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW);
 		if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
-			vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R);
-			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
-			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+			vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -3797,30 +3800,24 @@ void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return;
 
 	if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV))
-		vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode);
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu, msr_bitmap, mode);
 
 	vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
 }
 
-void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
 	u32 i;
 
-	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS,
-							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
-	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE,
-							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
-	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK,
-							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
-	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH,
-							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
 	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.addr_range; i++) {
-		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
-			MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
-		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
-			MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -6886,18 +6883,18 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto free_pml;
 
 	msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
-	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
 	if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
-		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
 	}
 	vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index d7ec66db5eb8..c964358b2fb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
 void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
-void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
 int vmx_find_msr_index(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr);
 void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 4/7] KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] KVM: x86: VMX: " Alexander Graf
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

We will introduce the concept of MSRs that may not be handled in kernel
space soon. Some MSRs are directly passed through to the guest, effectively
making them handled by KVM from user space's point of view.

This patch introduces all logic required to ensure that MSRs that
user space wants trapped are not marked as direct access for guests.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  7 ++++
 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 41aaee666751..fd2875932189 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, current_tsc_ratio);
 static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
 	u32 index;   /* Index of the MSR */
 	bool always; /* True if intercept is always on */
-} direct_access_msrs[] = {
+} direct_access_msrs[MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS] = {
 	{ .index = MSR_STAR,				.always = true  },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,		.always = true  },
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -553,15 +553,41 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 
 }
 
-static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
+static int direct_access_msr_idx(u32 msr)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++)
-		if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == index)
-			return true;
+		if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
 
-	return false;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static void set_shadow_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int read,
+				     int write)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	int idx = direct_access_msr_idx(msr);
+
+	if (idx == -EINVAL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Set the shadow bitmaps to the desired intercept states */
+	if (read)
+		set_bit(idx, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+	else
+		clear_bit(idx, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+
+	if (write)
+		set_bit(idx, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+	else
+		clear_bit(idx, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+}
+
+static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
+{
+	return direct_access_msr_idx(index) != -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
@@ -583,8 +609,8 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
 	return !!test_bit(bit_write,  &tmp);
 }
 
-static void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
-				 int read, int write)
+static void set_msr_interception_nosync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
+					u32 msr, int read, int write)
 {
 	u8 bit_read, bit_write;
 	unsigned long tmp;
@@ -596,6 +622,13 @@ static void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
 	 */
 	WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
 
+	/* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
+	if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ))
+		read = 0;
+
+	if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE))
+		write = 0;
+
 	offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
 	bit_read  = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
 	bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
@@ -609,6 +642,13 @@ static void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
 	msrpm[offset] = tmp;
 }
 
+static void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
+				 int read, int write)
+{
+	set_shadow_msr_intercept(vcpu, msr, read, write);
+	set_msr_interception_nosync(vcpu, msrpm, msr, read, write);
+}
+
 static u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void)
 {
 	struct page *pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
@@ -639,6 +679,25 @@ static void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
 	__free_pages(virt_to_page(msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
 }
 
+static void svm_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	u32 i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set intercept permissions for all direct access MSRs again. They
+	 * will automatically get filtered through the MSR filter, so we are
+	 * back in sync after this.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
+		u32 msr = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
+		u32 read = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+		u32 write = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+
+		set_msr_interception_nosync(vcpu, svm->msrpm, msr, read, write);
+	}
+}
+
 static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -4212,6 +4271,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.need_emulation_on_page_fault = svm_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
 
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+
+	.msr_filter_changed = svm_msr_filter_changed,
 };
 
 static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 45496775f0db..07bec0d5aad4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static const u32 host_save_user_msrs[] = {
 
 #define NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS ARRAY_SIZE(host_save_user_msrs)
 
+#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	15
 #define MSRPM_OFFSETS	16
 extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
 extern bool npt_enabled;
@@ -157,6 +158,12 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
 	 */
 	struct list_head ir_list;
 	spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
+	struct {
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS);
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS);
+	} shadow_msr_intercept;
 };
 
 struct svm_cpu_data {
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 5/7] KVM: x86: VMX: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering Alexander Graf
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

We will introduce the concept of MSRs that may not be handled in kernel
space soon. Some MSRs are directly passed through to the guest, effectively
making them handled by KVM from user space's point of view.

