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From: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Natarajan  <>
To: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan  <>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <>,
	Ingo Molnar <>, Borislav Petkov <>,
	Peter Zijlstra <>,
	Andy Lutomirski <>, Peter H Anvin <>,
	Dave Hansen <>,
	Tony Luck <>,
	Dan Williams <>,
	Andi Kleen <>,
	Kirill Shutemov <>,
	Sean Christopherson <>,,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] Add TDX Guest Support (Initial support)
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:22:06 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

Hi x86 maintainers,

On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 3:58 PM Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<> wrote:
> Hi All,
> Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect guest VMs from malicious
> hosts and some physical attacks. This series adds the basic TDX guest
> infrastructure support (including #VE handler support, and #VE support
> for halt and CPUID). This is just a subset of patches in the bare minimum
> TDX support patch list which is required for supporting minimal
> functional TDX guest. Other basic feature features like #VE support for
> IO, MMIO, boot optimization fixes and shared-mm support will be submitted
> in a separate patch set. To make reviewing easier we split it into smaller
> series. This series alone is not necessarily fully functional.
> Also, the host-side support patches, and support for advanced TD guest
> features like attestation or debug-mode will be submitted at a later time.
> Also, at this point it is not secure with some known holes in drivers, and
> also hasn’t been fully audited and fuzzed yet.
> TDX has a lot of similarities to SEV. It enhances confidentiality and
> of guest memory and state (like registers) and includes a new exception
> (#VE) for the same basic reasons as SEV-ES. Like SEV-SNP (not merged
> yet), TDX limits the host's ability to effect changes in the guest
> physical address space. With TDX the host cannot access the guest memory,
> so various functionality that would normally be done in KVM has moved
> into a (paravirtualized) guest. Partially this is done using the
> Virtualization Exception (#VE) and partially with direct paravirtual hooks.
> The TDX architecture also includes a new CPU mode called
> Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM). The software (TDX module) running in this
> mode arbitrates interactions between host and guest and implements many of
> the guarantees of the TDX architecture.
> Some of the key differences between TD and regular VM is,
> 1. Multi CPU bring-up is done using the ACPI MADT wake-up table.
> 2. A new #VE exception handler is added. The TDX module injects #VE exception
>    to the guest TD in cases of instructions that need to be emulated, disallowed
>    MSR accesses, etc.
> 3. By default memory is marked as private, and TD will selectively share it with
>    VMM based on need.
> Note that the kernel will also need to be hardened against low level inputs from
> the now untrusted hosts. This will be done in follow on patches.
> You can find TDX related documents in the following link.
> Changes since v1 (v2 is partial set submission):
>  * Patch titled "x86/x86: Add early_is_tdx_guest() interface" is moved
>    out of this series.
>  * Rest of the change log is added per patch.

I have submitted the following list of TDX patch series 2-3 weeks back, and so
far we only received feedback for a few patches in sets 1 and 4 (from Boris &
Tom Lendacky). So, I was curious if you were planning on taking a look at
other sets of patch series in this submission or were waiting for new
revisions? Please let me know your comments.

sets 1-4 are core sets of patches that add TDX guest support.
set 4+ adds extra TDX features support.

Add TDX Guest Support (Initial support) [set 1] (currently v3 version)

Add TDX Guest Support (#VE handler support) [set 2] (currently v2 version)

Add TDX Guest Support (boot fixes) [set 3] (currently v2 version)

Add TDX Guest Support (shared-mm support) [set 4] (currently v2 version)

Add TDX Guest Support (Debug support) [set 5] (currently v1 version)

Add TDX Guest Support (Attestation support) [set 6] (currently v1 version)

Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer

      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-30 23:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-18 22:57 [PATCH v3 00/11] Add TDX Guest Support (Initial support) Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] x86/paravirt: Move halt paravirt calls under CONFIG_PARAVIRT Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] x86/tdx: Introduce INTEL_TDX_GUEST config option Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-19 11:59   ` Juergen Gross
2021-06-19 17:11     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/cpufeatures: Add TDX Guest CPU feature Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 23:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-19  0:13     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-19  6:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-15 11:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-07-19  5:10     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] x86: Introduce generic protected guest abstraction Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-24 15:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 17:58     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-28 17:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-28 18:59     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-28 19:14     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-29 19:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] x86/tdx: Get TD execution environment information via TDINFO Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] x86/tdx: Add HLT " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] x86/tdx: Add MSR support for TDX guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-18 22:57 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-30 23:22 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Natarajan [this message]

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