From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 01/10] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 16:57:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+aBpeQYOWGrCoaJ=HAa0BsSekyL88kcLBTGwc--C+Ch0w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200907134055.2878499-2-elver@google.com>
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:41 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> +config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
> + int "Number of guarded objects available"
> + default 255
> + range 1 65535
> + help
> + The number of guarded objects available. For each KFENCE object, 2
> + pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
> + ones used as guard pages.
Hi Marco,
Wonder if you tested build/boot with KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS=65535? Can a
compiler create such a large object?
> +config KFENCE_FAULT_INJECTION
> + int "Fault injection for stress testing"
> + default 0
> + depends on EXPERT
> + help
> + The inverse probability with which to randomly protect KFENCE object
> + pages, resulting in spurious use-after-frees. The main purpose of
> + this option is to stress-test KFENCE with concurrent error reports
> + and allocations/frees. A value of 0 disables fault injection.
I would name this differently. "FAULT_INJECTION" is already taken for
a different thing, so it's a bit confusing.
KFENCE_DEBUG_SOMETHING may be a better name.
It would also be good to make it very clear in the short description
that this is for testing of KFENCE itself. When I configure syzbot I
routinely can't figure out if various DEBUG configs detect user
errors, or enable additional unit tests, or something else.
Maybe it should depend on DEBUG_KERNEL as well?
> +/*
> + * Get the canary byte pattern for @addr. Use a pattern that varies based on the
> + * lower 3 bits of the address, to detect memory corruptions with higher
> + * probability, where similar constants are used.
> + */
> +#define KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr) ((u8)0xaa ^ (u8)((unsigned long)addr & 0x7))
(addr) in macro body
> + seq_con_printf(seq,
> + "kfence-#%zd [0x" PTR_FMT "-0x" PTR_FMT
PTR_FMT is only used in this file, should it be declared in report.c?
Please post example reports somewhere. It's hard to figure out all
details of the reporting/formatting.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-10 20:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-07 13:40 [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 01/10] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure Marco Elver
2020-09-07 15:41 ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-09-07 16:38 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 14:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2020-09-10 15:06 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:48 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 16:22 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:42 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 16:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-10 17:11 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 17:41 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 20:25 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-09-15 13:57 ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-15 14:14 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 14:26 ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 02/10] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86 Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64 Marco Elver
2020-09-09 15:13 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Marco Elver
2020-09-11 7:17 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 12:24 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 05/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 06/10] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN Marco Elver
2020-09-11 7:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:00 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 07/10] kfence, kmemleak: make KFENCE compatible with KMEMLEAK Marco Elver
2020-09-08 11:53 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-08 12:29 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 08/10] kfence, lockdep: make KFENCE compatible with lockdep Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 09/10] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation Marco Elver
2020-09-07 15:33 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 16:33 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 17:55 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 18:16 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:54 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 16:14 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 7:14 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 7:46 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 10/10] kfence: add test suite Marco Elver
2020-09-08 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 12:16 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 14:40 ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 15:21 ` Marco Elver
[not found] ` <e399d8d5-03c2-3c13-2a43-3bb8e842c55a@intel.com>
2020-09-08 15:31 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:36 ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 15:56 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 7:35 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 12:03 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:33 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 16:33 ` Marco Elver
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