From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration.
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 19:08:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABayD+fxrRVR2An2wKA4uf99NtScWvAAvv4UdoE_vsSFpe8KxQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <697cbb9301acf18296b65bb63686b6c0d422e382.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 2:21 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>
> Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel
> specific page encryption status settings before we load a
> new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete
> page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the
> UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
>
> The host's page encryption bitmap is maintained for the
> guest to keep the encrypted/decrypted state of the guest pages,
> therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as
> encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> index 4b29815de873..a8bc30d5b15b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
> #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
> #include <asm/tlb.h>
> #include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h>
> +#include <asm/e820/api.h>
>
> static int kvmapf = 1;
>
> @@ -358,6 +359,33 @@ static void kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused)
> */
> if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
> wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0);
> + /*
> + * Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel
> + * specific page encryption status settings before we load a
> + * new kernel by kexec. NOTE: We cannot reset the complete
> + * page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the
> + * UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
> + */
> + if (sev_live_migration_enabled() & (smp_processor_id() == 0)) {
> + int i;
> + unsigned long nr_pages;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) {
> + struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i];
> + unsigned long start_pfn;
> + unsigned long end_pfn;
> +
> + if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
> + continue;
What should the behavior be for other memory types that are not
expected to be mucked with by firmware? Should we avoid resetting the
enc status of pmem/pram pages?
My intuition here is that we should only preserve the enc status of
those bits that are set by the firmware.
> +
> + start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + end_pfn = (entry->addr + entry->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS,
> + entry->addr, nr_pages, 1);
> + }
> + }
> kvm_pv_disable_apf();
> kvm_disable_steal_time();
> }
> --
> 2.17.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-30 2:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-05 21:13 [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 01/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 02/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:48 ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 03/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:51 ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 04/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:52 ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 05/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 06/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 07/18] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 08/18] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:05 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 09/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:05 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 10/18] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:06 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:06 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for static allocation of unified Page Encryption Bitmap Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-30 5:49 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 11:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 21:38 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-06 10:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-05 21:19 ` [PATCH v8 13/18] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-12-04 11:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 16:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-04 17:08 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 17:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-06 10:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-06 14:09 ` Kalra, Ashish
2020-12-04 18:06 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 18:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-04 18:48 ` Kalra, Ashish
2020-12-04 19:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-04 21:42 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 14/18] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:07 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-30 5:51 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 15/18] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 16/18] KVM: x86: Mark _bss_decrypted section variables as decrypted in page encryption bitmap Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:21 ` [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:08 ` Steve Rutherford [this message]
2020-05-05 21:22 ` [PATCH v8 18/18] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV live migration feature implicitly on Incoming VM(s) Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30 2:09 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-12-04 11:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 11:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 21:46 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-06 10:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-18 19:07 ` [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2020-06-01 20:02 ` Steve Rutherford
2020-06-03 22:14 ` Ashish Kalra
2020-08-05 18:29 ` Steve Rutherford
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