From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 14:47:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJute8aakro+Cb7oNrxgCiZTYj2BOt2WMc1dYF-xktxBucQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190718194415.108476-20-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 12:45 PM Matthew Garrett
<matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
> parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
> dma buffers and other types).
>
> Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Jessica, any feedback on this?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-29 21:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-18 19:43 [PATCH V36 00/29] security: Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-29 21:47 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 21:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 21:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-29 21:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-25 2:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-30 18:47 ` [PATCH] " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31 1:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
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