From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CC0BC10F03 for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 03:33:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55084218EA for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 03:33:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="VXH2nYGz" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729481AbfCADd3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2019 22:33:29 -0500 Received: from mail-io1-f68.google.com ([209.85.166.68]:45978 "EHLO mail-io1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727753AbfCADd3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2019 22:33:29 -0500 Received: by mail-io1-f68.google.com with SMTP id x9so18444381iog.12 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 19:33:28 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=GtFvcteIBJq3dYSU1h9ov8iTU+O9WXT4b1Ku5DaUd0w=; b=VXH2nYGzuptscs7Fi4efQlx/r+cyna9QZXwaSg4rMz9AxSl9/Ehdtwpe4teyPs/qdy rc2Y4LKBegDyBC0E43GDNfna6kWvvA4NngkXrHqB7Wp15yNUlvN6Nh5CpP3H/iwP3zPh I8nFNir6284yHc/TvfVVvw4jYsR3guVNvL5TCah6YngTBf4Slm+t0rWNIPZcuY7fK4FR 9cd7gubpIrrk0rA1z/xrYjuQepAkTjZwi3d48W73JZNPl86xgFAM71znC9GoCBeg0MR1 DRrzonpU6222sy7XhhzWY/1USFNCfz36OqPRl/ZCl7Bcf4Udquz/eITqHhPpS1tSmUds wtCA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=GtFvcteIBJq3dYSU1h9ov8iTU+O9WXT4b1Ku5DaUd0w=; b=e1N63RJf8kzjRryz05aI/jWC1xJ7+Dr+Sjc8Lk8atrWjB3qPn8AN5JpETCip4/svxQ WbLSHFeVmQa8DmMZ7ruclNfNzEYubJdVQQsmlA5Vx5sTHkRzI6gva+SrW/f3EHtaKH5P eXU4xRGtIXFCQB6T3vIjy57xRHA+TC/K0ivYiV7Y426WgXdaJHZTriY689jiikBlqRrJ C/OvJP4shpp6ZnN8jI4U6pjBh32aDIFgzfDyNnnhoChihPE9B71oGVuom6G+hLbqAD4h 0+RGtGutfkvyhbC0bFrLeJxBCdwYTffSnC4khrnS2nkZbkMoGuZwaPDnCYQAy3nle7w2 MVIg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWJboGMOskaHmQw6bFc3qCGZdAYIVmIuBK/PyCv+i2vX+mAZRCX U4OdAoD/bWYAAnCZsUEkKlFSpw02+nwykIwl1EMdIOkwmAd4Tg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyPENJJcQkJnxS6nB1jB8TSdoJmkbYn1a2eZoOmbzIaClwCmZeL3fRP/q0osC/tT4t3aVJTl0giuhpgkon/cb0= X-Received: by 2002:a5d:9254:: with SMTP id e20mr1601733iol.88.1551411207771; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 19:33:27 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1551392438.10911.227.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1551398720.10911.270.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1551404654.10911.276.camel@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <1551404654.10911.276.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 19:33:16 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches To: Mimi Zohar Cc: jmorris@namei.org, LSM List , Linux Kernel Mailing List , David Howells Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 5:45 PM Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for > > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures > > > from enabling "lock down". This just means that there needs to be > > > some coordination between the different signature verification > > > methods. [1][2] > > > > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible > > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do > > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to > > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before > > merging the patchset. > > That's simply not true. Have you even looked at the IMA architecture > patches? Sorry, I think we're talking at cross purposes - I was referring to your patch "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode" (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit/?h=efi-lock-down&id=7fa3734bd31a4b3fe71358fcba8d4878e5005b7f). If the goal is just to use the architecture rules then I don't see any conflict, and as far as I can tell things would just work as is if I drop the ima portion from "kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down"? Apologies, I'd thought that the secure_boot ruleset was still intended to be used in a lockdown environment.