From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79840C28CBC for ; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:37:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56EF22082E for ; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:37:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="b8R8BXxV" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730459AbgEFShE (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2020 14:37:04 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60848 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729757AbgEFShD (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2020 14:37:03 -0400 Received: from mail-il1-x142.google.com (mail-il1-x142.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::142]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 073B5C061A0F for ; Wed, 6 May 2020 11:37:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-il1-x142.google.com with SMTP id x2so347478ilp.13 for ; Wed, 06 May 2020 11:37:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=+SQS458OK5cEDlJQ1KUWYZtsylPRbVwiBUEmh5tlCnw=; b=b8R8BXxVNvZvYXXiTbMCsRpDZGgc3jvvenhNrJX604kungvLvVRc62AbdokVNOPwtL rsRXS/vrWau/KmBiRYzSlpvSep5rCgHY76rlEU+IaIWgxIJVQD8xU4qFhWi4h7jE3k4n kv6CoyiAlOzD0QtEJHJzwHXn5gozFcjpIgKgAqNJPzuZuYeyy8/i5bDL6JeF+8CjhowN pluwVl8T/69ZoZxC+VTWtoIheJZ+zPmaVgvIQAJFd8SJInmYqtuo6HjWHzJqLinVolMf FUQy4XZkxdOQbHwe870KHTZDpoGKtk3I2c2KBV9lhuwoJ1yHLT59BTow9I9fuSSxU1/s og7Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=+SQS458OK5cEDlJQ1KUWYZtsylPRbVwiBUEmh5tlCnw=; b=sKdSXyyfwpKEEKzYRzEQhyLIX1ThyIgoHDegtfarrwwAcqkx9yTc3E6o3mReLaeK4M jrEYVsWSGQgaMFPnz/e6PWICJnlAT/9yppI8CEdgPlSGI9KhQO74TzIIwT2EVkv2NOyQ m4hdtV0Ih8fE17IP4lOIIBa06rPV6NYf12Hnem6nJhk4YF6qmIyj8LTeBHp7Nyacf/vK QCfly8fmNB7YRq4HFT8LgPaiWy+5hGLjsrhCWZZutXaG7vKqxY3nQGC8apbm4QHKTKim AOj/5zYxMBlGlQggRhHBEF69NEdv3VoypOqtSVo6OjS83yO975IDE5+2hxOyKMPdw2L7 j3IQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AGi0Puah0ggNJxOLbG20kUhHbyM8l1lYlXS15rdEyIPuKA+0+h7vvkt6 OUGOEuUxFo5U5bkpjCji9vL3fkA9UM7GPYdVzOhh4Q== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypKxrod6BbhYUw9n6wJofRB8bXCS7KZdmIPqIP3eXq/lW+vUTQM0VHRaaNA1mibRTxoQfW+qS7CtmtAazGzb6bQ= X-Received: by 2002:a92:aa48:: with SMTP id j69mr10794636ili.16.1588790221975; Wed, 06 May 2020 11:37:01 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200504232132.23570-1-daniel.kiper@oracle.com> <20200504232132.23570-13-daniel.kiper@oracle.com> <20200506133306.xrzplgdt4cckgrqc@tomti.i.net-space.pl> In-Reply-To: <20200506133306.xrzplgdt4cckgrqc@tomti.i.net-space.pl> From: Matthew Garrett Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 11:36:49 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status to the Linux kernel To: Daniel Kiper Cc: The development of GNU GRUB , Linux Kernel Mailing List , trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, "the arch/x86 maintainers" , alexander.burmashev@oracle.com, Andrew Cooper , Ard Biesheuvel , "Daniel P. Smith" , eric.snowberg@oracle.com, Javier Martinez Canillas , kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com, lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com, michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com, "Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko" , pirot.krol@3mdeb.com, Peter Jones , Ross Philipson Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper wrote: > > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper wrote: > > > > > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various > > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot. > > > > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI > > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why > > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub? > > It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2]. > So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that. Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable.