From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] bpf: Check xattr name/value pair from bpf_lsm_inode_init_security()
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 10:14:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAADnVQKD5e9vKsSo1TPeBm5hr6j4GzQeHqRURoBJyB++VOwHCw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <34357c96-fe58-ffe5-e464-4bded8f119d5@huaweicloud.com>
On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 1:42 AM Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>
> On 10/26/2022 8:37 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 7:58 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 10/25/2022 12:43 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> >>> On Mon, 2022-10-24 at 19:13 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >>>> I'm looking at security_inode_init_security() and it is indeed messy.
> >>>> Per file system initxattrs callback that processes kmalloc-ed
> >>>> strings.
> >>>> Yikes.
> >>>>
> >>>> In the short term we should denylist inode_init_security hook to
> >>>> disallow attaching bpf-lsm there. set/getxattr should be done
> >>>> through kfuncs instead of such kmalloc-a-string hack.
> >>> Inode_init_security is an example. It could be that the other hooks are
> >>> affected too. What happens if they get arbitrary positive values too?
> >>
> >> TL;DR - Things will go cattywampus.
> >>
> >> The LSM infrastructure is an interface that has "grown organically",
> >> and isn't necessarily consistent in what it requires of the security
> >> module implementations. There are cases where it assumes that the
> >> security module hooks are well behaved, as you've discovered. I have
> >> no small amount of fear that someone is going to provide an eBPF
> >> program for security_secid_to_secctx(). There has been an assumption,
> >> oft stated, that all security modules are going to be reviewed as
> >> part of the upstream process. The review process ought to catch hooks
> >> that return unacceptable values. Alas, we've lost that with BPF.
> >>
> >> It would take a(nother) major overhaul of the LSM infrastructure to
> >> make it safe against hooks that are not well behaved. From what I have
> >> seen so far it wouldn't be easy/convenient/performant to do it in the
> >> BPF security module either. I personally think that BPF needs to
> >> ensure that the eBPF implementations don't return inappropriate values,
> >> but I understand why that is problematic.
> >
> > That's an accurate statement. Thank you.
> >
> > Going back to the original question...
> > We fix bugs when we discover them.
> > Regardless of the subsystem they belong to.
> > No finger pointing.
>
> I'm concerned about the following situation:
>
> struct <something> *function()
> {
>
> ret = security_*();
> if (ret)
> return ERR_PTR(ret);
>
> }
>
> int caller()
> {
> ptr = function()
> if (IS_ERR(ptr)
> goto out;
>
> <use of invalid pointer>
> }
>
> I quickly found an occurrence of this:
>
> static int lookup_one_common()
> {
>
> [...]
>
> return inode_permission();
> }
>
> struct dentry *try_lookup_one_len()
> {
>
> [...]
>
> err = lookup_one_common(&init_user_ns, name, base, len, &this);
> if (err)
> return ERR_PTR(err);
>
>
> Unfortunately, attaching to inode_permission causes the kernel
> to crash immediately (it does not happen with negative return
> values).
>
> So, I think the fix should be broader, and not limited to the
> inode_init_security hook. Will try to see how it can be fixed.
I see. Let's restrict bpf-lsm return values to IS_ERR_VALUE.
Trivial verifier change.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-26 17:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-21 16:46 [RFC][PATCH] bpf: Check xattr name/value pair from bpf_lsm_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu
2022-10-23 23:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-10-24 9:25 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-24 15:28 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-25 2:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-10-25 7:43 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-25 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-26 6:37 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-10-26 8:42 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-26 17:14 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2022-10-27 10:39 ` KP Singh
2022-10-27 15:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-28 8:48 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-28 15:01 ` Casey Schaufler
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