From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 mm 08/13] kasan, mm: optimize krealloc poisoning
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:24:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAeHK+xHnAVbVOF_wuk3+K5Dy2K2i0NTi+_fZfGX-KHXubRW4A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCEW4SNDDERCWd7f@elver.google.com>
On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 11:48 AM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:34PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> > Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole
> > object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc()
> > repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer.
> >
> > This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented
> > __ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos()
> > is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone.
> >
> > For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables
> > KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead
> > of unpoisoning it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
>
> Clarification below.
>
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/common.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> > mm/slab_common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
> > 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index 7ea643f7e69c..a8a67dca5e55 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> >
> > /*
> > * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
> > - * kmalloc() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> > + * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> > */
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> >
> > /*
> > * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
> > - * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> > + * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> > */
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -554,8 +554,16 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> > if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
> > return (void *)object;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Unpoison the object's data.
> > + * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
> > + * how big that part is.
> > + */
> > + kasan_unpoison(object, size);
> > +
> > page = virt_to_head_page(object);
> >
> > + /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
> > if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> > return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
> > else
> > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> > index dad70239b54c..60a2f49df6ce 100644
> > --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> > @@ -1140,19 +1140,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
> > void *ret;
> > size_t ks;
> >
> > - if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
> > - return NULL;
> > -
> > - ks = ksize(p);
> > + /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
> > + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
> > + if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
> > + return NULL;
>
> Just checking: Check byte returns true if the object is not tracked by KASAN, right? I.e. if it's a KFENCE object, kasan_check_byte() always returns true.
kasan_check_byte() still performs the check, but since KFENCE objects
are never poisoned, the check always passes.
Thanks!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-09 13:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-05 17:34 [PATCH v3 mm 00/13] kasan: optimizations and fixes for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 01/13] kasan, mm: don't save alloc stacks twice Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 02/13] kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 03/13] kasan: optimize large " Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 04/13] kasan: clean up setting free info in kasan_slab_free Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 05/13] kasan: unify large kfree checks Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 06/13] kasan: rework krealloc tests Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 07/13] kasan, mm: fail krealloc on freed objects Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 08/13] kasan, mm: optimize krealloc poisoning Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-08 10:48 ` Marco Elver
2021-02-09 13:24 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 09/13] kasan: ensure poisoning size alignment Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 10/13] arm64: kasan: simplify and inline MTE functions Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 11/13] kasan: inline HW_TAGS helper functions Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-08 11:04 ` Marco Elver
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 12/13] arm64: kasan: export MTE symbols for KASAN tests Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-05 17:34 ` [PATCH v3 mm 13/13] kasan: clarify that only first bug is reported in HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-08 11:06 ` Marco Elver
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CAAeHK+xHnAVbVOF_wuk3+K5Dy2K2i0NTi+_fZfGX-KHXubRW4A@mail.gmail.com \
--to=andreyknvl@google.com \
--cc=Branislav.Rankov@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=elver@google.com \
--cc=eugenis@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=pcc@google.com \
--cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).