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From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration.
Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 19:08:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABayD+fxrRVR2An2wKA4uf99NtScWvAAvv4UdoE_vsSFpe8KxQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <697cbb9301acf18296b65bb63686b6c0d422e382.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 2:21 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>
> Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel
> specific page encryption status settings before we load a
> new kernel by kexec. We cannot reset the complete
> page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the
> UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
>
> The host's page encryption bitmap is maintained for the
> guest to keep the encrypted/decrypted state of the guest pages,
> therefore we need to explicitly mark all shared pages as
> encrypted again before rebooting into the new guest kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> index 4b29815de873..a8bc30d5b15b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>  #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
>  #include <asm/tlb.h>
>  #include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h>
> +#include <asm/e820/api.h>
>
>  static int kvmapf = 1;
>
> @@ -358,6 +359,33 @@ static void kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused)
>          */
>         if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI))
>                 wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN, 0);
> +       /*
> +        * Reset the host's page encryption bitmap related to kernel
> +        * specific page encryption status settings before we load a
> +        * new kernel by kexec. NOTE: We cannot reset the complete
> +        * page encryption bitmap here as we need to retain the
> +        * UEFI/OVMF firmware specific settings.
> +        */
> +       if (sev_live_migration_enabled() & (smp_processor_id() == 0)) {
> +               int i;
> +               unsigned long nr_pages;
> +
> +               for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) {
> +                       struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i];
> +                       unsigned long start_pfn;
> +                       unsigned long end_pfn;
> +
> +                       if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
> +                               continue;
What should the behavior be for other memory types that are not
expected to be mucked with by firmware? Should we avoid resetting the
enc status of pmem/pram pages?

My intuition here is that we should only preserve the enc status of
those bits that are set by the firmware.

> +
> +                       start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +                       end_pfn = (entry->addr + entry->size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +                       nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +                       kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS,
> +                                          entry->addr, nr_pages, 1);
> +               }
> +       }
>         kvm_pv_disable_apf();
>         kvm_disable_steal_time();
>  }
> --
> 2.17.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-30  2:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-05 21:13 [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 01/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:14 ` [PATCH v8 02/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:48   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 03/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:51   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 04/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 22:52   ` Venu Busireddy
2020-05-05 21:15 ` [PATCH v8 05/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 06/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:16 ` [PATCH v8 07/18] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 08/18] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:05   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 09/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:05   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:17 ` [PATCH v8 10/18] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:06   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/18] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:06   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for static allocation of unified Page Encryption Bitmap Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:07   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-30  5:49     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 11:08   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 21:38     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-06 10:19       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-05 21:19 ` [PATCH v8 13/18] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:07   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-12-04 11:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 16:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-04 17:08       ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 17:23         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-06 10:57           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-06 14:09             ` Kalra, Ashish
2020-12-04 18:06       ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-04 18:41         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-04 18:48           ` Kalra, Ashish
2020-12-04 19:02           ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-04 21:42     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 14/18] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:07   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-30  5:51     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 15/18] KVM: x86: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:08   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:20 ` [PATCH v8 16/18] KVM: x86: Mark _bss_decrypted section variables as decrypted in page encryption bitmap Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:08   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-05-05 21:21 ` [PATCH v8 17/18] KVM: x86: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:08   ` Steve Rutherford [this message]
2020-05-05 21:22 ` [PATCH v8 18/18] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV live migration feature implicitly on Incoming VM(s) Ashish Kalra
2020-05-30  2:09   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-12-04 11:11   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 11:22   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-04 21:46     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-12-06 10:18       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-18 19:07 ` [PATCH v8 00/18] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2020-06-01 20:02   ` Steve Rutherford
2020-06-03 22:14     ` Ashish Kalra
2020-08-05 18:29       ` Steve Rutherford

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