This patch introduces all logic required to ensure that MSRs that
user space wants trapped are not marked as direct access for guests.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

---

v6 -> v7:

  - s/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSGHROUGH_MSRS/MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS/g
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 226 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h |   7 ++
 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 3bb93da2a6f1..30b924c36914 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -149,6 +149,26 @@ module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
 #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK \
 	(~((1UL << cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) - 1) | 0x7f)
 
+/*
+ * List of MSRs that can be directly passed to the guest.
+ * In addition to these x2apic and PT MSRs are handled specially.
+ */
+static u32 vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS] = {
+	MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+	MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+	MSR_IA32_TSC,
+	MSR_FS_BASE,
+	MSR_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
+	MSR_CORE_C1_RES,
+	MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY,
+	MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY,
+};
+
 /*
  * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
  * ple_gap:    upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
@@ -623,6 +643,41 @@ static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
 	return flexpriority_enabled;
 }
 
+static int possible_passthrough_msr_idx(u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++)
+		if (vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i] == msr)
+			return i;
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
+{
+	bool r;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case 0x800 ... 0x8ff:
+		/* x2APIC MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic() */
+		return true;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		/* PT MSRs. These are handled in pt_update_intercept_for_msr() */
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	r = possible_passthrough_msr_idx(msr) != -ENOENT;
+
+	WARN(!r, "Invalid MSR %x, please adapt vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[]", msr);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 static inline int __find_msr_index(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -3660,12 +3715,51 @@ void free_vpid(int vpid)
 	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
 }
 
+static void vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(ulong *msr_bitmap, u32 msr)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff)
+		__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+	else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff))
+		__clear_bit(msr & 0x1fff, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+}
+
+static void vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(ulong *msr_bitmap, u32 msr)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff)
+		__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+	else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff))
+		__clear_bit(msr & 0x1fff, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(ulong *msr_bitmap, u32 msr)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff)
+		__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+	else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff))
+		__set_bit(msr & 0x1fff, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(ulong *msr_bitmap, u32 msr)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff)
+		__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+	else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff))
+		__set_bit(msr & 0x1fff, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+}
+
 static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 							  u32 msr, int type)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
-	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
 
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
 		return;
@@ -3674,30 +3768,37 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
 
 	/*
-	 * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
-	 * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
-	 * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
-	 */
-	if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
-			/* read-low */
-			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filters change.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_idx(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				clear_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
 
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
-			/* write-low */
-			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_R) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_R;
+	}
 
-	} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
-		msr &= 0x1fff;
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
-			/* read-high */
-			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+	if ((type & MSR_TYPE_W) &&
+	    !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) {
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
+		type &= ~MSR_TYPE_W;
+	}
 
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
-			/* write-high */
-			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
 
-	}
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_clear_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -3705,7 +3806,6 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
-	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
 
 	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
 		return;
@@ -3714,30 +3814,25 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
 
 	/*
-	 * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
-	 * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
-	 * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
-	 */
-	if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
-			/* read-low */
-			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
-
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
-			/* write-low */
-			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
-
-	} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
-		msr &= 0x1fff;
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
-			/* read-high */
-			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+	 * Mark the desired intercept state in shadow bitmap, this is needed
+	 * for resync when the MSR filter changes.
+	*/
+	if (is_valid_passthrough_msr(msr)) {
+		int idx = possible_passthrough_msr_idx(msr);
+
+		if (idx != -ENOENT) {
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+			if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+				set_bit(idx, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+		}
+	}
 
-		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
-			/* write-high */
-			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_read(msr_bitmap, msr);
 
-	}
+	if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+		vmx_set_msr_bitmap_write(msr_bitmap, msr);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -3764,15 +3859,14 @@ static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return mode;
 }
 
-static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					 unsigned long *msr_bitmap, u8 mode)
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 mode)
 {
 	int msr;
 
-	for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
-		unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
-		msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0;
-		msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0;
+	for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr++) {
+		bool intercepted = !!(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV);
+
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercepted);
 	}
 
 	if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) {
@@ -3792,7 +3886,6 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
 	u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu);
 	u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode;
 
@@ -3800,7 +3893,7 @@ void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return;
 
 	if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV))
-		vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu, msr_bitmap, mode);
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu, mode);
 
 	vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
 }
@@ -3841,6 +3934,29 @@ static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
 }
 
+static void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set intercept permissions for all potentially passed through MSRs
+	 * again. They will automatically get filtered through the MSR filter,
+	 * so we are back in sync after this.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs); i++) {
+		u32 msr = vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[i];
+		bool read = test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
+		bool write = test_bit(i, vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
+
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_R, read);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, msr, MSR_TYPE_W, write);
+	}
+
+	pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu);
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu, vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu));
+}
+
 static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 						     bool nested)
 {
@@ -6882,6 +6998,10 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto free_pml;
 
+	/* The MSR bitmap starts with all ones */
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+	bitmap_fill(vmx->shadow_msr_intercept.write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+
 	msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
 	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
 	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
@@ -7907,6 +8027,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
 	.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
+
+	.msr_filter_changed = vmx_msr_filter_changed,
 };
 
 static __init int hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index c964358b2fb0..cc49506c9351 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -301,6 +301,13 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	u64 ept_pointer;
 
 	struct pt_desc pt_desc;
+
+	/* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
+#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS	13
+	struct {
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(read, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(write, MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS);
+	} shadow_msr_intercept;
 };
 
 enum ept_pointers_status {
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] KVM: x86: VMX: " Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  2020-09-17 21:03   ` Aaron Lewis
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some
MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like
uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model.

To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM,
this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into
KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access.
With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the
denied MSR events to user space to operate on.

If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

---

v2 -> v3:

  - document flags for KVM_X86_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST
  - generalize exit path, always unlock when returning
  - s/KVM_CAP_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST/KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_ALLOWLIST/g
  - Add KVM_X86_CLEAR_MSR_ALLOWLIST

v3 -> v4:
  - lock allow check and clearing
  - free bitmaps on clear

v4 -> v5:

  - use srcu

v5 -> v6:

  - send filter change notification
  - change to atomic set_msr_filter ioctl with fallback flag
  - use EPERM for filter blocks
  - add bit for MSR user space deflection
  - check for overflow of BITS_TO_LONGS (thanks Dan Carpenter!)
  - s/int i;/u32 i;/
  - remove overlap check
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  14 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  21 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 145 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index cb998af8b4d9..5d27542667db 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -4704,6 +4704,94 @@ KVM_PV_VM_VERIFY
   Verify the integrity of the unpacked image. Only if this succeeds,
   KVM is allowed to start protected VCPUs.
 
+4.126 KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msr_filter
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+  struct kvm_msr_filter_range {
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ  (1 << 0)
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE (1 << 1)
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in bitmap */
+	__u32 base;  /* MSR index the bitmap starts at */
+	__u8 *bitmap; /* a 1 bit allows the operations in flags, 0 denies */
+  };
+  
+  struct kvm_msr_filter {
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW (0 << 0)
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY  (1 << 0)
+	__u32 flags;
+	struct kvm_msr_filter_range ranges[16];
+  };
+
+flags values:
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ
+
+  Filter read accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+  indicates that a read should immediately fail, while a 1 indicates that
+  a read should be handled like without the filter.
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE
+
+  Filter write accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+  indicates that a write should immediately fail, while a 1 indicates that
+  a write should be handled like without the filter.
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ | KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE
+
+  Filter booth read and write accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0
+  in the bitmap indicates that both reads and writes should immediately fail,
+  while a 1 indicates that reads and writes should be handled like without
+  the filter.
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW
+
+  If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+  fall back to allowing access to the MSR.
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY
+
+  If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+  fall back to rejecting access to the MSR. In this mode, all MSRs that should
+  be processed by KVM need to explicitly be marked as allowed in the bitmaps.
+
+This ioctl allows user space to define a up to 16 bitmaps of MSR ranges to
+specify whether a certain MSR access should be explicitly rejected or not.
+
+If this ioctl has never been invoked, MSR accesses are not guarded and the
+old KVM in-kernel emulation behavior is fully preserved.
+
+As soon as the filtering is in place, every MSR access is precessed through
+the filtering. If a bit is within one of the defined ranges, read and write
+accesses are guarded by the bitmap's value for the MSR index. If it is not
+defined in any range, whether MSR access is rejected is determined by the flags
+field of in the kvm_msr_filter struct: KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW and
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY.
+
+Calling this ioctl with an empty set of ranges (all nmsrs == 0) disables MSR
+filtering. In that mode, KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY no longer has any effect.
+
+Each bitmap range specifies a range of MSRs to potentially allow access on.
+The range goes from MSR index [base .. base+nmsrs]. The flags field
+indicates whether reads, writes or both reads and writes are filtered
+by setting a 1 bit in the bitmap for the corresponding MSR index.
+
+If an MSR access is not permitted through the filtering, it generates a
+#GP inside the guest. When combined with KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR, that
+allows user space to deflect and potentially handle various MSR accesses
+into user space.
+
+If a vCPU is in running state while this ioctl is invoked, the vCPU may
+experience inconsistent filtering behavior on MSR accesses.
+
 
 5. The kvm_run structure
 ========================
@@ -5184,6 +5272,7 @@ receive MSR exit traps when a particular reason was requested during through
 ENABLE_CAP. Currently valid exit reasons are:
 
 	KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL - access to invalid MSRs or reserved bits
+	KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER - access blocked by KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
 
 For KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR, the "index" field tells user space which MSR the guest
 wants to read. To respond to this request with a successful read, user space
@@ -6242,3 +6331,17 @@ writes to user space. It can be enabled on a VM level. If enabled, MSR
 accesses that would usually trigger a #GP by KVM into the guest will
 instead get bounced to user space through the KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and
 KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications.
+
+8.25 KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+---------------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+
+This capability indicates that KVM supports that accesses to user defined MSRs
+may be rejected. With this capability exposed, KVM exports new VM ioctl
+KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER which user space can call to specify bitmaps of MSR
+ranges that KVM should reject access to.
+
+In combination with KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR, this allows user space to
+trap and emulate MSRs that are outside of the scope of KVM as well as
+limit the attack surface on KVM's MSR emulation code.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9bc4fa34c90b..4cfca1111dc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
 #define KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH \
 	KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(27, KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
 #define KVM_REQ_APF_READY		KVM_ARCH_REQ(28)
+#define KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED	KVM_ARCH_REQ(29)
 
 #define CR0_RESERVED_BITS                                               \
 	(~(unsigned long)(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | X86_CR0_TS \
@@ -860,6 +861,13 @@ struct kvm_hv {
 	struct kvm_hv_syndbg hv_syndbg;
 };
 
+struct msr_bitmap_range {
+	u32 flags;
+	u32 nmsrs;
+	u32 base;
+	unsigned long *bitmap;
+};
+
 enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
 	KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE,
 	KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL,       /* created with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP */
@@ -964,6 +972,12 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	/* Deflect RDMSR and WRMSR to user space when they trigger a #GP */
 	u32 user_space_msr_mask;
 
+	struct {
+		u8 count;
+		bool default_allow:1;
+		struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16];
+	} msr_filter;
+
 	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
 	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 50650cfd235a..66bba91e1bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -192,8 +192,25 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
 	__u32 indices[0];
 };
 
-#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ  (1 << 0)
-#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE (1 << 1)
+/* Maximum size of any access bitmap in bytes */
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE 0x600
+
+/* for KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER */
+struct kvm_msr_filter_range {
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ  (1 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE (1 << 1)
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in bitmap */
+	__u32 base;  /* MSR index the bitmap starts at */
+	__u8 *bitmap; /* a 1 bit allows the operations in flags, 0 denies */
+};
+
+struct kvm_msr_filter {
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW (0 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY  (1 << 0)
+	__u32 flags;
+	struct kvm_msr_filter_range ranges[16];
+};
 
 struct kvm_cpuid_entry {
 	__u32 function;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index fd2875932189..45b0c180f42c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ static void set_msr_interception_nosync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
 	WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
 
 	/* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
-	if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ))
+	if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
 		read = 0;
 
-	if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE))
+	if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
 		write = 0;
 
 	offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 99234244d97b..8e3f064b15c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1489,7 +1489,35 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits);
 
 bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type)
 {
-	return true;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct msr_bitmap_range *ranges = kvm->arch.msr_filter.ranges;
+	u32 count = kvm->arch.msr_filter.count;
+	u32 i;
+	bool r = kvm->arch.msr_filter.default_allow;
+	int idx;
+
+	/* MSR filtering not set up, allow everything */
+	if (!count)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Prevent collision with set_msr_filter */
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		u32 start = ranges[i].base;
+		u32 end = start + ranges[i].nmsrs;
+		u32 flags = ranges[i].flags;
+		unsigned long *bitmap = ranges[i].bitmap;
+
+		if ((index >= start) && (index < end) && (flags & type)) {
+			r = !!test_bit(index - start, bitmap);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+	return r;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_msr_allowed);
 
@@ -1504,6 +1532,9 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
 {
 	struct msr_data msr;
 
+	if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (index) {
 	case MSR_FS_BASE:
 	case MSR_GS_BASE:
@@ -1560,6 +1591,9 @@ int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
 	struct msr_data msr;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!host_initiated && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, index, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	msr.index = index;
 	msr.host_initiated = host_initiated;
 
@@ -1621,6 +1655,8 @@ static int complete_emulated_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 static u64 kvm_msr_reason(int r)
 {
 	switch (r) {
+	case -EPERM:
+		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER;
 	default:
 		return KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL;
 	}
@@ -3603,6 +3639,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG:
 	case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU:
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
+	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
@@ -5134,6 +5171,103 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 	return r;
 }
 
+static void kvm_clear_msr_filter(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	u32 i;
+	u32 count = kvm->arch.msr_filter.count;
+	struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16];
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	kvm->arch.msr_filter.count = 0;
+	memcpy(ranges, kvm->arch.msr_filter.ranges, count * sizeof(ranges[0]));
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		kfree(ranges[i].bitmap);
+}
+
+static int kvm_add_msr_filter(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_msr_filter_range *user_range)
+{
+	struct msr_bitmap_range *ranges = kvm->arch.msr_filter.ranges;
+	struct msr_bitmap_range range;
+	unsigned long *bitmap = NULL;
+	size_t bitmap_size;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!user_range->nmsrs)
+		return 0;
+
+	bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(user_range->nmsrs) * sizeof(long);
+	if (!bitmap_size || bitmap_size > KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	bitmap = memdup_user((__user u8*)user_range->bitmap, bitmap_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(bitmap))
+		return PTR_ERR(bitmap);
+
+	range = (struct msr_bitmap_range) {
+		.flags = user_range->flags,
+		.base = user_range->base,
+		.nmsrs = user_range->nmsrs,
+		.bitmap = bitmap,
+	};
+
+	if (range.flags & ~(KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ | KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!range.flags) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Everything ok, add this range identifier to our global pool */
+	ranges[kvm->arch.msr_filter.count] = range;
+	/* Make sure we filled the array before we tell anyone to walk it */
+	smp_wmb();
+	kvm->arch.msr_filter.count++;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	kfree(bitmap);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_msr_filter __user *user_msr_filter = argp;
+	struct kvm_msr_filter filter;
+	bool default_allow;
+	int r = 0;
+	u32 i;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&filter, user_msr_filter, sizeof(filter)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	kvm_clear_msr_filter(kvm);
+
+	default_allow = !(filter.flags & KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY);
+	kvm->arch.msr_filter.default_allow = default_allow;
+
+	/*
+	 * Protect from concurrent calls to this function that could trigger
+	 * a TOCTOU violation on kvm->arch.msr_filter.count.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(filter.ranges); i++) {
+		r = kvm_add_msr_filter(kvm, &filter.ranges[i]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		       unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -5440,6 +5574,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER:
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pmu_event_filter(kvm, argp);
 		break;
+	case KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER:
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_msr_filter(kvm, argp);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -ENOTTY;
 	}
@@ -8587,6 +8724,8 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
 		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu))
 			kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
+		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MSR_FILTER_CHANGED, vcpu))
+			kvm_x86_ops.msr_filter_changed(vcpu);
 	}
 
 	if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win) {
@@ -10139,6 +10278,8 @@ void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	u32 i;
+
 	if (current->mm == kvm->mm) {
 		/*
 		 * Free memory regions allocated on behalf of userspace,
@@ -10155,6 +10296,8 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 	if (kvm_x86_ops.vm_destroy)
 		kvm_x86_ops.vm_destroy(kvm);
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm->arch.msr_filter.count; i++)
+		kfree(kvm->arch.msr_filter.ranges[i].bitmap);
 	kvm_pic_destroy(kvm);
 	kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
 	kvm_free_vcpus(kvm);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 8bd9baaa9eb3..be2014379329 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ struct kvm_run {
 			__u8 error; /* user -> kernel */
 			__u8 pad[7];
 #define KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL	(1 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER	(1 << 1)
 			__u32 reason; /* kernel -> user */
 			__u32 index; /* kernel -> user */
 			__u64 data; /* kernel <-> user */
@@ -1049,6 +1050,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_S390_DIAG318 186
 #define KVM_CAP_STEAL_TIME 187
 #define KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR 188
+#define KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER 189
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
@@ -1550,6 +1552,9 @@ struct kvm_pv_cmd {
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED */
 #define KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND		_IOWR(KVMIO, 0xc5, struct kvm_pv_cmd)
 
+/* Available with KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER */
+#define KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER	_IOW(KVMIO,  0xc6, struct kvm_msr_filter)
+
 /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */
 enum sev_cmd_id {
 	/* Guest initialization commands */
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling
  2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-16 20:29 ` Alexander Graf
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2020-09-16 20:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm list
  Cc: Sean Christopherson, Aaron Lewis, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

Now that we have the ability to handle MSRs from user space and also to
select which ones we do want to prevent in-kernel KVM code from handling,
let's add a selftest to show case and verify the API.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>

---

v2 -> v3:

  - s/KVM_CAP_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST/KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_ALLOWLIST/g
  - Add test to clear whitelist
  - Adjust to reply-less API
  - Fix asserts
  - Actually trap on MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL writes

v5 -> v6:

  - Adapt to new ioctl API
  - Check for passthrough MSRs
  - Check for filter exit reason
  - Add .gitignore

v6 -> v7:

  - trap on KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER as well
  - fix asserts
  - add test for invalid msr handling
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore        |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c      | 247 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 249 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
index 452787152748..307ceaadbbb9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 /x86_64/set_sregs_test
 /x86_64/smm_test
 /x86_64/state_test
+/x86_64/user_msr_test
 /x86_64/vmx_preemption_timer_test
 /x86_64/svm_vmcall_test
 /x86_64/sync_regs_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 4a166588d99f..80d5c348354c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_set_nested_state_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_tsc_adjust_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xss_msr_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/debug_regs
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/user_msr_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += clear_dirty_log_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += demand_paging_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..acc01214bb93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * tests for KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR and KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Amazon Inc.
+ *
+ * This is a functional test to verify that we can deflect MSR events
+ * into user space.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+
+#define VCPU_ID                  5
+
+static u32 msr_reads, msr_writes;
+
+static u8 bitmap_00000000[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE];
+static u8 bitmap_00000000_write[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE];
+static u8 bitmap_40000000[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE];
+static u8 bitmap_c0000000[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE];
+static u8 bitmap_c0000000_read[KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE];
+static u8 bitmap_deadbeef[1] = { 0x1 };
+
+static void deny_msr(uint8_t *bitmap, u32 msr)
+{
+	u32 idx = msr & (KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE - 1);
+
+	bitmap[idx / 8] &= ~(1 << (idx % 8));
+}
+
+static void prepare_bitmaps(void)
+{
+	memset(bitmap_00000000, 0xff, sizeof(bitmap_00000000));
+	memset(bitmap_00000000_write, 0xff, sizeof(bitmap_00000000_write));
+	memset(bitmap_40000000, 0xff, sizeof(bitmap_40000000));
+	memset(bitmap_c0000000, 0xff, sizeof(bitmap_c0000000));
+	memset(bitmap_c0000000_read, 0xff, sizeof(bitmap_c0000000_read));
+
+	deny_msr(bitmap_00000000_write, MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL);
+	deny_msr(bitmap_c0000000_read, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
+	deny_msr(bitmap_c0000000_read, MSR_GS_BASE);
+}
+
+struct kvm_msr_filter filter = {
+	.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY,
+	.ranges = {
+		{
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ,
+			.base = 0x00000000,
+			.nmsrs = KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_00000000,
+		}, {
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE,
+			.base = 0x00000000,
+			.nmsrs = KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_00000000_write,
+		}, {
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ | KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE,
+			.base = 0x40000000,
+			.nmsrs = KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_40000000,
+		}, {
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ,
+			.base = 0xc0000000,
+			.nmsrs = KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_c0000000_read,
+		}, {
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE,
+			.base = 0xc0000000,
+			.nmsrs = KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_c0000000,
+		}, {
+			.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE | KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ,
+			.base = 0xdeadbeef,
+			.nmsrs = 1,
+			.bitmap = bitmap_deadbeef,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+struct kvm_msr_filter no_filter = {
+	.flags = KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW,
+};
+
+static void guest_msr_calls(bool trapped)
+{
+	/* This goes into the in-kernel emulation */
+	wrmsr(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, 0);
+
+	if (trapped) {
+		/* This goes into user space emulation */
+		GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK) == MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
+		GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_GS_BASE) == MSR_GS_BASE);
+	} else {
+		GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK) != MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
+		GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_GS_BASE) != MSR_GS_BASE);
+	}
+
+	/* If trapped == true, this goes into user space emulation */
+	wrmsr(MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL, 0x1234);
+
+	/* This goes into the in-kernel emulation */
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL);
+
+	/* Invalid MSR, should always be handled by user space exit */
+	GUEST_ASSERT(rdmsr(0xdeadbeef) == 0xdeadbeef);
+	wrmsr(0xdeadbeef, 0x1234);
+}
+
+static void guest_code(void)
+{
+	guest_msr_calls(true);
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable msr filtering, so that the kernel
+	 * handles everything in the next round
+	 */
+	GUEST_SYNC(0);
+
+	guest_msr_calls(false);
+
+	GUEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static int handle_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct ucall uc;
+
+	switch (get_ucall(vm, VCPU_ID, &uc)) {
+	case UCALL_ABORT:
+		TEST_FAIL("Guest assertion not met");
+		break;
+	case UCALL_SYNC:
+		vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER, &no_filter);
+		break;
+	case UCALL_DONE:
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		TEST_FAIL("Unknown ucall %lu", uc.cmd);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void handle_rdmsr(struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+	run->msr.data = run->msr.index;
+	msr_reads++;
+
+	if (run->msr.index == MSR_SYSCALL_MASK ||
+	    run->msr.index == MSR_GS_BASE) {
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.reason == KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER,
+			    "MSR read trap w/o access fault");
+	}
+
+	if (run->msr.index == 0xdeadbeef) {
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.reason == KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL,
+			    "MSR deadbeef read trap w/o inval fault");
+	}
+}
+
+static void handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+	/* ignore */
+	msr_writes++;
+
+	if (run->msr.index == MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL) {
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.data == 0x1234,
+			    "MSR data for MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL incorrect");
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.reason == KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER,
+			    "MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL trap w/o access fault");
+	}
+
+	if (run->msr.index == 0xdeadbeef) {
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.data == 0x1234,
+			    "MSR data for deadbeef incorrect");
+		TEST_ASSERT(run->msr.reason == KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL,
+			    "deadbeef trap w/o inval fault");
+	}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	struct kvm_enable_cap cap = {
+		.cap = KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR,
+		.args[0] = KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_INVAL |
+			   KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER,
+	};
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	struct kvm_run *run;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Tell stdout not to buffer its content */
+	setbuf(stdout, NULL);
+
+	/* Create VM */
+	vm = vm_create_default(VCPU_ID, 0, guest_code);
+	vcpu_set_cpuid(vm, VCPU_ID, kvm_get_supported_cpuid());
+	run = vcpu_state(vm, VCPU_ID);
+
+	rc = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR);
+	TEST_ASSERT(rc, "KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR is available");
+	vm_enable_cap(vm, &cap);
+
+	rc = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER);
+	TEST_ASSERT(rc, "KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER is available");
+
+	prepare_bitmaps();
+	vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER, &filter);
+
+	while (1) {
+		rc = _vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+
+		TEST_ASSERT(rc == 0, "vcpu_run failed: %d\n", rc);
+
+		switch (run->exit_reason) {
+		case KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR:
+			handle_rdmsr(run);
+			break;
+		case KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR:
+			handle_wrmsr(run);
+			break;
+		case KVM_EXIT_IO:
+			if (handle_ucall(vm))
+				goto done;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	}
+
+done:
+	TEST_ASSERT(msr_reads == 4, "Handled 4 rdmsr in user space");
+	TEST_ASSERT(msr_writes == 3, "Handled 3 wrmsr in user space");
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.28.0.394.ge197136389




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering
  2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering Alexander Graf
@ 2020-09-17 21:03   ` Aaron Lewis
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Aaron Lewis @ 2020-09-17 21:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alexander Graf
  Cc: kvm list, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Jonathan Corbet,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov, Wanpeng Li, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
	KarimAllah Raslan, Dan Carpenter, linux-doc, linux-kernel

+4.126 KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
+:Architectures: x86
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_msr_filter
+:Returns: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+
+::
+
+  struct kvm_msr_filter_range {
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ  (1 << 0)
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE (1 << 1)
+       __u32 flags;
+       __u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in bitmap */
+       __u32 base;  /* MSR index the bitmap starts at */
+       __u8 *bitmap; /* a 1 bit allows the operations in flags, 0 denies */
+  };
+
+  struct kvm_msr_filter {
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW (0 << 0)
+  #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY  (1 << 0)
+       __u32 flags;
+       struct kvm_msr_filter_range ranges[16];

Can we replace 16 with something more meaningful.  Prehaps
KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_RANGES.

+  };
+
+flags values:
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ
+
+  Filter read accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+  indicates that a read should immediately fail, while a 1 indicates that
+  a read should be handled like without the filter.

nit: not sure you need 'like without the filter'

+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE
+
+  Filter write accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0 in the bitmap
+  indicates that a write should immediately fail, while a 1 indicates that
+  a write should be handled like without the filter.

nit: again, not sure you need 'like without the filter'

+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ | KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE
+
+  Filter booth read and write accesses to MSRs using the given bitmap. A 0

nit: replace 'booth' for 'both'

+  in the bitmap indicates that both reads and writes should immediately fail,
+  while a 1 indicates that reads and writes should be handled like without
+  the filter.

nit: again, not sure you need 'like without the filter'

+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW
+
+  If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+  fall back to allowing access to the MSR.
+
+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY
+
+  If no filter range matches an MSR index that is getting accessed, KVM will
+  fall back to rejecting access to the MSR. In this mode, all MSRs that should
+  be processed by KVM need to explicitly be marked as allowed in the bitmaps.
+
+This ioctl allows user space to define a up to 16 bitmaps of MSR ranges to

nit: "define up to" remove 'a'

+specify whether a certain MSR access should be explicitly rejected or not.
+
+If this ioctl has never been invoked, MSR accesses are not guarded and the
+old KVM in-kernel emulation behavior is fully preserved.
+
+As soon as the filtering is in place, every MSR access is precessed through

nit: processed

+the filtering. If a bit is within one of the defined ranges, read and write
+accesses are guarded by the bitmap's value for the MSR index. If it is not
+defined in any range, whether MSR access is rejected is determined by the flags
+field of in the kvm_msr_filter struct: KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW and

nit: remove 'of' or 'in'

+KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY.
+
+Calling this ioctl with an empty set of ranges (all nmsrs == 0) disables MSR
+filtering. In that mode, KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY no longer has any effect.


+struct msr_bitmap_range {
+       u32 flags;
+       u32 nmsrs;
+       u32 base;
+       unsigned long *bitmap;
+};
+
 enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
        KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE,
        KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL,       /* created with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP */
@@ -964,6 +972,12 @@ struct kvm_arch {
        /* Deflect RDMSR and WRMSR to user space when they trigger a #GP */
        u32 user_space_msr_mask;

+       struct {
+               u8 count;
+               bool default_allow:1;
+               struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16];

Replace 16 with macro

+       } msr_filter;
+
        struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
        struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 50650cfd235a..66bba91e1bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -192,8 +192,25 @@ struct kvm_msr_list {
        __u32 indices[0];
 };

-#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_READ  (1 << 0)
-#define KVM_MSR_ALLOW_WRITE (1 << 1)
+/* Maximum size of any access bitmap in bytes */
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_BITMAP_SIZE 0x600

Add a macro.  Prehaps, #define KVM_MSR_FILTER_MAX_RANGES 16

+
+/* for KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER */
+struct kvm_msr_filter_range {
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ  (1 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE (1 << 1)
+       __u32 flags;
+       __u32 nmsrs; /* number of msrs in bitmap */
+       __u32 base;  /* MSR index the bitmap starts at */
+       __u8 *bitmap; /* a 1 bit allows the operations in flags, 0 denies */
+};
+
+struct kvm_msr_filter {
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_ALLOW (0 << 0)
+#define KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY  (1 << 0)
+       __u32 flags;
+       struct kvm_msr_filter_range ranges[16];

Replace 16 with macro

+};

 struct kvm_cpuid_entry {
        __u32 function;

@@ -3603,6 +3639,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm
*kvm, long ext)
        case KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG:
        case KVM_CAP_LAST_CPU:
        case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
+       case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
                r = 1;
                break;
        case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
@@ -5134,6 +5171,103 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
        return r;
 }

+static void kvm_clear_msr_filter(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+       u32 i;
+       u32 count = kvm->arch.msr_filter.count;
+       struct msr_bitmap_range ranges[16];

Replace 16 with macro

+
+       mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+       kvm->arch.msr_filter.count = 0;
+       memcpy(ranges, kvm->arch.msr_filter.ranges, count * sizeof(ranges[0]));
+       mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+       synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu);
+
+       for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+               kfree(ranges[i].bitmap);
+}

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2020-09-17 21:03 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-09-16 20:29 [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filtering Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] KVM: x86: Prepare MSR bitmaps for userspace tracked MSRs Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] KVM: x86: SVM: Prevent MSR passthrough when MSR access is denied Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] KVM: x86: VMX: " Alexander Graf
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filtering Alexander Graf
2020-09-17 21:03   ` Aaron Lewis
2020-09-16 20:29 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf

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